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
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THE CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH

1897-1898





From a Photograph by Bassano.

GENERAL SIR WILLIAM LOCKHART, G.C.B., K.C.S.I.
Commander of the Tirah Expeditionary Force.

Frontispiece.

THE
CAMPAIGN IN TIRAH
1897-1898

AN ACCOUNT OF
THE EXPEDITION AGAINST THE
ORAKZAI'S AND AFRIDIS

UNDER
GENERAL SIR WILLIAM LOCKHART, G.C.B., K.C.S.I.

BASED (BY PERMISSION) ON LETTERS CONTRIBUTED TO
'THE TIMES'

BY

COLONEL H. D. HUTCHINSON


DIRECTOR OF MILITARY EDUCATION IN INDIA
AUTHOR OF 'THE STORY OF WATERLOO,' 'THE STORY OF 1812,' 'THE STORY OF
CORUNNA,' 'MILITARY SKETCHING MADE EASY,' ETC., ETC.

WITH MAPS, PLANS, AND ILLUSTRATIONS

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TO

**GENERAL SIR WILLIAM S. A. LOCKHART,
G.C.B., K.C.S.I.**

COMMANDER OF THE TIRAH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

P R E F A C E

I BELIEVE this narrative of the Tirah Expedition gives an accurate account of the operations, and I hope it will also be found a readable account. Its interest will certainly be enhanced by the reliable maps and plans which accompany it, and by the excellent illustrations, for which I am indebted to my friends Colonel More - Molyneux, Assistant Quartermaster-General for Intelligence, Lieutenant-Colonel C. Pulley, commanding the 3rd Gurkha Rifles, and others. These officers served with distinction in the expedition, and their pictures portray scenes in which they were themselves actors.

It has not been part of my plan to make any reference to the frontier policy of the Government of India. It is a policy of which it may be said, "*Quot homines, tot sententiae.*" Nothing, indeed, could be more striking than the fact that on this

great Imperial question, men whose knowledge of the subject, and experience, are equal, hold opinions absolutely opposed. It is, however, outside my province, or my purpose, even to approach the discussion which has recently attracted so much public attention. I have only, in my introductory chapters, following my usual practice when I write the story of a campaign, endeavoured to state so much of facts which are notorious as may enable the general reader to form his own conclusions as to the cause of the war, and "what they killed each other for."

H. D. HUTCHINSON, *Colonel.*

LONDON, 1st *September* 1898.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

*“Now tell us all about the war,
And what they killed each other for?”*

*“Why, that I cannot tell,” said he,
“But 'twas a famous victory!”*

I HAVE been through this campaign in Tirah myself; I have talked about it a great deal with friends; and I have read much that has been written about it in newspapers, books, and despatches. But I am quite sure that, even now that it is all over, if you button-hole ten intelligent men, and ask them “all about the war, and what they killed each other for?” you will get a different answer from each, and no two will agree in essential particulars!

This may seem an amazing assertion to make, but I am convinced it is not far outside the truth. We all know that the general object of the expedition launched by us against the Afridis and Orakzais was to exact reparation for their unprovoked aggres-

sion on the Peshawar - Kohat border, for their attacks on our frontier posts, and for the damage to life and property inflicted by these raids on British territory and British subjects. But that is only *our* view of the matter. We want to get behind this, and ascertain the *Afriди* view. Why did *they*, who had faithfully kept their agreements with us for sixteen long years, why did *they* rise against us, and commit these outrages? Were they altogether "unprovoked," as we so confidently assert? Besides, the Afridis and Orakzais were not the only tribes in arms against us in this momentous year. The Waziris, the Swatis, the Boners, the Mohmands, the Bajauris, and others, have all been on the war-path in 1897-98, in deadly earnest; and undoubtedly something more than a fanaticism fanned by frenzied Mullahs has been the cause of a conflagration so widely spread, so fierce, and so dangerous.

Before, then, I plunge *in medias res*, and recount the incidents of a campaign which took us into a wild and difficult and unknown country, and introduced our troops to a warfare more serious than anything they have been engaged in since the Mutiny, it will be interesting to discuss the events which preceded the expedition, and rendered it necessary, and to arrive, if we can, at some definite conclusion as to the "why" and the "wherefore" of it all.

It will be understood, of course, that any opinions which I may express in the course of this narrative

are my own, that I profess to possess no special acquaintance with facts, and that I merely endeavour to place them before the reader in the light in which they have appeared to one on the spot, who has had ordinary opportunities to read, mark, learn, and inwardly digest them.

To go, then, at once to the root of the matter, I venture to submit that for the *fons et origo mali*, we must hark back to the year 1893, when Sir Mortimer Durand returned from Cabul with the Boundary Agreement signed by the Amir of Afghanistan in his hand, and that that document was the outward and visible sign of all our subsequent troubles on the North-West Frontier. Our idea in proposing that a definite boundary should be demarcated between Afghanistan and India was a most just and reasonable one. We wished that it should be made clear, once for all, under whose influence and control the tribes on the border should remain. Wild, turbulent freebooters, loving frays and forays, fiercely jealous of their independence, acknowledging the authority of no one but their own immediate Maliks and Mullahs, they had for years past been a veritable thorn in the flesh of successive Governments; and the difficulty of restraining them within limits, and of dealing out punishment to them when patience and the expedients of diplomacy were exhausted by some more - than - usually - lawless outrage, was accentuated by the fact that it was in many in-

stances impossible to say, or at least a delicate matter to decide, whether the offenders were subjects of the Amir or fairly inside the pale of our own influence.

For this principal reason, it was deemed necessary to come to a definite agreement with the Amir regarding a boundary. Once a line was agreed to, and demarcated, between Afghanistan and India, there could be no question when raids and outrages were committed as to the responsibility of the Power concerned, or as to the right of that Power to intervene, restrain, and punish.

But it is an open secret that the idea of a boundary was distasteful to the Amir. The negotiations for a friendly commission to visit Cabul to arrange the details of it, more than once very nearly fell through, and there can be no doubt that it required all the patience, and tact, and diplomatic skill that Sir Mortimer Durand could command, to get the Agreement signed by His Highness, and to carry the affair to a successful conclusion.

For the Amir and his people were quite satisfied with the existing *régime*. What useful purpose could a boundary serve for them? The tribes seldom troubled *them*, and the English, on the other hand, had always been well able to take care of themselves when *their* borders were harried. What was the need then of a boundary? One certain effect of it would be to lop off, and place

definitely under the influence of the British Government, certain tribes and sections, which hitherto had, at least nominally and outwardly, acknowledged the Amir as their Suzerain. By so much at all events he would be disadvantaged. North of the Khyber, particularly, the new boundary would run through districts—the Mohmand country, Bajaur, and Asmar—in which he was extremely sensitive of interference, and though he was persuaded at last into a reluctant acquiescence, we may be sure it was with many an *arrière pensée*, and much mental reserve, that he appended his signature to the fateful document; and that, astute and shrewd as he is, he foresaw then the storm that would blow when actual demarcation should be attempted.

But the irritation caused by the actual boundary question, with the interference and misappropriation (from *his* point of view) which it threatened, was comparatively insignificant. It was a deeper anxiety which troubled the Amir, and made the whole arrangement repugnant to him. He was not a student of European history, and knew nothing of Napoleon, and his wars of aggression and conquest; and yet, even as the Czar Alexander, after the overthrow of Frederick William at Jena and Auerstadt in 1806, protested against the total dismemberment of Prussia,¹ not from friendship to Prussia,

¹ After Jena, “the Czar objected to Napoleon absorbing Silesia, not because it would be unjust to Prussia, but because he feared Napoleon as a

but because he deemed it wise to keep such a powerful neighbour as the French Emperor at arm's length ; so did the Amir instinctively feel that the longer the tribes could be maintained in their original independence as a buffer between India and Afghanistan, the longer would his own country be secluded and safe. Of any injustice or hardship to the tribes, or of what fate might befall them through coming under British influence and control, or even of their own wishes and feelings in the matter, he was supremely careless. Such considerations would not affect him, any more than similar sentiments in similar circumstances swayed Alexander when the fate of Prussia was discussed with Napoleon at Tilsit. But the Amir well understood what a wonderful power of absorption the British possess. Where they go they stay. *J'y suis, j'y reste*, appears to be their motto ; and being convinced that once a boundary was fixed *they would live up to it*, he was filled with alarm for what might happen next.

We, of course, on our side, have always repudiated any idea of advance or annexation, or of interference with tribal customs and independence ; but circumstances have often been in the past, and will be no doubt in the future, too strong for us. We find it necessary to push forward military posts,

neighbour." . . . "Napoleon certainly would have made an end of Prussia at once, had he not feared thereby to lose the friendship of the Russian Czar. That Czar cared little for Frederick William, but he had a keen distrust of Napoleon, and insisted that Prussia should remain between them as a buffer." —Poulteny Bigelow, *History of the German Struggle for Liberty*.

to make roads to them, to raise tribal levies, to establish police arrangements, to interfere in tribal quarrels, and so forth ; and however judiciously these steps are taken, however they may be forced upon us, by whatever name we may describe them, the result is the same : we advance, we absorb, we dominate, we destroy independence, and we practically assume the administrative control of the country occupied.

Such would, at all events, rightly or wrongly, be the Amir's line of thought and argument, and with such convictions in his mind it is easy to understand why he should intensely dislike the boundary proposals ; for when agreed to, and carried out, they would mean that in the course of years the wild mountain barrier at present shutting off India from Afghanistan would disappear, because it would be penetrated at so many points by our military roads ; the fierce and warlike tribes who hitherto had interposed their strength between the Afghans and the English would be tamed, and disarmed, and dominated ; and in their place he would have his powerful neighbour living right up against his own ring-fence, overlooking him, and possibly threatening next his own independence.

However, he signed the Agreement. Sir Mortimer Durand returned to India with honour, his mission accomplished, in November 1893, and the next step in the proceedings, the actual demarcation of the boundary agreed to, was forthwith under-

taken by the Indian Government, to whom, however, it was patent, from many indications, that the work would not be carried out unmolested. A strong escort, some 3000 men and 6 guns, was accordingly sent with the Delimitation Commission, *via* the Gomal Valley, into Southern Waziristan, where it was intended to commence the task, and the immediate consequence was—Wāna. In the early morning of the 3rd November 1894, our camp at that place was fiercely attacked by the tribesmen, who thus rudely and emphatically made their protest against our presence, and against our work. They were, of course, beaten off (after a severe and costly engagement), and a regular expedition sent against them after this, under Sir William Lockhart, traversed their country from end to end, inflicted severe loss upon them, drove off their flocks and herds, and destroyed their village defences and towers. In the end they sued for peace, accepted our terms, paid up the fines demanded, and allowed the boundary from the Gomal in the south to the Tochi and the Kurram in the north to be demarcated without further interruption.

I have only referred to this Wāna affair to illustrate the spirit in which the tribes regard our arrangements about a boundary, and to show the Amir's acumen and judgment were correct when he foresaw the storm that would burst whenever we might attempt to demarcate the line agreed to. And how can one blame these people, simple,

savage, and unsophisticated as they are? We may explain to them as much as we like, and protest as loudly as we can, but when they see the long line of boundary pillars going up; when they are told that henceforth all inside that line practically belongs to the British *Raj*, and that from this time their allegiance must be to us; and when, finally, they note our surveyors at work, mapping their country and measuring their fields, their reflection is, "Methinks you do protest too much!" And they are irresistibly driven to the conclusion that their country is annexed, and their independence gone; a conclusion which it is not easy to dispel when we follow on with military posts on their borders, or in their midst, as, for instance, those now established at Wāna, and at points in the Gomal, Tochi, and Kurram valleys, and more especially on the Samāna range.

The next section of the boundary which we proposed to demarcate was that north of the Khyber, where the line would run through Mohmand, Bajaur, and Asmar. Here, as I have previously indicated, we were, literally, on very delicate ground indeed, and although the Mission worked with the full concurrence of the Amir, and travelled indeed as his guests, and under the escort of his troops, yet hitches and difficulties constantly arose, and such frequent references to their respective Governments by Afghan and English officials were necessary, that little or no progress had been made with the work

when, in the spring of 1895, the Chitral affair occurred, and a military expedition to that country diverted attention for a while to matters more grave than boundary commissions. In the autumn of 1895 Sir Robert Low and his troops returned to India, their task brilliantly completed. But we stayed in Chitral; we built a fort there; we made a good road to it from India, and placed it in the keeping of tribal levies in our pay; and we established strong posts on the Malakhand and Chakdara.

In the meantime, matters had come to an absolute dead-lock on the Mohmand-Bajaur-Asmar border, and our Commission was withdrawn, the boundary unmarked.

This brings us to a point where we may pause for a moment, not to consider the wisdom or expediency of our policy on the Frontier (which it is no part either of my plan or my business to discuss) but to consider its effects. In view of the facts which I have stated it will probably be conceded as reasonable inferences—

- (a) That the boundary agreement was most distasteful to the Amir; and *a fortiori* to his subjects.
- (b) That the tribes on the border were thoroughly alarmed by the demarcation of the boundary, that their fears were accentuated by our establishment of military posts in Wāna, in the Tochi and Kurram valleys, in Chitral, on the Malakhand, and on the

Samāna range, and that in spite of our assurances they trembled for their independence.

(c) That the Amir's subjects and officials all along the border, particularly Gholam Hyder Khan, the Sipah Salar, or Commander-in-Chief, would be, and were, thoroughly imbued with the Amir's own views and spirit in the matter of the boundary agreement.

I would lay particular stress upon this last point, because while the Sipah Salar has been universally charged with hostility to the Indian Government; and while it has been laid at his door that he has corresponded (to our hurt) with the leading Mullahs on the border, *e.g.* Sayid Akbar of the Aka Khels, the "Mad Fakir" in Swat, and the Hadda Mulla at Jarobi in the Mohmand country; that he has instigated risings against us, and helped the tribesmen with arms, ammunition, and even men; strenuous efforts have been made to prove that he has acted throughout on his own initiative and responsibility, and in direct opposition to the wishes of the Amir, whom, it is asserted, having the Afghan troops and tribesmen of the Jellalabad district at his back, he was strong enough to defy.

Well, perhaps he was not in touch or correspondence with his master, but there are certainly some who think otherwise, and when, on the 10th June 1897, the Maizar outrage (in the Tochi

valley) occurred,—a regular bolt from the blue, for it was a time of profound peace and quiet on the border: and when this ominous occurrence was followed by the attacks on the Malakhand in the end of July, by the rising of the Mohmands and Bajauris in early August, and finally by the revolt of the Afridis and Orakzais in the latter part of the same month, then undoubtedly the universal sentiment was that the Amir himself was at least in sympathy with an outbreak which had set the whole border in a blaze from the Malakhand to the Kurram.

And most certainly there were substantial reasons for connecting the Amir with these risings. It was notorious that for some years past “he had been devoting himself with much persistency to the *religious* nature of the sovereignty which he wields over the followers of the prophet in north-west India, and beyond; and the means employed to solidify his supreme headship as the light of religion were such as to be considered antagonistic to the preservation of harmonious relations between the tribesmen and the Indian Government. There was the book *Takwim-ud-din*, inspired by the Amir himself, and written to his command, which impressed upon true Muhammadans the essential and all-important character of the *jehad*—that war of religious fanaticism laid down by the Korān as the duty of every follower of Islam to wage against the infidel. The book was certainly a remarkable

production, and even assuming that the greater part of it was merely a rehearsal and exposition of doctrines laid down in the Muhammadan gospels, it was none the less singular that Abdur Rahman should feel the necessity to propagate afresh its doctrines, and give them his own imperial impress at such a time. Fanatical Mussulmans realise only too completely at present that the *jehad* is, under given circumstances, a part of their creed, and it was with reason argued that to have its meaning newly interpreted in times of peace by a Muhammadan ruler was in itself more or less of an incitement to spread out the green flag of Islam, and to smite the infidel wherever found.”¹

It was further noted that the Amir had recently assumed the title of *Zia-ul-Millat wa ud-Din*, i.e. the Light of Union and Faith, and referred to himself significantly in correspondence as the “King of Islam.”

Also, it was well-known that a Turkish visitor had been received with honour in Cabul in May 1897, and that all Mullahs had been summoned to that city for an interview shortly afterwards. It may be that the Turk was a nobody, travelling on his own account, unaccredited by the Sultan’s Government: and it may be that the gathering of the Mullahs had no political importance whatever. But the significance of incidents like these must depend upon the connection in which they are

¹ Mills, *The Pathan Revolt in North-West India*.

viewed : and when they were shortly succeeded by an uprising of the tribes on the frontier, as widespread as it was unlooked for, and (apparently) unprovoked, then the voice of the public and the press, with one accord, declared the Amir to be responsible for the trouble.

The Indian Government so far shared the popular opinion at this time as to address a strong remonstrance to His Highness. "A strong expression of the Governor-General's opinion regarding General Gholam Hyder's relations with the Hadda Mullah, and the part taken by Afghans from the Jellalabad district in the Mohmand disturbance, was forwarded to the Amir, together with an admonition that something more than a mere formal disclaimer of responsibility was expected from him."¹ This produced a reply which was accepted as satisfactory and sincere. The Amir explicitly denied all responsibility for the outbreaks that had occurred, and emphatically repudiated all connection with the revolting tribesmen. He issued orders forthwith strictly forbidding any of his own people to join the tribal gatherings, and directed that no refuge within his dominions should be accorded to armed bodies of tribesmen fleeing before the advance of our troops.

This prompt disavowal and action on H. H. Abdur Rahman's part restored him to favour in the general estimation : and when shortly afterwards he read

¹ "The Risings on the North-West Frontier, 1897-98" (p. 150), *Pioneer Press*, Allahabad.

out in public *durbar* the Viceroy's letter to himself, and the draft of his own reply, and at the same solemnly asserted his sincere friendship for the British, and his determination to maintain his agreements with them unbroken, he was fully rehabilitated in the good opinion of Government; and it may be said here that, from this time, and throughout the operations which ensued, he adhered honourably to the friendly attitude assumed.

CHAPTER II

THE AFRIDIS AND THEIR GRIEVANCES

THE Afridis alleged their reasons for quarrelling with the British to be—

1. Encroachment upon their country.
2. Enhancement of the salt tax.
3. Interference with tribal customs, in that we refused to give up to them such of their women as had taken refuge in British territory.

Probably the first of these reasons, the facts being considered in the light of what I have written in the preceding chapter, was the real *teterrima causa belli*: and, in the audacious demand now made by their leaders that we should abandon our posts on the Samāna, and withdraw altogether from the Swāt Valley, they doubtless reckoned on the countenance and support of the Amir.

At the conclusion of the Afghan war of 1878-80 the Government of India, with the concurrence of the Amir, entered into an agreement with the Afridis to keep open the Khyber Pass. For cen-

turies past the route *via* the Khyber has been the great historic highway connecting Central Asia, Afghanistan, and India. All other avenues of approach sink into insignificance by comparison with it: and it is of the first importance in the interests of peace and trade and civilisation that it should be steadily kept open, and safeguarded against the marauding bands who in the past have made it their happy hunting-ground, and have levied tolls of blood and money from all who have ventured to use it.

The Government of India determined, therefore, to place the Pass arrangements permanently on a sound basis, and it was agreed, in February 1881, that the Afridis should cease their raiding from this time, receiving from Government in lieu of the plunder collected from caravans and travellers an annual payment of 87,000 rupees. It was further decided that forts should be built by us in the Khyber, and garrisoned by levies furnished by the Afridis, but paid by us. This put another 87,000 rupees annually into their hungry pockets.

These arrangements were fully assented to by the Afridis, and cordially concurred in by the Amir, to whom it is a matter of much moment that the Pass should be kept open uninterruptedly for traffic, for he derives a large revenue from the tolls paid by caravans which traverse it, as they enter or leave his territory. Forts were built by us at Ali

Musjid, and at Landi Kotal, and at one or two intermediate points; the levies were raised and armed; and under the command of men like Mr. Hastings (who was their first C.O.) and afterwards Colonel Warburton (whose name is a household word among these border clans), and still later under Captain Barton of the Guides, they discharged their duties punctually and faithfully, and peace and order reigned along the perilous route.

But this was to end now. The preposterous demand of the Afridis that we should withdraw from the Samāna and the Swāt Valley could not, of course, be entertained for a moment. They decided, therefore, urged on by their Mullahs, to break the faith they had kept with us for sixteen years, to sack the forts, and to close the Khyber. They persuaded the Orakzais to join them in this declaration of war, and almost before we had realised that such a stroke could fall, they had assembled their *lashkars*, and attacked and captured forts Ali Musjid, Maude, and Landi Kotal. A few days later, the Orakzais rose in revolt on the Kohat border, and fiercely assailed the Samāna forts, of which one, Saragheri, small and isolated, fell, after a heroic defence by the handful of 36th Sikhs, who constituted its garrison, and died to a man before the enemy finally got possession.

In the meantime the Afridis, realising the gravity of the situation they had themselves created,

turned now to the Amir for aid in the coming struggle. In a petition sent to Cabul by a deputation of their Maliks and Elders, they wrote—

The British Government has been from olden times gradually encroaching upon our country, and even upon Afghan territory, and has erected forts at various points within our borders. We have complained of this to the Afghan Government on many occasions, but your Highness has paid no attention to our complaints. Therefore, being helpless, and having regard to Islam, and our constancy in religion, we have now, under the guidance of God, opened the door of jihad in the face of the said Government, and we have severed our connection with them in every way. We have plundered and destroyed five forts on the Samāna above Hangu, one fort at Shinauri, at the foot of the Samāna, in British territory, one fort at the Ublān Pass, near Kohat, etc., etc. There are, however, three big forts on the top of the said mountain (the Samāna) which have not been taken yet. By the grace of God we will destroy and burn these also. All the people of Tirah have taken up their position on the top of the mountain (Samāna); and at its base, from Kohat to the Rud-i-Kurman in the district of Kurram, the frontier of the Orakzai runs, and the tribesmen have been making jihad from time to time within their respective limits. We will never consent to tender our allegiance to the British Government, and become their subjects. We will never give up the reins of authority of our country to the hands of the Government. On the contrary, we are willing to tender our allegiance to the King of Islam. It is incumbent on the Government of Islam not only to look after our interests, and consider our position, but that of the whole of Afghanistan. We therefore send these eighteen persons from among our Maliks, Ulama, and Elders, with our petitions to your Highness' presence. We are at present engaged in a jihad on the Samāna range, and we request that your Highness will be pleased to do what is for our good and benefit; and, by the grace of God, we will act up to your Highness' instructions, because we leave the conduct and management of our affairs in the hands of your Highness in every respect. We have used our endeavours with our tribesmen to do service to your Highness. This is the time to gain the object

of your Highness.¹ All the Moslems are now at the disposal of your Highness in the shape of regular troops, artillery, and money. If the British prove victorious, they will ruin the Moslems. The services to be done on this side may be left to us by your Highness. We hope that after the perusal of our petition your Highness will favour us with a reply.—Dated 7 Rabius-Sani, 1315 (7th September 1897).

To this appeal the Amir turned a deaf ear. The petition was sent on to him in Cabul, but the members of the deputation were refused an audience, and were not allowed to proceed beyond Jellalabad. On the 23rd of September His Highness replied as follows :—

I have perused your petitions,² all of which were with one object. I now write to you in reply that it is eighteen years since I came to Cabul, and you know yourselves that I went to Rawal Pindi (in April 1885) by the Khyber route. In consideration of my friendship with the British Government I had gone to their country as their guest, and on my way I found many of your tribesmen on both sides of the Pass, who made salaams to me. If what you state now is true, why did you not tell me at that time about the matter, so that I might have conferred with H.E. the Viceroy about it? Some years after this, when the boundary was being laid down, Sir Mortimer Durand passed through the Khyber and came to Cabul. All the frontier tribesmen knew of this, and saw the Mission with their own eyes. Why did not then your Mullahs, and Maliks, and Elders come to me when Sir Mortimer Durand came with authority to settle the boundary, so that I could have discussed the matter with him? At that time you all remained silent, and silence indicates consent. I do not know on what account now a breach has taken place between you and the English. But after you have fought with them, and displeased them, you inform me.

¹ A remarkable expression.

² Each section of the Afridis seems to have petitioned separately, but the purport of their combined appeals is given accurately above.

I have entered into an alliance with the British Government in regard to matters of State, and up to the present time no breach of the agreement has occurred from the side of the British, notwithstanding that they are Christians. We are Moslems and followers of the religion of the Prophet, and also of the four Khalifas of the Prophet. How can we then commit a breach of an agreement? What do you say about the verse in the Koran—"Fulfil your promise; to fulfil your promise is the first duty of a Moslem. God, on the day when the first promise was taken, asked all the creatures whether he was their God or not. They said, 'Yes, you are our God and our Creator.' Therefore, on the day of the resurrection the first question will be about the observance of agreements. Infidels and Moslems will thus be distinguished by this test." You will thus see that the matter of the agreement is of great importance. I will never, without cause or occasion, swerve from an agreement, because the English, up to the present time, have in no way departed from the line of boundary laid down in the map they have agreed upon with me. Then why should I do so? To do so will be far from justice. I cannot, at the instance of a few interested people, bring ignominy on myself and my people.

What you have done with your own hands you must now carry on your own backs. I have nothing to do with you. You are the best judge of your affairs. Now that you have got into trouble (literally, spoiled the matter) you want me to help you. You have allowed the time when matters might have been ameliorated to slip by. Now I cannot say or do anything. I have sent back from Jellalabad the Maliks you had deputed to me. I gave them each a lungi and ten rupees for their road expenses, and I did not trouble them to come to Cabul.

And that, for the present, was all the Afridis got out of the Amir. It would be interesting to know what were their thoughts and speculations, as, disappointed and with heavy hearts, the members of the deputation retraced their steps to the highlands of Tirah.

CHAPTER III

PREPARATIONS, AND THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN

WHILE the Afridis sought in vain the help of the Amir, the Government of India was organising its forces to punish them, and the Commander-in-Chief was considering the plan of the coming campaign. It was generally admitted that the autumn was not the most favourable time for the start of the expedition. If any choice had been permissible in the matter, the spring, when the luxuriant crops of the uplands of Maidan and Tirah, and of the fertile valleys of Mastura and Bāra, were ready for cutting, would have been the best season for an advance. An invasion of their country at this time, following on a rigorous blockade throughout the preceding winter, would probably have brought the tribes to their senses, and secured their submission, comparatively early in the day. But it was no time to dally or delay. The irruption into the Khyber, and the capture and destruction of our forts, were a serious blow to our prestige, and an outrage demanding swift and certain punishment. To have delayed

active operations for even a week longer than was necessary for earnest preparation, would have been misinterpreted on both sides of the border to mean hesitation, weakness, and fear, and irreparable mischief and misunderstanding might have been the result.

It was wisely decided therefore to launch a force forthwith against the foe. General Sir William Lockhart was nominated to command it, and hastened out at short notice from England, where he was enjoying a well-earned holiday, to assume the leadership of an army which included many of the finest regiments, British and Native, in the Service.

The composition of the force, and the names of those who filled the chief commands and staff appointments, are given below.

In considering the size of this force, it must be remembered that the Orakzais and the Afridis could muster between them between 40,000 and 50,000 fighting men, if all the sections combined and put forth their full strength. But it was not probable that this would happen; and, notwithstanding the pressure put upon them by their Mullahs, certain sections held aloof from the first—the Adamkhels and the Jowākis, for example—while others, particularly amongst the Orakzais, betrayed irresolution and reluctance to join in the fray.

Still, it was certain that formidable numbers would oppose our advance. The country to be

invaded was a *terra incognita*, but known to be wild and mountainous, abounding in difficult passes and dangerous defiles; the tribesmen were notoriously well-armed, enterprising, and bold; and the line of communication would be a long one, subject to attack throughout its length, and requiring careful guarding. Therefore, large though the force described below was, it was felt, and the event proved that not a regiment too many had been detailed.

The force was officially styled the "Tirah Expeditionary Force," and was distributed for operations as follows:—

- (a) A main column of two divisions, each consisting of two infantry brigades and certain divisional troops, to start from Kohat and advance on Tirah from the neighbourhood of the Samāna range.
- (b) A force to hold the line of communication of the main column between Kohat and Tirah (including the posts on the Samāna range), consisting of one mountain battery, two native cavalry regiments, and four native infantry battalions.
- (c) A mixed brigade, to be styled the "Peshawar Column," to operate as required from Peshawar.
- (d) A force, designated the "Kurram Movable Column," to be stationed in support on the Hangu-Parachinar line, for employment as circumstances might require.

III PREPARATIONS, AND THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN 25

(e) A mixed brigade to be formed at Rawal Pindi as a reserve.

These forces were composed as follows :—

THE MAIN COLUMN—FIRST DIVISION

First Brigade

2nd Battalion, The Derbyshire Regiment.
1st , The Devonshire Regiment.
2nd , 1st Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment.
30th (Punjab) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.
No. 6 British Field Hospital.
No. 34 Native Field Hospital.

Second Brigade

2nd Battalion, The Yorkshire Regiment.
1st Battalion, Royal West Surrey Regiment.
2nd Battalion, 4th Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment.
3rd Regiment of Sikh Infantry, Punjab Frontier Force.
Sections A and B of No. 8 British Field Hospital.
Sections A and C of No. 14 British Field Hospital.
No. 51 Native Field Hospital.

DIVISIONAL TROOPS

No. 1 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery.
No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery.
No. 1 (Kohat) Mountain Battery.
Two Squadrons, 18th Regiment of Bengal Lancers.
28th Regiment of Bombay Infantry (Pioneers).
No. 3 Company, Bombay Sappers and Miners.
No. 4 Company, Bombay Sappers and Miners.
One Printing Section from the Bombay Sappers and Miners
The Nabha Regiment of Imperial Service Infantry.
The Maler Kotla Imperial Service Sappers.
Section A of No. 13 British Field Hospital.
No. 63 Native Field Hospital.

SECOND DIVISION

Third Brigade

1st Battalion, The Gordon Highlanders.
1st Battalion, The Dorsetshire Regiment.

1st Battalion, 2nd Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment.
 15th (The Ludhiana Sikh) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.
 No. 24 British Field Hospital.
 No. 44 Native Field Hospital.

Fourth Brigade

2nd Battalion, The King's Own Scottish Borderers.
 1st Battalion, The Northamptonshire Regiment.
 1st Battalion 3rd Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment.
 36th (Sikh) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.
 Sections C and D of No. 9 British Field Hospital.
 Sections A and B of No. 23 British Field Hospital.
 No. 48 Native Field Hospital.

DIVISIONAL TROOPS

No. 8 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery.
 No. 9 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery.
 No. 5 (Bombay) Mountain Battery.
 Machine Gun Detachment, 16th Lancers.
 Two Squadrons, 18th Regiment of Bengal Lancers.
 21st Regiment of Madras Infantry (Pioneers).
 No. 4 Company, Madras Sappers and Miners.
 One Printing Section from the Madras Sappers and Miners.
 The Jhind Regiment of Imperial Service Infantry.
 The Sirmur Imperial Service Sappers.
 Section B of No. 13 British Field Hospital.
 No. 43 Native Field Hospital.

LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS

No. 1 Kashmir Mountain Battery.
 22nd (Punjab) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.
 2nd Battalion, 2nd Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment.
 39th (Gurhwal Rifle) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.
 2nd Regiment of Punjab Infantry, Punjab Frontier Force.
 3rd Regiment of Bengal Cavalry.
 18th Regiment, Bengal Lancers.
 No. 1 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners.
 No. 42 Native Field Hospital.
 No. 52 Native Field Hospital.
 The Jeypore Imperial Service Transport Corps.

The Gwalior Imperial Service Transport Corps.

Ordnance Field Park.

Engineer Field Park.

British General Hospital, of 500 beds, at Rawal Pindi.

Native General Hospital, of 500 beds, at Rawal Pindi.

No. 1 Field Medical Store Depôt. (For First Division.)

No. 2 Field Medical Store Depôt. (For Second Division.)

No. 5 Veterinary Field Hospital.

No. 11 British Field Hospital.

No. 25 British Field Hospital.

No. 47 Native Field Hospital.

No. 64 Native Field Hospital.

} For sick and wounded returning from the field.

THE PESHAWAR COLUMN

2nd Battalion, The Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers.

2nd Battalion, The Oxfordshire Light Infantry.

9th Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.

34th Pioneers.

45th (Rattray's Sikh) Regiment of Bengal Infantry

57th Field Battery, Royal Artillery.

No. 3 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery.

9th Regiment of Bengal Lancers.

No. 5 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners.

No. 5 British Field Hospital.

No. 45 Native Field Hospital, A and B Sections.

British General Hospital, of 250 beds, at Nowshera.

Native General Hospital, of 500 beds, at Nowshera.

THE KURRAM MOVABLE COLUMN

12th (Khelat-i-Ghilzai) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.

1st Battalion, 5th Gurkha Rifles.

The Kapurthala Regiment of Imperial Service Infantry.

3rd Field Battery, Royal Artillery.

6th Regiment of Bengal Cavalry.

One Regiment of Central India Horse.

Section D of No. 3 British Field Hospital.

No. 62 Native Field Hospital.

Section B of No. 46 Native Field Hospital.

Native General Hospital, of 200 beds, at Kohat.

THE RAWAL PINDI RESERVE BRIGADE

2nd Battalion, The King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry.
 1st Battalion, The Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry.
 27th Regiment (1st Baluch Battalion) of Bombay (Light) Infantry.
 2nd Regiment of Infantry, Hyderabad Contingent.
 Jodhpur Imperial Service Lancers.
 No. 12 British Field Hospital.
 No. 53 Native Field Hospital.

The staff and commands of the force were as follows:—

ARMY STAFF

Lieutenant-General Commanding the Force	General Sir W. S. A. Lockhart, K.C.B., K.C.S.I. Lieutenant F. A. Maxwell, 18th Bengal Lancers.
Aides-de-Camp . . .	2nd Lieutenant J. H. A. Annesley, 18th Hussars. Lieutenant G. R. De. H. Smith, Central India Horse.
Orderly Officers . . .	2nd Lieutenant E. H. E. Collen, Royal Artillery. Maharaj Dhiraj Sir Pratap Singh, Bahadur, G.C.S.I., of Jodhpur.
Deputy Adjutant-General and Chief of the Staff	Brigadier-General W. G. Nicholson, C.B.
Assistant Adjutant-General . . .	Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel E. G. Barrow, 7th Bengal Infantry.
Assistant Quartermaster-General . . .	Major G. H. W. O'Sullivan, R.E.
Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General	Captain J. A. L. Haldane, Gordon Highlanders.
Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General	Captain C. O. Swanston, 18th B.L.
Assistant Quartermaster-General for Intelligence	Colonel G. H. More-Molyneux, Assistant Quartermaster-General.
Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General for Intelligence	Captain E. W. S. K. Maconchy, D.S.O., 4th Sikhs.
Field Intelligence Officer . . .	Captain F. F. Badcock, D.S.O., 1st Battalion 5th Gurkhas.
Principal Medical Officer (with the temporary rank of Surgeon-Major-General)	Surgeon-Colonel G. Thomson, C.B., Indian Medical Service.



From a Photograph by Bassano.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL SIR W. G. NICHOLSON, K.C.B.

Deputy Adjutant-General and Chief of the Staff, Tirah Expeditionary Force.

An officer of brilliant abilities, fertility of resource, and experience in war, the value of whose assistance it is difficult for me to acknowledge in adequate terms.'—SIR WILLIAM LOCKHART'S Despatches.

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Secretary to Principal Medical Officer	{ Surgeon-Major W. A. Morris, Army Medical Staff.
Brigadier-General, Commanding Royal Artillery	{ Brigadier-General C. H. Spragge, Royal Artillery.
Brigade-Major, Royal Artillery	{ Captain C. de C. Hamilton, Royal Artillery.
Orderly Officer, Royal Artillery	Major H. F. Mercer, Royal Artillery.
Ordnance Officer	Colonel C. H. Scott, Royal Artillery.
Brigadier-General, Commanding Royal Engineers	{ Brevet-Colonel J. E. Broadbent, R.E. (with the temporary rank of Brigadier-General).
Brigade-Major, Royal Engineers	Captain S. L. Craster, R.E.
Orderly Officer, Royal Engineers	Lieutenant H. Biddulph, R.E.
Superintendent, Army Signalling	{ Major G. J. N. Logan-Home, 1st Bedfordshire Regiment.
Headquarter Commandant	{ Captain R. E. Grimston, 6th Bengal Cavalry.
Assistant Judge Advocate-General	{ Captain F. J. S. Lowry, 29th Bombay Infantry.
Principal Provost Marshal	{ Lieutenant-Colonel E. Balfour, Deputy Judge Advocate-General.
Commissariat Transport Officer	{ Captain G. W. Palin, Assistant Commissary-General.
Staff-Surgeon (from the Force).	
Inspecting Veterinary Officer	{ Veterinary Lieutenant-Colonel B. L. Glover.
Controller of Military Accounts	{ Lieutenant-Colonel W. R. Le G. Anderson, Military Accounts Department.
Field Paymaster	{ Captain P. G. Shewell, Military Accounts Department.
Chief Survey Officer	{ Brevet-Colonel Sir T. H. Holdich, K.C.I.E., C.B., R.E.
Principal Chaplain	{ Rev. A. S. Dyer, M.A.

MAIN COLUMN

FIRST DIVISION

Commanding (with the local rank of Major-General)	{ Brigadier-General W. P. Symons, C.B.
Aide-de-Camp	. Captain A. G. Dallas, 16th Lancers.
Orderly Officer	. Lieutenant J. M. Wikely, 17th B.C.
Orderly Officer	. Lieutenant G. H. Badcock, 7th B.C.
Assistant Adjutant-General	{ Lieutenant-Colonel C. W. Muir, C.I.E., 17th Bengal Cavalry.

Assistant Quartermaster-General	. { Major E. A. G. Gosset, and Derbyshire Regiment.
Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General	. { Captain A. Nicholls, 2nd Punjab Infantry.
Field Intelligence Officer	. { Lieutenant C. E. E. F. K. Macquoid, 1st Lancers, Hyderabad Contingent.
Principal Medical Officer	. { Surgeon-Colonel E. Townsend, Army Medical Staff.
Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding Royal Artillery	. { Lieutenant-Colonel A. E. Duthy, Royal Artillery.
Adjutant, Royal Artillery	. { Captain W. K. Macleod, Royal Artillery.
Divisional Ordnance Officer	. { Captain A. R. Braid, Royal Artillery.
Commanding Royal Engineers	. { Lieutenant-Colonel H. H. Hart, R.E.
Adjutant, Royal Engineers	. { Captain O. M. R. Thackwell, Royal Engineers.
Field Engineer	. { Major J. A. Ferrier, D.S.O., Royal Engineers.
Assistant Field Engineer	. { Lieutenant J. F. N. Carmichael, Royal Engineers.
Assistant Field Engineer	. { Lieutenant W. H. Bunbury, Royal Engineers.
Assistant Superintendent, Army Signalling	. { Captain H. T. Kenny, 2nd Bombay Lancers.
Provost Marshal	. { Captain H. W. G. Graham, D.S.O., 5th Lancers.
Commissary-General	. { Colonel L. W. Christopher, Commissariat Department.
Assistant to Commissary-General	. { Captain H. S. G. Hall, Commissariat Department.
Chief Transport Officer	. { Major Mansfield, Commissariat Department.
Assistant to Chief Transport Officer	. { Captain T. H. Smith, 12th B.C.
Divisional Commissariat Officer	. { Major W. R. Yielding, C.I.E., D.S.O., Commissariat Department.
Assistant to Divisional Commissariat Officer	. { Lieutenant C. H. Corbett, 18th Hussars.
Divisional Transport Officer	. { Captain F. C. W. Rideout, Commissariat Department.
Assistant to Divisional Transport Officer	. { Captain A. W. V. Plunkett, 2nd Battalion, The Manchester Regiment.
Survey Officer	. { Major W. T. Bythell, R.E.
Chaplain, Church of England	. { Rev. R. M. Kirwan, M.A.
Wesleyan Chaplain	. { Rev. J. Findlater.
Roman Catholic Chaplain	. { Rev. Father N. J. Winkley.

III PREPARATIONS, AND THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN 31

First Brigade: First Division

Commanding { Brigadier-General R. C. Hart, V.C., C.B.
Orderly Officer { Lieutenant A. H. S. Hart, East Surrey Regiment.
Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General	. { Captain A. G. H. Kemball, 1st Battalion 5th Gurkhas.
Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General	. { Captain H. R. B. Donne, 1st Norfolk Regiment.
Brigade Commissariat Officer	. { Captain A. Mullaly, Deputy Assistant Commissary-General.
Assistant to Brigade Commissariat Officer { Lieutenant H. I. Nicholl, 1st Bedfordshire Regiment.
Brigade Transport Officer	. { Captain E. de V. Wintle, 15th Bengal Lancers.
Veterinary Officer Veterinary Captain H. T. W. Mann.

Second Brigade: First Division

Commanding { A.D.C. Brigadier-General A. Gaselee, C.B.
Orderly Officer { Lieutenant A. N. D. Fagan, 1st Lancers, Hyderabad Contingent.
Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General	. { Major W. Aldworth, D.S.O., 1st Bedfordshire Regiment.
Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General	. { Major A. A. Barrett, 2nd Battalion 5th Gurkhas.
Brigade Commissariat Officer	. { Lieutenant C. S. D. Leslie, Deputy Assistant Commissary-General.
Assistant to Brigade Commissariat Officer	. { Captain H. de la P. Gough, 16th Lancers.
Brigade Transport Officer	. Lieutenant H. Macandrew, 5th B.C.
Veterinary Officer Veterinary Lieutenant W. F. Shore.

SECOND DIVISION

Major-General Commanding	. { Major-General A. G. Yeatman-Biggs, C.B.
Aide-de-Camp { Captain E. St. A. Wake, 10th Bengal Lancers.
Orderly Officers { Captain R. G. Brooke, 7th Hussars. Hon. Lieutenant-Colonel H. H. Maharajah Sir Nripendra Narayun, Bahadur, of Cooch Behar, G.C.I.E., 6th B.C.

Assistant Adjutant-General	.	{ Lieutenant-Colonel R. K. Ridgeway, V.C.
Assistant Quartermaster-General	.	Major C. P. Triscott, D.S.O., R.A.
Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General for Intelligence	.	{ Major R. C. A. B. Bewicke-Copley, King's Royal Rifle Corps.
Field Intelligence Officer	.	{ Captain H. F. Walters, 24th (Baluchistan) Regiment of Bombay Infantry.
Principal Medical Officer	.	{ Surgeon-Colonel G. M'B. Davis, D.S.O., Indian Medical Service.
Lieutenant-Colonel Commanding Royal Artillery	.	{ Lieutenant-Colonel R. Purdy, Royal Artillery.
Adjutant, Royal Artillery	.	Captain H. D. Grier, Royal Artillery.
Divisional Ordnance Officer	.	Captain H. F. Head, Royal Artillery.
Commanding Royal Engineer	.	Lieutenant-Colonel C. B. Wilkieson, R.E.
Adjutant, Royal Engineers	.	Captain T. Fraser, R.E.
Field Engineer	.	Captain F. H. Kelly, R.E.
Assistant Field Engineer	.	Lieutenant W. A. Stokes, R.E.
Assistant Field Engineer	.	Lieutenant C. B. L. Greenstreet, R.E.
Assistant Superintendent, Army Signalling	.	{ Captain G. C. Rigby, 1st Wiltshire Regiment.
Provost Marshal	.	{ Captain W. C. Knight, 4th Bengal Cavalry.
Field Treasure Chest Officer	.	{ Lieutenant W. M. Grimley, 20th (Punjab) Bengal Infantry.
Chaplain, Church of England	.	Rev. H. W. Nelson, M.A.
Roman Catholic Chaplain	.	Rev. Father A. Vanden Deyssel.
Divisional Commissariat Officer	.	{ Lieutenant-Colonel R. L. P. Reilly, Commissariat Department.
Assistant to Divisional Commissariat Officer	.	{ Lieutenant A. D. Macpherson, 2nd P.C.
Divisional Transport Officer	.	{ Major H. L. Hutchins, Commissariat Department.
Assistant to Divisional Transport Officer	.	{ Major H. R. W. Lumsden, 3rd Bengal Infantry.
Survey Officer	.	Mr. E. A. Wainwright, Survey of India.
Assistant Survey Officer	.	Lieutenant G. A. J. Leslie, R.E.

Third Brigade: Second Division

Commanding (with the temporary rank of Brigadier-General)	.	{ Colonel F. J. Kempster, D.S.O., A.D.C.
Orderly Officer	.	{ Lieutenant G. D. Crocker, 2nd Royal Munster Fusiliers.
Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General	.	{ Major H. St. Leger Wood, 1st Dorsetshire Regiment.

III PREPARATIONS, AND THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN 33

Deputy Assistant Quartermaster	Major H. S. Massy, 19th Bengal Lancers.
Brigade Commissariat Officer	Lieutenant D. H. Drake-Brockman, D.A.C.G.
Assistant to Brigade Commissariat Officer	Lieutenant F. W. Birch, 29th Punjab Infantry.
Brigade Transport Officer	Lieutenant R. A. N. Tytler, 1st Gordon Highlanders.
Veterinary Officer	Veterinary Lieutenant C. Rose.

Fourth Brigade : Second Division

Commanding	Brigadier-General R. Westmacott, C.B., D.S.O.
Orderly Officer	Lieutenant R. C. Wellesley, Royal Horse Artillery.
Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General	Captain W. P. Blood, 1st Royal Irish Fusiliers.
Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General	Captain F. J. M. Edwards, 3rd Bombay Light Cavalry.
Brigade Commissariat Officer	Captain E. Y. Watson, Commissariat Department.
Assistant to Brigade Commissariat Officer	Lieutenant N. G. Fraser, 4th Bombay Cavalry.
Brigade Transport Officer	Captain W. H. Armstrong, 1st East Yorkshire Regiment.
Veterinary Officer	Veterinary Lieutenant F. W. Wilson.

LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS

General Officer Commanding	Lieutenant-General Sir A. P. Palmer, K.C.B.
Aide-de-Camp	Lieutenant F. C. Galloway, R.A.
Orderly Officer	Lieutenant H. O. Parr, 7th B. I.
Assistant Adjutant and Quarter-master-General	Captain (temporary Major) J. W. G. Tulloch, 24th Bombay Infantry.
Deputy Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster-General	Captain I. Philipps, 1st Battalion, 5th Gurkhas.
Principal Medical Officer (with the temporary rank of Surgeon-Colonel)	Brigade - Surgeon - Lieutenant - Colonel W. E. Saunders, Army Medical Staff.
Senior Ordnance Officer	Captain Watkins, Royal Artillery.
Section Commandant	Captain O. B. S. F. Shore, 18th Bengal Lancers.
Section Commandant	Captain St. G. L. Steel, 2nd Bengal Lancers.

Section Commandant	{ Captain F. de B. Young, 6th Bengal Cavalry.
Lieutenant-Colonel Commanding, Royal Engineers	{ Lieutenant - Colonel J. W. Thurburn, Royal Engineers.
Adjutant, Royal Engineers	Captain H. V. Biggs, Royal Engineers.
Field Engineer	Captain C. H. Cowie, Royal Engineers.
Assistant Field Engineer	{ Lieutenant H. S. Rogers, Royal Engineers.
Assistant Field Engineer	{ Lieutenant R. P. T. Hawksley, Royal Engineers.
Assistant Field Engineer	Lieutenant A. E. Turner, Royal Engineers.
Provost Marshal	Major L. S. Peyton, 14th Bengal Lancers.
Chief Commissariat Officer	{ Brevet Colonel C. M. Keighley, D.S.O., Commissariat Department.
Chief Transport Officer, L. of C. . . .	{ Major C. V. Williamson, Commissariat Department.
Assistant to Chief Transport Officer	{ Captain T. H. Smith, 12th Bengal Cavalry.
Veterinary Inspector	Veterinary Captain F. W. Forsdyke.

STAFF AT THE BASE

Base Commandant	{ Colonel W. J. Vousden, V.C., Indian Staff Corps.
Deputy Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster-General	{ Major A. J. W. Allen, 1st East Kent Regiment.
Commandant, British Troops Depôt	{ Major A. de B. V. Paget, Durham Light Infantry.
Adjutant and Quartermaster, British Troops Depôt	{ Captain A. F. Bancock, 2nd Battalion South Lancashire Regiment.
Commandant, Native Troops Depôt	{ Captain S. M. Edwardes, D.S.O., 2nd Bombay Infantry (Grenadiers).
Base Ordnance Officer	{ Captain M. W. S. Pasley, Royal Artillery.
Officer in charge of Engineer Field Park	{ Captain U. W. Evans, R.E.
Base Commissariat Officer	{ Major H. R. Marrett, Assistant Commissary-General.
Departmental Assistants to Base Commissariat Officer	{ Captain W. H. D. Rich, Assistant Commissary-General.
	Lieutenant F. W. H. Forreath, Deputy Assistant Commissary-General.
	Lieutenant L. H. Marriott, Deputy Assistant Commissary-General.
	Lieutenant H. G. P. Beville, Deputy Assistant Commissary-General.

III PREPARATIONS, AND THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN 35

Departmental Assistant (for Transport) to the Base Commissariat Officer	Captain H. N. Hilliard, Deputy Assistant Commissary-General.
Regimental Assistants to Base Commissariat Officer	Captain W. P. M. Pollock, 18th Hussars. Captain H. Smyth, 1st Battalion, Cheshire Regiment. Lieutenant T. E. Bayley, 20th Hussars. Lieutenant C. G. E. Ewart, 5th Bengal Cavalry. Lieutenant E. N. Davis, 3rd Infantry, Hyderabad Contingent.
Controller of Military Accounts	

THE PESHAWAR COLUMN

Commanding	Brigadier-General A. G. Hammond, C.B., D.S.O., V.C., A.D.C.
Orderly Officer	Lieutenant H. D. Hammond, Royal Artillery.
Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster-General	Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel F. S. Gwatkin, 13th Bengal Lancers.
Deputy Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster-General	Major C. T. Becker, 2nd King's Own Scottish Borderers.
Field Intelligence Officer	Captain F. H. Hoghton, 1st Bombay Infantry (Grenadiers).
Principal Medical Officer	Brigade-Surgeon-Lieutenant-Colonel R. G. Thomsett, Army Medical Staff.
Lieutenant-Colonel Commanding, Royal Artillery	Lieutenant-Colonel W. M. M. Smith, Royal Artillery.
Adjutant, Royal Artillery	Captain F. R. Drake, Royal Artillery.
Brigade Ordnance Officer	Major T. E. Rowan, Royal Artillery.
Field Engineer	Major E. C. Spilsbury, R.E.
Assistant Field Engineer	Lieutenant C. B. Farwell, R.E.
Assistant Superintendent, Army Signalling	Lieutenant C. E. Cobb, East Yorkshire Regiment
Brigade Commissariat Officer	Lieutenant H. H. Jones, Deputy Assistant Commissary-General.
Assistant to Brigade Commissariat Officer	Lieutenant V. R. Pigott, 1st Battalion Cheshire Regiment.
Brigade Transport Officer	Lieutenant C. Charlton, Royal Horse Artillery.
Veterinary Officer	Veterinary Lieutenant F. U. Carr.

THE KURRAM MOVABLE COLUMN

Commanding (with rank and pay of Colonel on the Staff)	Colonel W. Hill, Indian Staff Corps.
Orderly Officer	Captain R. O. C. Hume, Border Regiment.
Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General	Major E. F. H. M'Swiney, D.S.O., 1st Lancers, Hyderabad Contingent.
Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General	Captain C. P. Scudamore, D.S.O., 1st Royal Scots Fusiliers.
Principal Medical Officer	Brigade-Surgeon-Lieutenant-Colonel W. R. Murphy, D.S.O., Indian Medical Service.
Brigade Ordnance Officer	Lieutenant D. R. Poulter, Royal Artillery.
Field Engineer	Captain J. A. Gibbon, Royal Engineers.
Assistant Field Engineer	Lieutenant E. A. Tandy, Royal Engineers.
Assistant Superintendent, Army Signalling	Lieutenant C. R. Scott-Elliott, 4th Madras Pioneers.
Brigade Commissariat Officer	Captain C. F. T. Murray, Assistant Commissary-General.
Assistant to Brigade Commissariat Officer	Captain P. H. Rogers, 2nd Yorkshire Light Infantry.
Brigade Transport Officer	Captain H. W. C. Colquhoun, 24th Madras Infantry.
Survey Officer	Lieutenant-Colonel R. A. Wahab, C.I.E., R.E.
Veterinary Officer	Veterinary Lieutenant W. N. Wright.

THE RAWAL PINDI RESERVE BRIGADE

Commanding	Brigadier-General C. R. Macgregor, D.S.O.
Orderly Officer	2nd Lieutenant E. W. C. Ridgeway, 29th Punjab Infantry.
Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General	Major Sir R. A. W. Colleton, Bart., 1st Royal Welsh Fusiliers.
Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General	Captain H. Hudson, 19th Bengal Lancers.
Brigade Commissariat Officer	Lieutenant E. G. Vaughan, Commissariat Department.
Assistant to Brigade Commissariat Officer	Lieutenant A. P. Trevor, 20th Bombay Infantry.

Brigade Transport Officer	. { Lieutenant K. E. Nangle, 3rd Infantry, Hyderabad Contingent.
Veterinary Officer	. Veterinary Lieutenant W. S. Anthony.

The political officers with the Force were Sir Richard Udny, K.C.S.I., Colonel Warburton, C.S.I., and Messrs. King, Hastings, Donald, and Blakeway. But in Sir William Lockhart himself was vested supreme political power, as well as supreme military control of the expedition.

The approximate strength of the force detailed in the foregoing pages was 1010 British officers, 10,882 British troops, 491 native officers, 22,123 native troops, 197 hospital assistants, 179 clerks, 19,558 followers, 8000 horses, 18,384 mules and ponies, and 1440 hospital riding-ponies. But to these figures must be added an enormous number of camels, carts, ponies, etc., working on the long line of communication with Kohat, and gradually brought into use as needs increased and the roads were improved.

In considering the plan of campaign it must be borne in mind that the objective of the expedition was Tirah, the summer home of the Afridis and Orakzais, which had never before been entered by a British force, or, for the matter of that, had never been visited by any European. The distribution of the force to effect the object in view has already been indicated. The chief feature of the scheme is the direct advance on Tirah of the main column in one body, under the personal command of Sir William Lockhart, "from the neighbourhood of the Samāna range." Other plans suggest themselves, and nodoubt

were discussed ; for example, the advance of *one division* only, with the headquarters, from the Samāna, while the other, diverging at Usterzai, shortly after leaving Kohat, might penetrate *via* the valley of the Kariach river and the Landukai Pass, into Mastura, and there join hands with the main body. This would perhaps have relieved the pressure caused by an advance on a single line, but possibly there were political objections to it. A simultaneous advance up the Bāra Valley, by the Peshawar column, under Brigadier-General Hammond, would have cut off the Afridis from retreat in the direction of Jellalabad and Lalpura, whither already they were sending their families. But this no doubt would have been a very hazardous undertaking. The Bāra Valley, though absolutely unexplored at this time, was known to be long and difficult, and abounding in dangerous defiles. The risks involved in fighting a way up such a route, and in maintaining such a long and precarious line of communication, far outweighed any advantage to be gained by attempting a diversion of this kind, unless with a very much larger force than was at this time available for the purpose, and had any disaster (and such things will happen) brought the movement prematurely to a standstill, Sir William Lockhart's own advance would have been seriously embarrassed at a critical juncture.

The special advantage of the line actually selected for the advance of the main column, viz. from Kohat *via* Shinauri, Khorappa, and the Sampagha and

Arhanga Passes, into Tirah, was, that up to the advanced base, Shinauri, it lay inside our own territory, while from this point, not only could a blow be struck at the very centre of the Orakzai country, cutting the defenders into two at once (an important achievement from a political point of view, for already there were waverers amongst them), but also the Tirah plateau, the objective of the expedition, the hub and heart of the Afridi nation, could be reached in four or five easy marches.

At the same time, when the main column had crossed the Samāna and was assembled at Khan-garbur in the Khānki Valley, it is a question whether from this point, and before assaulting the Sampagha, one of its divisions might not with advantage have marched *up* the Khānki Valley and penetrated into Tirah independently, *via* the Chingakh or Lozakka Pass. Here, again, the argument is that by separating the divisions, the pressure caused by moving such a mass of men and transport on a single road would be relaxed, and consequent delays avoided, and that the enemy would be alarmed by the demonstration against his flank and rear.

But there were undoubtedly strong reasons for adhering to the single line of advance, and keeping the column concentrated.

In the first place, the stronger the force brought to bear directly on the objective point, the less formidable and obstinate the resistance likely to be met with, while the value and importance of a quick,

decisive, knock-down blow, where Asiatics are concerned, are not to be over-estimated.

Secondly, a considerable proportion of the transport was of an inferior type, and imperfectly organised, while the supervising staff was limited. Had that staff been divided into two sections at the very outset of the expedition, confusion and delay would certainly have increased.

Thirdly, the whole country-side up the Khānki Valley was hostile. It is, moreover, a region intersected by deep ravines, and commanded by numerous heights, while the existing roads and tracks through it were practically useless for military purposes.

Consequently, had this double line of advance been adopted, a much larger force to guard the communications would have been imperative, and as no advance on *either* line could be made until sappers and pioneers, working incessantly, had improved the way sufficiently to admit of the passage of laden animals, the military labour available, which was strictly limited, would have taken at least twice as long as it actually did to accomplish its double task, and the delay thus caused would have been most mischievous.

Even with a single line of advance it was found necessary later to reinforce the troops on the line of communication by one native infantry regiment to hold the Dargai heights, and by a pioneer regiment to strengthen the Khangarbur post, when the main column had passed on. And after the Sampagha

Pass had been captured the whole of the First Brigade, augmented by a pioneer regiment and a battery of artillery, had to be posted permanently in the Mastura Valley to overawe the Orakzais, and maintain uninterrupted communication between Khangarbur and the headquarters in Tirah.

The theoretical advantages of a double line of advance are obvious and indisputable, but, on the other hand, the practical objections to it, which I have endeavoured to make clear, are not to be denied.

It may be added here that when the force was at Khangarbur nothing was known of the condition of the western passes—the Durbikhel, the Chingakh, or the Lozakka—by one of which the detached division, had the double line of advance been adopted, would have had to make its way into Tirah, except that native report declared them all to be extremely bad. When later, in an expedition against the Chamkanis and Massozais, an opportunity was afforded to examine these passes, the first two of them being actually crossed by our troops, they were found to be so difficult as to fully justify the decision previously arrived at by Sir William Lockhart to pursue his course by a single line of advance.

We may now consider the preliminaries of the campaign made fairly clear, and I proceed, with the kind permission of the proprietors of the *Times*,

with the narrative of the expedition in the form of letters contributed by me at the time, and while impressions were fresh; but expanded now, and supplemented where necessary by notes and information which have reached me since the original letters were written.

CHAPTER IV

WAITING TO BEGIN

KOHAT, 6th October.

“TOUT vient à qui sait attendre!” There has been waiting enough for the launch of this expedition, and even the Afridis amid the rocks and glens of Tirah, conscious that the long arm of retribution must eventually reach them, and exact a full penalty for their treacherous assaults on Ali Masjid and Landi Kotal, must wonder when we are going to begin. But if the mills of the British *Raj* grind slowly, their work is sure, and they grind exceeding small, once set in motion. An expedition into a difficult and unsurveyed country like that which lies between the Samāna range and the Safed Koh mountains, and against such warlike and well-armed tribes as the Orakzais and the Afridis, was not to be lightly undertaken, nor without ample means and careful preparation; and while other insurgent clans in many directions—the Waziris in the Tochi Valley to the south, and the Mohmands, the Bajauris, and the Swatis to the north—had still to be dealt with,

and absorbed some of our best regiments, together with a large proportion of the transport, the Tirah expedition had perforce to be postponed. When our authority had been re-established in these other districts, undivided attention could be paid to the formidable foe on our western border who has defied us, and whose proud boast is that no white man has hitherto invaded his stronghold.

It was in the end of August, 23rd to the 25th, that, smarting under the sense of their imaginary grievances, and prompted by fanatical impulse and senseless rage, the Afridis attacked, and eventually captured and burned, our forts on the Khyber line: Landi Kotal, Ali Masjid, and Fort Maude. With minds inflamed by the preachings of their Mullahs, and excited by the treacherous success achieved by the Waziris in the Tochi Valley, by distorted reports of the murderous fighting on the Malakhand, and by the example of the Mohmands at Shabkadr, they recklessly broke a faith they had kept for sixteen years, and, throwing prudence to the winds, put to the sword their own kinsmen—the levies in our pay, who gallantly resisted their assaults—and declared war to the knife against a Government which has ever treated them in the past with forbearance and with generosity.

But generosity has its limits, and the forbearance of even an Indian Government can be overstrained. The Bonerwals, that powerful tribe located between the Malakhand and the Indus, had indeed been let

alone by us, though surely after the events of the 26th July and following days—the attacks on the Malakhand—never had any Government better cause for quarrelling with them. But this last outrage was too much. Our prestige would indeed be lowered should we shrink now from inflicting chastisement, and exacting reparation for the blood shed, and the mischief done; and therefore, almost within a week of the occurrences in the Khyber, the Viceroy's Council had come to a decision, and the fiat for the expedition to Tirah had gone forth.

That was in the beginning of September, and here we are well on in chill October, and not quite ready to begin yet. But what a busy month it has been! Not a day, not an hour of it, has been wasted. Well and loyally have those toiled who have been intrusted with the preparations which must be completed before such an expedition can be safely launched. Hereafter, no doubt, their names will be honourably mentioned with those whose more congenial task will be to lead the troops in battle against the enemy. I have before me while I write the revised scheme of the operations now on the eve of commencing, and when I note for you that it provides for the concentration of a force which includes 1010 British officers, 491 native officers, 10,882 British non-commissioned officers and men, 22,123 native non-commissioned officers and men, 8000 horses and ponies, upwards of 18,000 baggage animals (chiefly mules), and over 20,000 followers,

etc., and involves the collection of supplies for feeding this huge force for at least two months, then it will be conceded that the task of the past few weeks has been no light one, and that those who have borne the burden and heat of the day in connection with it will be entitled to gratitude and recognition when the time comes to consider the question of honours and rewards.

Meantime their labours have borne fruit, for the force stands ready, fully equipped, and impatient to start. Yet for a few days more, a very few, patience must be exercised, the reason being, that unexpected developments on the Mohmand and Bajaur side have delayed the troops which are detailed, after their campaign is over in the North, to come down and join brigades destined for the operations in Tirah. In another four or five days, however, they will all have arrived, and then a general advance will begin. It is needless to dilate on the spirit which animates the troops on this occasion—officers and men are alike keen for the fray, and eager to start. For weeks past every one in authority, from Sir George White downwards, has been besieged by entreaties and appeals from individuals and regiments to be detailed for this expedition. To be left out of it is lamented as an irretrievable misfortune. The appetite of the troops has been whetted by the accounts of the severe fighting that has already taken place, and by the description of the gallant deeds already performed. So far as can


be judged it is certain that the Orakzais and Afridis will combine to defend stubbornly their hitherto inviolate strongholds. They are the finest and hardiest race, physically speaking, on our frontier ; they are known to be well armed, and they can put upwards of 40,000 men into the field against us. Assuredly they will face us bravely, and, the greater the certainty of hard fighting, the keener the anxiety of every soldier of Her Majesty in India to be present, and to bear his share in it.

With such a spirit prevailing amongst the men and officers, and with such a practised leader as Sir William Lockhart, whose very name is a tower of strength on this wild frontier, the issue should be sharp, short, and decisive.

CAMP KOHAT, 12th October.

Still waiting to begin ! After all it is one thing to declare war against the Afridis ; it is another to "let loose the dogs" and start the game. But in this instance, there are others besides the Afridis to think of, and great allowances must be made for those who have had the preparations to make for the arduous campaign ahead of us. Not only is it being undertaken on a scale greater even than that on which we started the Afghan War of 1878-80, but also every detail in connection with it has been complicated by the expedition on our hands at the same time against the Mohmands, the Waziris, the Swatis, and the Bajauris, and by the unexpected

developments which some of these "side-shows" have taken at the last moment. Thus, regiments and batteries and transport and hospitals, etc., destined for Tirah, have been unavoidably detained in other quarters, and at the eleventh hour substitutes have had to be found for them, and called up from distant stations in India. All this means delay, though it does not, of course, mean wasted time. What has been done in the way of preparation by the great Commissariat-Transport Department while outsiders chafe and wonder "when are they going to begin?" must be seen to be believed. Our railway from Rawal Pindi ends at Khushalgarh, on the banks of the Indus, 32 miles from Kohat, which is to be our base of operations. For weeks past trains have been delivering at this terminus from 1500 to 2000 tons of stores daily, and the Transport Department have been moving this immense amount of supplies, clothing, and war material to Kohat on carts, camels, mules, ponies, and bullocks, an endless stream, discharging on the stony plains round this cantonment, which have now become thickly studded in every direction with mounds of stuff destined to feed and supply man and beast for weeks to come in the distant wilds of Tirah. To the uninitiated, it looks as if chaos was supreme, but, so far from that being the case, the reception and distribution of the convoys as they arrive, proceed without a hitch. Every one has an appointed task, and everything has an appointed place, and though upwards of



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50,000 men and followers, and more than 20,000 animals, have to be daily provided for here, it is all done quietly and efficiently without fuss or delay : and that this should be so reflects great credit on all concerned in making and working the necessary arrangements.

But for the present, remember, we are halted. It is true troops come and go every day, but the marches are short ones. They arrive from Peshawar, three marches away, and as the brigades are completed, pass on to Hangu, Kai, and Shinauri, only four marches away. At these places, too, large commissariat depôts have been formed, more especially at the last named, Shinauri, which for some time to come will be our most advanced base. It is situated at the foot of a spur of the Samāna range only some five miles from the ridge, and from it, *via* the Chagru Valley, the main advance will eventually be made. It is then that the strain will come, and that the commissariat-transport arrangements will be severely tested. When there is little more than a single six-foot track for troops and animals, and that winding in and out on a steep gradient, through darkling glens and gloomy defiles, the question of food and shelter, sufficient and in time, becomes a deeply interesting one! But we know the Department. They have perhaps never been tried so high as they will be on this occasion, but they have worried successfully through many a tough transport task before this, and we have little

doubt that they will overcome all difficulties in this instance too.

Still it will be no promenade for them. Did not the Great Duke say of campaigning in Spain, "If you make war in that country with a large army you starve; and if you go into it with a small one you get beaten!" Well, the saying is in a sense applicable here. We certainly have guarded against defeat, for the size of the force mobilised must flatter, if it does not frighten, the Afridis, as it certainly surprises better-informed people. But on the other hand, though we do not expect to starve, we think we may sometimes have to wait a while for our dinners!

I give you here the full text of Sir William Lockhart's proclamation to the Tirah Afridis and Orakzais:—

In the year 1881, the Afridis of the Khyber Pass entered into treaty engagements with the British Government, undertaking, in consideration of certain allowances, to maintain order throughout the pass, to deal with offences on the road, to furnish levies for the above purpose, and to abstain from committing outrages in British territory. Up to the month of August last these engagements have been, on the whole, faithfully observed, but during that and the succeeding month, the Afridis have broken their engagements, attacked, plundered, and burnt posts in the Khyber Pass, which were garrisoned by levies furnished by themselves, and have joined the Orakzais in attacking British posts and villages on the Kohat border.

For these offences all tribal and service allowances hitherto granted by the British Government to the Afridis and Orakzais are declared forfeit, and entirely at the disposal of the British Government to withhold or to renew, wholly or in part, as they

may think fit. The British Government has also determined to despatch a force under my command to march through the country of the Orakzais and Afridis, and to announce from the heart of their country the final terms which will be imposed. This advance is made to mark the fact that these tribes took part in the attacks above mentioned, and the power of the British Government to advance if and when they choose.

The Government have neither the intention nor the wish to inflict unnecessary damage on the tribes, provided they immediately make submission and reparation. The terms and conditions on which such submission will be accepted will be announced to the jirgahs of the tribes when I have arrived in Tirah ; and I am authorised to enforce fulfilment of these terms and conditions, and of any further terms and conditions which opposition by any tribe or section or individuals there may render it necessary to impose. It is therefore notified that all who wish to live in peace with the Sirkar and desire to possess their own country and to see it no more in the power and occupation of the Sirkar should assist to the utmost of their abilities in the work of enforcing compliance with my orders and with the said terms and conditions, by which means they will save the tribes from the further punishments which any opposition to the advance of the British troops will infallibly bring upon them, and the tribal country from further occupation.

It is too soon to judge the effect of this proclamation, which is the usual style of announcement made when you are about to invade an enemy's country, *with this difference*. It states emphatically that until we have entered and marched through their lands, in order to demonstrate our power to assert our position as rulers, and to strike how and when we like, we will listen to no overtures from them. Their offence has been too gross and too unprovoked for it to be now lightly pardoned or condoned. In the past these tribes have boasted

that we cannot and dare not enter their country. Now the time has come to dispel that illusion once and for all. The purdah will be lifted, the veil that has hitherto been so jealously kept down will be drawn aside, and "from the heart of their country" Sir William Lockhart will announce to the tribal jirgahs, when they come in to make their submission to him, the final terms and conditions on which the British Government will conclude a peace with them.

This is of course a just and wise policy. It is true that some of the clans, amongst the Orakzais especially, and more than one chief of repute and position amongst the Afridis, have already sued for terms, and expressed contrition for their misdeeds, each of them, *more suo*, protesting "it wasn't me, sir, please sir, it was the other boy, sir." But very rightly they have not been listened to, or even answered, *yet*. A Pathan or an Afghan understands only one kind of argument, the *argumentum ad baculinum*, a good knock-down blow. Administer that, and he will respect you, and bear you no ill-will. But argue with him, parley or compromise with him, and you are lost. He will give you back words smoother than your own, he will promise anything you want, he will greedily accept your bribes and your subsidies, but he will despise you in his heart, and he will betray you at the first opportunity.

I am not concerned here to discuss this policy or

that for the management of the tribes on our frontier, or to speculate how the present series of troubles was precipitated, or how they could have been avoided, though much might be written on all these heads. But it may be safely said that, having committed ourselves to this expedition, it should be, and will be, carried through now in such complete and stern fashion, that hereafter Afridi and Orakzai will think twice, and hesitate long, before they break out again into such wanton outrage.

In the meantime, it is fairly certain they will fight. It is not at all because we have "cornered" them, but, though there are waverers amongst them, it is because after years of proud boasting and absolute immunity from any punishment (if we except the Bazaar Valley raids in 1878-79) their reputation as the most warlike and independent tribe on the frontier would be lost for ever, and their "faces blackened" among all true Pathans, if they failed to stand up to us now. But there is no question of what they will do, and we may be sure some hard knocks will be exchanged before the heights are won leading into their hitherto inviolate stronghold, the breezy uplands known as Tirah. As a matter of fact our latest information as to their movements points to a concentration of their strength already in the upper Khānki Valley, and occupation by them of dominating points at the western end of the Samāna ridge, whence they can observe our preparations at Shinauri, and even

threaten an attack on that camp itself. These would be chiefly Orakzais, but behind them we hear on good authority that the Afridis are collecting on the Sampagha Pass, and it will probably be for the possession of this point that our first big fight will be fought, and the 28th or 29th inst. will not improbably be the date of it.

Before I close this letter I may refer briefly to a matter which has been much discussed lately. It is that we have some 2000 Afridis in our own ranks at the present time. They are amongst our best soldiers, and have borne themselves bravely in many a fight on the side of the Sirkar. But it is unquestionable that there is an uneasy feeling among them on the eve of this expedition against their own country. Already several have deserted, taking their rifles and accoutrements and ammunition with them, arguing no doubt that it is trying them too high to expect them to march against their own kinsmen, and assault their own villages. But this was what no one required them to do. An army order¹ has been published expressing confidence

¹ Subjoined is the order referred to.

G.O.C.C., dated 8th October 1897.

The Government of India have lived at peace with the Afridi tribe and made an agreement with them, under which the British forts in the Khyber were intrusted to their care. Allowances were paid to the tribe, and arms were issued so that they might be strong in their alliance and friendship with the Government of India, and have the means of forcing turbulent persons to keep the peace. Without any provocation the Afridis, in conjunction with other tribes, have broken their alliance with the British Government, and have attacked and destroyed the forts which their tribe had engaged to guard. Further, they have waged war against our garrisons on the Samāna and else-

in their loyalty, and sympathy with their peculiar position, and announcing the decision of Government that under the special circumstances the Afridi companies in our service will be sent back to stations where they will carry on garrison duties only, while at the same time they are assured that so far as can be managed, their own homes in Tirah will be spared, and their people and property unmolested. This arrangement and this assurance should restore confidence to them. Yet such is the suspicious and designing nature of the Afridi, so restless and excited does he become in times of difficulty and danger, and so little trust would he repose in similar promises made by any of his own people under where, killing some of the soldiers in the British service, and causing great loss of property.

The British Government, confident in its power, cannot sit down quietly under such defiance and outrages, and has been forced by the wanton acts of the Afridis themselves to inflict punishment on them in their own country, and to send a force into Tirah to exact reparation for what has lately taken place. The Afridi soldiers in the service of the Government have given proofs of their loyalty, devotion, and courage on many a hard-fought field, and the value of their services has been fully appreciated by the Government of India. After the most careful consideration of the circumstances connected with the Tirah expedition, the Government of India have decided to show consideration to those Afridi soldiers who wish to keep their engagements, and to excuse them from service in the campaign which the Government have been forced to wage against their fellow-tribesmen.

On these grounds alone it has been determined that Afridi soldiers who are serving in the regiments detailed for service on the Peshawar-Kohat border, are not to be employed near the Tirah frontier at the present time, but their services will be utilised elsewhere. The necessary orders to this effect will at once issue. As far as possible care will be taken that the property of those who have not taken part in the raids on British territory is neither confiscated nor destroyed during the time that our troops are engaged in the Orakzai or Afridi territory.

This order is to be read and carefully explained to all Afridi soldiers belonging to regiments detailed for service on the Peshawar-Kohat border.

similar circumstances, that it is doubtful if the just and humane order of the Commander-in-Chief will entirely quiet their fears, though it is obvious that it was the most considerate action His Excellency could have possibly taken.

CHAPTER V

THE ACTIONS AT DARGAI

HEADQUARTERS CAMP, NEAR KHANGARBUR,
22nd October.

LONG ere this arrives my telegrams will have informed you that the curtain has been rung up and the play has begun. I had hardly posted my last letter to you when collision with the enemy occurred, and his skill in choosing a strong position, his resolution in defending it, the numbers he can bring into the field against us, and the efficiency of his equipment and fire, as testified by the severe losses we have already incurred, all are proof, if proof were wanted, of the arduous task ahead—a task which makes us rejoice that we have such a tried and capable leader as General Sir William Lockhart, and which fully warrants the judgment of the Commander-in-Chief, and the decision of the Government of India, in sending such a powerful force into the field.

In this letter I shall be able to give you a better idea than is possible within the limits of a telegram, of the immense difficulties of many kinds which

beset an expedition on this wild and mountainous frontier, of the desperate nature of the fighting, and of the valour of our troops.


The first advance from our advanced base, Shinauri, was fixed for the 20th, but in the meantime the enemy, aware of our intentions (for our working parties trying to improve the road up to the top of the Chagru Kotal, or ridge, and as far as possible down the other side, had sufficiently and unavoidably indicated our intended route), had skilfully occupied in strength the village of Dargai and the Narik spur, which forms the western boundary of the Chagru Valley, and completely dominates the road down it, by which we must perforce descend. It was necessary, therefore, to dislodge him from this coign of vantage as a preliminary measure. Sir William Lockhart accordingly ordered this to be done by the 2nd Division, and planned that General Westmacott's brigade should engage the enemy in front, supported by No. 5 and No. 9 Mountain Batteries, while General Kempster's brigade, accompanied by the scouts of the 5th Gurkhas, No. 8 Mountain Battery, and No. 4 Co. Madras Sappers and Miners, should make a wide detour to the west, and get round his right flank and rear. Great secrecy was observed in issuing the orders and making the necessary arrangements for the attack, as it was very much desired to find our friends "at home," but subsequent events have assured us that they are full of

fight, and may be depended upon to accept battle whenever we choose to offer it. The conduct of the operations was intrusted to General Sir Power Palmer, as General Yeatman-Biggs was temporarily laid up by sickness. It must be remembered that he has been here since the beginning of August last, and the hard work, single-handed for a long time, and the exposure have naturally told upon him.¹

Leaving Shinauri at 4 A.M., General Kempster's brigade, with which Sir Power Palmer himself elected to march, commenced its circuitous climb to turn the enemy's right flank. Westmacott started an hour later, and by 9 A.M. had reached the Chagru Kotal, on which at 9.20 his batteries came into action against the ridge at Dargai, where the enemy thickly clustered. The range was about 2500 yards, and though, of course, well within the power of the 2.5-inch gun, a very perfect weapon in its way, yet the fear was expressed that this shell fire might have the not-to-be-desired effect of dispersing the enemy too soon, and driving him away before the infantry could get at him and inflict severe punishment. No doubt this often has been done, and as often regretted, for those who

¹ This gallant officer died in January. "He was in a very bad state of health from the outset, but his indomitable spirit carried him through the whole of the operations, only to die at Peshawar on the 4th January 1898. I would fain have sent him back to India from the Samāna, or subsequently from Khangarbur, but the responsible medical officers considered him fit to remain in the field, a decision which gratified him, though I personally could not agree with it."—Sir Wm. Lockhart's *Despatches*.

fight and run away will live to fight another day, and an enemy frightened away by long-range shell fire may be likened to flies brushed off a pot of honey by a wave of the hand. They are not hurt, and will all settle again in the same place directly you leave them alone. Fortunately in this instance this was not the effect. The tribesmen were under such excellent cover, naturally provided by the rocks, and improved by walls, etc., built up by themselves, that all they had to do was to lie low and sit tight, and they soon found that the shells did not hurt them very much. Meantime Westmacott's regiments toiled up the steep ascent to reach their foe, the 1st Battalion 3rd Gurkha Rifles leading, the King's Own Scottish Borderers and the Northamptons in close support. (The fourth regiment of this brigade, the gallant 36th Sikhs, ever famous for their glorious defence of Saragheri and Gulistan, was not out to-day.) It seemed incredible that any enemy could be turned out of such a position as that occupied by the enemy now. It literally had to be climbed up to, so steep and precipitous was the mountain-side. In many places the men could move only in single file, and progress was perforce painfully slow. Sir William Lockhart, attended by Brigadier-General Nicholson, the chief of the staff, and by the rest of the headquarters *personnel*, was on the Samāna Sukh, closely observing the movement, and watches were often compared to note how the attack was getting on. But if slow,





"The brave little Gurkhas streamed across the deadly space. . . . The Scottish Borderers followed close."—*Dargai, 18th October 1897.*

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it never flagged, and ere long the quick sharp cracks of the enemy's rifles, mingled occasionally with the louder booms of their *jezails*, showed that it was coming under effective fire. At last, at twelve noon exactly, a point was reached whence a rush across the open must be made and the affair finished. There was no hesitation. Gallantly led by Major Rose, Captain Bateman-Champain, and Lieutenant Beynon, the brave little Gurkhas streamed across the deadly space as fast as their legs would carry them, or the steep slope would permit. The Scottish Borderers followed close, and with loud cheers the crest of the hill was carried, and the enemy in full retreat shot down as he nimbly fled over its reverse slopes. It was a gallant action, reflecting great credit on all engaged in it, and testifying to their endurance as well as to their pluck. The really dangerous zone crossed at the run was not more than 100 yards across, but so close was the range, and so hot the fire, that many a good soldier threw up his arms and pitched heavily forward stricken to death, before he reached the other side. The Gurkhas left thirteen men killed and wounded on this stony slope; the Borderers six. It is quite marvellous that this was all the loss. But the fact is that about this time Kempster's brigade was beginning to make the pressure of its advance felt, and the tribesmen, ever anxious when their rear is threatened, gave way probably with greater readiness than they otherwise would have done.

To the movements of this brigade I must now advert. The route by which it advanced had been reported on only by natives, and as usual their estimate of its difficulties, and of the time required to reach a given point, was much too low. As a matter of fact, so extraordinarily bad was the track that Sir Power Palmer, after some five miles had with difficulty been accomplished, was compelled to turn back to Shinauri No. 8 Mountain Battery, and a laden animals, under escort of the Dorsets, and two companies of the 15th Sikhs: the mountain-road being absolutely impracticable for four-footed beasts. And, though no effort was relaxed, for the General well appreciated that it was Sir William Lockhart's design that Kempster's brigade should deal the decisive stroke from the rear, yet so long was the road, and so terrific the climb, that the enemy was already in retreat when at last Kempster's men appeared upon the scene. They were, however, in time to accelerate his departure with effective volleys, after which they joined Westmacott on the captured ridge. It was now past 2 P.M., and time to think about returning to camp at Shinauri, fully eight miles distant on a bad road. Westmacott's regiments accordingly filed off at once, and between 4 P.M. and 5 P.M., when the sun was rapidly sinking in the west, Kempster prepared to follow them. But, meantime, the booming of the mountain guns, resounding up and down the Khānki Valley, had spread the news that a fight was going on, and from north and east



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and west the Afridis and Orakzais hastened to the scene of the strife, and General Kempster, who was preparing to withdraw *via* the Chagru Kotal—by the same road, that is, as Westmacott's troops—had to make dispositions to meet them, and to cover the movement in retreat. These dispositions were so ably conceived, and executed with such alacrity and spirit by the tired men, that they met with entire success. The excellent practice of the batteries on the Chagru Kotal, and the steady volleys and resolute bearing of the Gordons, 15th Sikhs, and two companies of the Borderers, who covered the withdrawal from the heights, were too much for the enemy, who, however, pressed their attack with characteristic dash and courage. The fight was carried on until long after darkness had set in; but, though the tribesmen by this time numbered several thousands, they were steadily kept at bay and severe loss inflicted on them, so much so that, after passing the Chagru Kotal, the retreat was absolutely unmolested. From that point there still remained six long and weary miles to camp. General Palmer reported that all the troops, British and Native, behaved with the greatest steadiness, but the honours of the action must be divided between the Gordon Highlanders¹ and the 15th Sikhs, whose losses were respectively ten and eight killed and wounded. Amongst the former were Major Jennings-Bramly

¹ In this affair, No. 2967, Private W. Rennie of the Gordon Highlanders, shot down four of the enemy at close quarters, and obtained honourable mention in General Palmer's Despatch.

killed, and Lieutenant Pears (attached from the Scottish Rifles) severely wounded.

The towers and defences of Dargai were effectually destroyed before the troops retired, and the village itself was burned. The rear-guard reached camp at eleven o'clock at night, having been under arms since 4 A.M., marched between 20 and 25 miles, climbed some 3000 to 4000 feet, and fought a severe action. It was not a bad day's work, and on the following morning Sir William Lockhart telegraphed his congratulations to Sir Power Palmer on having so successfully carried out his instructions.

It was hoped that this action would drive the enemy permanently from the Dargai heights, and leave the road down the Chagru Valley open for the safe passage of our troops; but our expectations were over-sanguine. The ardour of the tribesmen was not at all quenched by their reverse on the 18th. Reinforcements were hurried up to the enemy by the maliks from Khangarbur and Ramadan, and the evening of the 19th found them established in their old position in greater strength than ever. The question, of course, suggests itself, Why surrender the position, having once captured it? It may be admitted at once that, had it been feasible, it would certainly have been advantageous to hold the position won, until, at least, the advance of the main column to Khangarbur had been effected. But it is a question if it was feasible. The water-supply

of Dargai was at a spot called Khand Talāo, nearly three miles away to the west, and the road to it was commanded throughout by adjacent heights, so that, in the presence of an enemy, water could not have been obtained for the troops unless *these heights, as well as the village of Dargai*, had been held in force. Khand Talāo itself was inaccessible to transport animals coming either from Shinauri or from Dargai. If at this stage it had been attempted to occupy Dargai, and also to hold the heights dominating the water-supply, serious delay in the advance of the force into the Khānki Valley would have been the certain consequence; and the troops engaged in the operation would not only have been entangled in extremely difficult ground, where, until the communications had been improved, it would have been almost impossible to supply them betimes with food, water, and ammunition, but also, until we had established ourselves strongly in the Khānki Valley, they would have been exposed to serious attack from the north and west. Thus grave complications might have arisen, and attention and strength would have been diverted from the main and all-important object (which at this time was the capture of the passes leading into Tirah) into indecisive side-issues.

In fact, to hold Dargai alone with a small detachment, as was possible *later*, was impossible while the enemy were masters of the Khānki Valley. While to attempt the major operation of occupying the position in force, and the heights beyond it too,

would have been a hazardous experiment in view of the considerations stated, and a source of anxiety and weakness rather than of confidence and strength. The fact that the place was reoccupied by the enemy in greater strength than ever as soon as we withdrew from it, shows that any detachment left there on the night of the 18th would at once have been fiercely attacked.

Moreover, it must be remembered that the primary object of the operations on the 18th was to drive off the comparatively small bodies of the enemy (Orakzai Alikhels) who at that time held Dargai, and who constantly annoyed our working-parties on the road below. Nothing more than this was contemplated; nor was it anticipated that they would be strongly and immediately reinforced by the Afridis, or possibly other arrangements might have been made. But in the actual circumstances, and in view of Sir William's orders for the 20th, to which I shall refer presently, the requirements of the case did not appear to justify action which, as I have shown, would almost certainly have delayed and dislocated the whole plan of campaign.¹

To continue—On the 19th October it had been the intention of Sir William Lockhart that the 2nd Division should resume work on the Chagru

¹ I have written at some length on this matter, because no point in the campaign has been so adversely criticised as this failure to hold the Dargai heights when they had been once captured. There are always two sides to every question, but irresponsible critics, and men with theories, will often persist in seeing one only.

Kotal-Khorappa road. After the severe fighting, and the losses which the Afridis had sustained on the previous day, it was not unreasonably surmised that the presence of our men, working under the protection of strong covering-parties (which had been arranged), might deter the enemy from re-occupying Dargai. But the troops had been much fatigued on the 18th, and had an arduous task before them again on the 20th, when the march to the Khānki Valley was ordered to begin, so General Yeatman-Biggs decided to give them a rest. Sir William Lockhart on the Samāna (Headquarters at this time were at Fort Lockhart) was not aware of this resolution until it was too late for further action in the matter. Otherwise, convinced of the importance of having the working-parties out, he would have ordered them to be covered by troops from the 1st Division.

We now come to the 20th, when the advance from Shinauri into the Khānki Valley must be commenced in earnest, the 2nd Division leading. Sir William Lockhart's original instructions to the Commander for this advance had been to move by the direct route, *via* the Chagru Kotal, and the road on the *west* side of the Chagru defile. But, late in the evening of the 19th, General Yeatman-Biggs wired up to say that, as the Dargai heights were now occupied again in strength by the enemy, he proposed to march down the *eastern* side of the defile, *via* the Samāna Sukh and the Talia spur. This movement

would, in his opinion, avoid the loss that would be incurred by using the other road, and engaging the enemy on the way, strongly posted as they were on such commanding vantage-ground.

Sir William Lockhart could not, however, approve this idea. His previous decision had been deliberately arrived at, and was based on the fact that he had reliable information that the road down the Talia spur was a mere goat-track, quite unfit for laden animals. But more than this, it was obvious that any attempt to thus evade the tribesmen posted about Dargai would not only have failed in its object, but also would have, in all probability, encouraged them to attack us. They could easily descend from Dargai, and, crossing the defile, vigorously harass and oppose the difficult march down the thickly-wooded and precipitous slopes of the Talia spur; and to be caught on such ground during a tedious processional movement, encumbered by long trains of baggage, supplies, and hospitals, in a position, in fact, in which no commander would willingly sustain an assault, in which reinforcement would be difficult, and from which withdrawal would be dangerous, was an experiment too full of risks to be permitted.

A reply was therefore sent that night to General Yeatman-Biggs that the original plan must be adhered to, and the difficulty faced. It was intimated to him at the same time that two battalions of the 1st Division, and one of its batteries, might be

borrowed for the day to assist in clearing the Dargai heights, and that the Northamptons, and No. 9 Mountain Battery, from Fort Lockhart, would co-operate from the Samāna Sukh. It was further remarked that the enemy would in all probability evacuate the heights as soon as the advancing troops reached the point below the Kotal—only some two or three miles—where the Narik Darra joins the defile, as their rear would then be threatened.


It is thus clear that Sir William Lockhart's intention was to engage the enemy in front with a portion of the force, while other troops pushed down the defile and threatened their rear, *via* the Narik Darra—a combination which would almost certainly have expelled them from their position on the heights without such severe loss as a purely frontal attack must inevitably involve. But General Yeatman-Biggs held that it would be dangerous to march men down the defile until the heights overhanging it had been captured, and, acting on this judgment, ordered a direct assault by the main front approach to be delivered as soon as his leading troops had reached the Kotal at 8 A.M. on the morning of the 20th; and it only remains now to record how gallantly it was carried out.

General Kempster's brigade, consisting of the Dorsets, the Gordons, the 2nd Gurkhas, and the 15th Sikhs, was charged with the task of storming the frowning heights, and it was strengthened for

the occasion by the Derbyshires and the 3rd Sikhs, lent by the 1st Division, and supported by the fire of three batteries on the Kotal under Colonel Purdy, R.A., No. 8 M.B. R.A., No. 1 Kohat M.B., and No. 5 Bombay M.B., while on the Samāna Sukh No. 9 M.B. R.A., and the Northamptons, stood ready to help if required. The tribesmen were assembled in far greater strength than on the 18th. Numerous contingents had joined them in the interim. Nineteen standards were counted, representing all the principal Afridi and Orakzai clans, and it was evident they were prepared to offer a desperate resistance. In vain did the united batteries shower their deadly missiles upon them. The fire was heavy and precise, as any onlooker might see; but on the foe, sheltered behind rocks and sangars, the guns could do but little execution, though doubtless it was cheering to the infantry struggling towards the accomplishment of their desperate task to feel that their friends the gunners were doing their best for them. By 11.15 A.M. the fatal zone was reached by the leading troops, the scouts of the 3rd Gurkhas, under Lieutenant Tillard,¹ and the 1st Battalion 2nd Gurkhas, under Colonel Eaton Travers, and, rushing across it, these brave men, splendidly led by their gallant officers, reached cover on the far side. But it was a costly rush, and was met by such a hot and well-aimed fire, that all they could do was to hold on

¹ Lieutenant Tillard was afterwards actually the first man on the ridge. His orderly, Hastbir, was a good second.





THE DARGAI HEIGHTS,
Shewing the ground over which the troops attacked on the 18th & 20th October 1897.

to the position they had reached, without being able to advance farther. Major Judge was killed on the spot by a shot through the head. Captain Robinson was mortally wounded, and many more dotted the slope, struck down by the leaden hail. In vain did others attempt to follow the splendid lead that had been given them. Their vigilance now fully roused, the enemy poured down such a murderous fire from the cliffs above that the head of each formation attempting the fatal passage was swept away, and Gurkhas, Dorsets, and Derbys, suffering terribly and enduring bravely, could get no farther. At this juncture General Yeatman-Biggs ordered the Gordons and the 3rd Sikhs to the front, and General Kempster, arranging first for three minutes' concentrated fire on the sangars by the massed batteries, launched them to assault. The time had arrived for desperate action, for it was now nearly three o'clock in the afternoon, the dead and wounded were lying thick on every side, over 100 men had already fallen, and the enemy were shouting their defiance, waving their standards, and beating their drums, confident in the impregnability of their position, and certain now of success. But the Gordons had yet to be reckoned with. Rapidly forming his men and addressing them in burning words,¹ Colonel Mathias dashed out at the head of his gallant regiment, and, closely backed by the 3rd Sikhs, in a moment they

¹ "Highlanders! The General says the position must be taken at all costs. The Gordons will take it!"

were all across, carrying every one with them in the impetuosity of their onrush, storming the ridge with a resolution that was resistless, and beating down all opposition. It was indeed a splendid exploit, and thrilled the nerves of all who were privileged to witness it.

But stay. Did I say that they were "all across"? Well, that is wrong. Three men of the Gordons, including Lieutenant Lamont, dropped killed on the spot, and forty-one more fell, more or less severely wounded, amongst them Major Macbean,¹ shot through the groin; Lieutenant Dingwall, severely hit in four places; Lieutenant Meiklejohn, Lieutenant Craufurd, and Captain Uniacke, all slightly wounded; and Colonel Mathias himself, hit in the foot, but only slightly. Many others were shot through their clothes or accoutrements, and had marvellous escapes. The other regiments all suffered heavily too. The Dorsets had nine killed and forty wounded, including Captain Arnold, whose wound was dangerous;² the Derbys four killed, including Captain Smith, and eight wounded; the Gurkhas eighteen killed and forty-nine wounded; the scouts two killed and two wounded; and the 3rd Sikhs three killed and twenty wounded, including Lieu-

¹ Major Macbean was among the first to spring from cover, and lead his men to the attack. He was shot almost immediately, but continued to cheer his men on while lying on the ground.

² Captain Arnold was wounded in a heroic attempt to lead his men across the deadly space before the Gordon rush occurred. "*Come on, E Company!*" he shouted, and sprung to the front, but was struck down almost immediately by the deadly hail from above.

tenant White, shot through the chest. This fine corps splendidly supported the Gordons in their great charge, and their Colonel, Tonnochy, was conspicuous in the forefront of the rush. The grand total of killed and wounded was 199. This will give some idea of the difficulty of the position, and the severity and accuracy of the fire to which the assaulting columns were exposed, and in a situation, too, whence they could not reply with much effect. The enemy's losses, too, were severe, but, as usual, they managed to carry off most of their dead and wounded, and it is impossible to estimate them accurately. They, however, acknowledge defeat, and have made no attempt since to molest the victors, or to retake the lost position, on which the brigade bivouacked for the night. The dead and wounded were carried back to Shinauri, where the former were buried with the honours which they had so gloriously earned, and the wounded were placed in the base hospitals, where there is every arrangement possible for their care and comfort.

Such is the story of the fighting on the 18th and 20th of October, and, whatever criticisms may be passed on the why and the wherefore of it, it will always remain a noble monument to the valour of our troops, and to the splendid heroism of British officers as troop leaders.

Before dismissing this subject, I must narrate two or three incidents connected with the Gordons' grand attack, which are worth placing on record.

The first is, that they were headed in their memorable rush by their pipers. One of these, named Findlater, blowing his loudest and best, was among the first to show the way across that deadly strip of ground above described, and when, after traversing but a few yards, he was laid low, shot through both legs, he managed to prop himself up against a boulder and continued with unabated energy to play "The Cock o' the North," animating his comrades by the familiar and stirring music of his beloved pipes. This hero has been recommended for the Victoria Cross, and we all sincerely hope he will get it, for it has been *grandly* earned.

Another is that, as the Gordons breasted the last stiff ascent, Colonel Mathias, no longer quite in his first youth, was somewhat short of breath, and said to Colour-Sergeant Mackie, alongside whom he found himself at this moment—" *Stiff climb, eh, Mackie? Not quite—so young—as I was—you know.*" " *Never mind, sir!*" answered the gallant Sergeant, giving his C.O. a hearty slap of genuine admiration on the back, which almost knocked his remaining wind out of him—" *Never mind, sir! Ye're gaun verra strong for an auld man!*"

I must add, that when the ridge was captured the Gordons of their own accord lined up and gave three cheers for their gallant Colonel, and officers, British and Native, of Sikhs and Gurkhas, crowded round to shake him by the hand.

The only other incident I would mention is, that on the 22nd Sir William Lockhart had the Gordons paraded, and addressed them with reference to their dashing conduct on the 20th. "Your records," said Sir William, "testify to many a gallant action performed by you, and you have now added to them another which may worthily rank beside those that have gone before. There is more hard work ahead for us all, and I am confident you will do your share of it well when the time comes to call upon you for a fresh effort." Sir William thanked Colonel Mathias personally, and the assembled officers, for their gallant leading, and the parade was then dismissed. The men were immensely pleased by the prompt and kindly praise bestowed by the Chief.

CHAPTER VI

IN THE KHĀNKI VALLEY

KHANGARBUR, 27th October.

AT daybreak on the next day, the 21st, the 2nd Division commenced its advance to the Khānki Valley according to programme, Sir William Lockhart and staff accompanying the movement, but marching independently from Fort Lockhart, down the Talia spur, with the Northamptons, the 36th Sikhs, and No. 9 Mountain Battery. The reports previously received on the state of this road were amply confirmed now. The baggage of even this small force did not reach Khangarbur until late on the 22nd, and some of it not until mid-day on the 23rd. The first intention had been to move on this day only as far as Khorappa, but that locality, situated at the junction of the Chagru defile with the Khānki river, is so commanded on every side by overhanging heights, that the advance was continued another two and a half miles up the valley to a spot nearly opposite the large fortified village of Khangarbur, where an extensive plateau on the north bank of

the Khānki afforded the necessary space for the large force assembling, and, by its remoteness from the nearest commanding ground, promised fair security against those prowling marauders (commonly known as snipers) whose chief amusement is to fire into your camp all night.

Khangarbur was full of Afridis, who briskly opened fire upon the leading brigade—General Westmacott's—but No. 8 Mountain Battery, R.A., promptly coming into action, pitched some shells into the village, and the enemy decided not to remain. Some infantry who were pushed to the front quickened their retreat, and they were soon out of sight in the hills to the north. There were no casualties on our side, and probably very few on theirs.

The march from Shinauri to this place (Khangarbur) is a very long and trying one, fully thirteen miles up hill and down dale, along what in many places is a rough track barely a foot wide, and for the last four or five miles is merely the stony bed of a ravine. Where men, and mules, and guns, and baggage animals have to follow such a trail in single file it is easy to imagine how the column is stretched out. The tail of it is hardly clear of the old camp when the head is arriving at the new. Then supervenes darkness, with all its attendant discomforts and dangers and risks. All calculations as to time and space are simply set at naught by conditions such as obtain in a country like this. A

wretched mule falls down, and the road is blocked at once. A check of this kind, occurring not once but a hundred times probably in the course of the day, multiplies in effect in geometrical progression as it passes from front to rear, and causes delays and fatigues which it is simply impossible to describe in words.

The difficulties of this country must be seen to be appreciated, and it must also be remembered that it produces nothing in the way of supplies except here and there a very moderate amount of forage for the transport animals. Hence everything must be carried with us. Then consider what our numbers are. There are now assembled on this ground 6800 British ranks, 10,200 native ranks, 17,000 followers, and upwards of 25,000 animals! The daily requirements of this multitude in the way of food alone (and they have other needs) amount to 3000 maunds' weight of stuff at a moderate estimate (1 maund = 80 lbs.). But the road from our base at Shinauri is at present so long and winding, and narrow and steep, and so crowded with troops and traffic, that supplies can only be very gradually brought up, and are consumed here almost as soon as they arrive; while to crown our difficulties, it is almost impossible to send back to Shinauri the unladen transport animals, because of the extreme narrowness of the track, on which two mules can hardly pass each other, except at a few points. Needless to say, sappers and pioneers have been,



"A wretched mule falls down, and the road is blocked at once."

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and are, toiling without ceasing to improve it, and every day has made it better, but their work is dreadfully interrupted by the ceaseless stream of traffic. In fact, it has been a case of stopping the traffic or stopping the work.

The consequence of such extraordinary difficulties is, of course, that we have remained here longer than was anticipated to let the columns close up. But the 1st and 2nd Divisions are assembled now; and as we are here within six or seven miles of the foot of the Sampagha Pass, it will, after all, be attacked on the 28th or 29th, as I advised you some days ago.

I have gone into all this at some length by way of explanation of our long halt here, which no doubt is criticised and commented upon adversely in many quarters, and perhaps by some who ought to know better. But an army must be fed, and it would be more than rash to attempt hasty movements in advance, and reckless enterprises, against a hardy and daring enemy, without being assured of ample supplies for man and beast, and feeling confident that every position gained can be maintained and supported.

But if we can satisfactorily account to ourselves for this long waiting, we cannot make the why and wherefore of it clear to the Afridis. They, of course, put it down to hesitation and fear, and in proportion to the timidity which we (in their estimation) display, do their own courage and

confidence increase, and their numbers too. If happily we could have attacked the Sampagha Pass within a day or two of arrival here, we should probably have found it not a very hard task to capture it, for it would not then have been defended by more than half the men that hold it now. But our unavoidable delay has been the tribesmen's opportunity, and they have made the most of it. Our latest information is that all the Afridi clans are now fully represented on the Sampagha, and that, combined with the Orakzais, there are not less than 10,000 or 12,000 of the enemy in our immediate neighbourhood. We also know from political reports—reconnaissances and spies—that they have been busy for some time past in adding to and strengthening the defences of the pass, building walls and sangars to command all likely approaches, digging trenches and rifle pits, and erecting obstacles. Amongst them are hundreds of old pensioned soldiers, many of whom have served their time in our sapper companies, so they know the business well, and are now turning to excellent account the training they have had in our ranks. So the storming of the Sampagha Pass will be something to achieve ; but there is only one feeling among the troops in regard to it, and that is eagerness to begin, and anxiety to be in the leading brigades.

But besides these reports of the gathering of the clans, and of their preparations to defend vigorously

the first of the great gateways of their country, we have other evidence of their numbers, activity, and boldness: for day by day our foraging parties have been harassed by them, and night by night our camp has been surrounded and fusilated with increasing audacity and severity. On the night of the 23rd particularly the enemy's onset amounted almost to an attack, and some of the picquets were heavily engaged from dusk until after midnight. A few star shells were fired with good effect, and the blood-stains found the next morning in many directions, with a few bodies actually retrieved within only 30 or 40 yards of our lines, attested at once the boldness of our assailants, and the fact that they had not gone away unpunished. Our own casualties were insignificant.

The night of the 24th passed in comparative quiet. But on the 25th the foe seemed to have recovered his spirit, for all our foraging parties on that day, though strongly guarded by guns as well as by infantry, were much harassed by crowds of Afridis, who followed them up with amazing energy and intrepidity as they returned to camp, and excited general comment and admiration by the skill with which they skirmished on the mountain side, and by the accuracy and judgment with which they delivered their fire. There was more than one instance of their waiting with coolness until our infantry had to show themselves on the sky-line as they crossed the crest of some ridge, and then

delivering a volley, at a range of 1000 yards sometimes, and invariably knocking some one over.

As darkness came on they closed in on the camp, and their marksmen, establishing themselves in coigns of vantage, began to make it extremely unpleasant for us. I do not know anything more uncomfortable than this whistling of bullets round one from hidden enemies. The fire cannot be replied to, nor can you escape from it, for it comes from all directions, and you are as much exposed in one spot as another. On this particular evening the casualties were numerous among men and followers and animals, some twenty odd being hit. Captain Badcock, D.S.O., 5th Gurkhas, Field Intelligence officer, was shot in the left arm just as he sat down to dinner, and Lieutenant-Colonel Hadow, 15th Sikhs, and Lieutenant Crocker, Munster Fusiliers, orderly officer to Brigadier-General Kempster, were wounded. Many other officers had very narrow escapes, bullets just missing them, or going through their tents. Poor Badcock was hit by a Snider bullet, which shattered the bone so dreadfully that amputation was necessary at once. He has borne the operation well, and, we hope, will soon make a good recovery. Two distant hills from which the fire on the camp seemed to be chiefly directed, one to the east and the other to the south-west, were occupied last night by our own troops, a wing of the 3rd Gurkhas holding one, and the Nabha Infantry, with admirable spirit, volunteer-



"On this particular evening the casualties were numerous."

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ing to hold the other. The consequence was we were left in comparative peace, and slept the sleep of the just.

I told you by wire of the five men, Afridis, who came in on the 24th and gave themselves up to one of our picquets, saying they wished to be loyal and would not fight against us. They proved to be a subadar and a sepoy of the 26th Punjab Infantry, and three pensioned native officers of other corps, all of whom, as it was at once remarked, might very well have come in weeks ago without hindrance had they really wished to prove their loyalty. But arriving on the eve of a general engagement, and coming straight from the enemy, strongly posted within six miles of us, it does seem as if there was more in it than meets the eye. For surely the Afridis would not have let them pass over to us with the chance that they might reveal all their plans and dispositions and strength, unless they had some ulterior design in letting them go. If, however, they reckoned that we should receive them with open arms, pat them on the back, and give them liberty to come and go as friends, they mis-calculated, for the five men were carefully blind-folded while being conducted into Sir William Lockhart's presence, and are detained as prisoners pending the development of events.

The Queen's gracious message of approval of the valour of her troops, of sympathy, and of tender inquiry after the welfare of the wounded, has been

greatly appreciated by all ranks and has gladdened many hearts. The feeling that Her Majesty is watching the progress of events on this wild frontier, as attentively and anxiously as any of her subjects, animates every soldier in this force to render the best service of which he is capable.

CHAPTER VII

THE CAPTURE OF THE SAMPAGHA PASS

CAMP IN THE MASTURA VALLEY, 30th October.

AT last we are fairly under way. It was a week of weary waiting at Khangarbur, but it was inevitable, and I have fully explained why. But the time was not wasted. Reconnaissances and foraging parties were sent out daily, good exercises for men and officers, resulting in the acquisition of useful information regarding routes, etc., and in the accumulation of a considerable quantity of fodder for the transport animals, and a limited amount of grain. Also, as there were constant skirmishes with the enemy, without serious loss on either side, and as, moreover, after each encounter we always perforce retired to our camp, he was gently encouraged, so many of us fondly hoped, to believe himself equal, if not superior, to us, and so we imagined would make a bold stand on the Sampagha, and give us a chance to beat him there handsomely. In this expectation, however, we have been deceived, as the sequel will show. Finally, during the week that we were

reconnoitring, and foraging, and skirmishing, the commissariat were busy pouring supplies into Khangarbur, the road to which from Shinauri has now been so much improved by the strenuous exertions of the Engineers, that even camels can traverse it; and on the 26th and 27th a convoy of 3000 of these animals, which carry loads of 400 lbs. each, came safely through to our camp. Thus, by the evening of the 27th, Sir William Lockhart was prepared to resume the advance in earnest, and to the joy of all the long-looked-for orders for the move were issued on that date.

The march to Gundaki was a very short and easy one on paper, barely three and a half miles; but it meant a good deal more than that for the troops engaged in it. From Khangarbur the route lay almost due north up a broad and undulating valley, fully one and a half miles wide at the start, but narrowing just beyond Gundaki to barely one-third of that distance. It is bounded on the east and west by low hills, which had to be cleared of the enemy and crowned by our infantry before the force could advance. On the east particularly lay some heights which had been regularly held by the Afridis, and on which, on the evening of the 27th, we could count five or six standards and see crowds of men. The 36th Sikhs and the Northampton Regiment were accordingly ordered to start at 5 A.M. and turn them out, and this was effected without more trouble than was involved in an arduous climb. For your

Pathan is not an early riser. He will say his evening prayer with fervour, and eat his evening meal with gusto, and then, fortified in the spirit and in the flesh, he will sling his rifle on his back, stick his knife into his belt, and start out for a few hours' real enjoyment before he turns in: which means that up to about 11 P.M. (or later, if the sport is good) he will amuse himself by shooting into his enemy's camp, or by stalking and cutting up stray camp followers or belated convoys. But about midnight, conscious of duty thoroughly done, he will retire to his eyrie in the rocks, curl himself up, and sleep if allowed until the sun has topped the horizon, and its rays have warmed the chill morning air. Consequently, he is not infrequently caught napping, if only he be sought early enough. And so it happened on this occasion. Before the Afridis were fully aware of the manœuvre, the column, under Colonel Chaytor, was upon them, and hastily bolting, their movements quickened by a few volleys, they abandoned their vantage ground, and the right flank of the force was made secure for the day.

Similarly, the hills on the left of the road were cleared by troops (the Yorks, half-battalion 4th Gurkhas, and half-battalion 3rd Sikhs) detached from the 2nd Brigade (General Gaselee's), and by 9 A.M. the force was in full march up the valley, the First Division on the left of the line, the Second on the right, both preceded, of course, by strong advanced guards. Sir William Lockhart himself


rode at the head of the main body of the First Division.


The opposition offered by the enemy to this advance was practically *nil*, and there were only some ten or twelve casualties incurred in the skirmishing on the flanks. On arriving on the ground on which it was proposed to encamp for the night, or rather bivouac (for the force is without tents), the troops were halted, and piled arms, while the baggage and rearguards closed up. In the meantime, Sir William Lockhart, from commanding ground well to the front, examined the approaches to the pass, and arranged the plan of attack for the following day. Up to the point now reached, the ground had been, as I have said, undulating and easy, and with a gentle rise towards the pass. But directly the Kandi Mishti stream was crossed, which here lay at our feet, it was roughly broken up by ravines and nullahs, between which long rugged spurs ran out from the mountain side, ending many of them in precipitous slopes, which could only be ascended in single file and at particular points. The road up the Sampagha Pass was in full view, zigzagging up one of these spurs. To the east of it (on our right, that is, as we stood facing the position), on an adjacent spur, was the village of Nazeno, which appeared to be full of armed men ; and to the west the village of Kandi Mishti was similarly held. High up on the zigzag path, sangars and walls could be seen, and everything pointed to a stout defence and a sharp



"Sir William Lockhart . . . examined the approaches to the pass."

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fight on the following day. It was not to be, however, notwithstanding that reconnaissances were fired on briskly, and that our picquets this night were sharply attacked, particularly on the left flank, incidents all tending to confirm the belief that the enemy meant to fight.

The plan of attack was as follows, omitting details:—

The honour of leading the direct attack by the main approach to the pass was intrusted to the 2nd Brigade (General Gaselee's), the Gurkha scouts of the division co-operating. This brigade was to leave its bivouac at 5 A.M., and it was reckoned would be across the Kandi Mishti stream, and established on the far side of it by daylight. By the same hour, the massed batteries of the two divisions, thirty-six guns, under Brigadier-General Spragge, and the rocket detachment, under Captain Browne, R.A., were to be in position on a flat-topped spur beyond the stream, almost opposite the centre of the position to be attacked. The 4th Brigade (Westmacott's) was to support the 2nd, particularly on its right flank, and the 3rd Brigade (Kempster's) was to follow it in reserve. The 1st Brigade (General Hart's) was distributed to protect the batteries, and to co-operate with, and support the whole movement by detaching a regiment to assail the village of Nazeno on the right flank of our advance, and another to attack Kandi Mishti on the left flank. I may say here that the Devons

on one side, and on the other the 2nd battalion 1st Gurkha Rifles (who, by the way, had their colonel, Sage, severely wounded in a reconnaissance the previous evening) carried out these operations very successfully. The baggage was left in camp ready for loading under suitable guards, which included the Nabha Infantry, and a squadron of the 18th Bengal Lancers, with instructions that it was to be brought on directly a helio message was sent back to it.

Such were briefly Sir William Lockhart's dispositions for the attack on the Sampagha Pass, to which every one has been so keenly looking forward for so many days past, and, notwithstanding some small delays caused in the beginning of the operations, they were entirely successful. The morning of 29th October was dark and cold, but still and clear. General Hart's Brigade was the first to move off, and had occupied its allotted positions in good time to protect the batteries as they took up their ground, and to cover the general advance. But in such a difficult country, and in the dark, it is particularly easy to lose your way. The batteries of the First Division got blocked on the road, and thus were somewhat late in coming into action ; and General Gaselee's Brigade took a wrong turning in one of the ravines through which it was threading its way, and lost a little time before it recovered its right direction. But these mistakes were soon put right. By 7 A.M. the attack was fairly launched on the

lines designed by Sir William, and it soon became evident that the enemy did not mean to fight very seriously, for they could be seen vacating positions in many directions, and wending their way up to the very crest of the pass, as though it was there they had determined to make their stand.

At one important point, however, on the zigzag road, there was a large sangar which evidently held some determined spirits; and as the Queen's and the 4th Gurkhas, who led the advance (their General with them) in capital style, approached it, a smart fire was opened on them, and several men were knocked over. The fire of the batteries of the Second Division was, however, turned on to this sangar with such effect that, after standing about twenty minutes of it, its occupants, some hundred or so, bolted, and the shells knocked many of them over as they fled up the hill-side. After this the infantry advance was nowhere opposed by anything like an organised defence, though a sputtering fire was aimed at it from many points, and casualties occurred here and there. The Queen's had one man killed and eight wounded (including their commanding officer, Major Hanford Flood), the Gurkhas two, the Yorkshires four, the 36th Sikhs two men killed and two wounded, No. 8 M.B., R.A., three men wounded; No. 5 Bombay M.B. lost its commanding officer, Captain De Butts, killed by a shot in the abdomen, and there were a few other casualties.

But the total was insignificant in proportion to the size of the force engaged, the magnitude of the enterprise, and the great natural strength of the position held by the enemy. Had they defended it with one-quarter of the determination shown by them on the Dargai heights on the 20th inst., no doubt the loss of life would have been far greater. Let us be thankful that they did not. The fact is that, on this occasion at all events, they seemed afraid to face the artillery fire. The practice made by the batteries was certainly excellent. Their shells appeared to burst with beautiful precision just where wanted, and their handling generally on this day was admirable.

By 9.45 A.M. the leading troops of General Symons's division had arrived on the crest of the ridge, and the pass was captured, but it was somewhat later—11.15 is, I understand, the official time—when the enemy had been entirely driven off, and firing had ceased. Sir William Lockhart himself, attended by General Nicholson, Sir Richard Udny, Lord Methuen, and the rest of his staff, had by this time arrived on the summit, whence a heliogram was at once despatched announcing the news to the Commander-in-Chief, and to his Excellency the Viceroy. The troops had all acquitted themselves admirably, for the climb had been a most arduous one, and though the opposition had not been very serious, yet the attack had been carried right through from start to finish without a check. The



MASTRA VALLEY.

"Wide, flat, well watered . . . fairly timbered."

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summit of the pass is 6700 feet above sea-level, so an ascent of fully 2000 feet was included in the morning's work.

The Mastura Valley now lay smiling below us. Its general level is only some 800 to 1000 feet below the crest of the pass, so the descent into it by a terribly stony, but very gently graded, road was a very simple matter. The troops were pushed on at once, the Yorks and the 3rd Sikhs remaining on the pass for the night, to protect the transport with which the road was now blocked, and Brigadier-General Hart's Brigade halting at Kandi Mishti to maintain communication with Gundaki.

We have all been much struck by the appearance of this valley. It is wide, flat, well watered even here at its head, fairly timbered with apricot and walnut trees about the villages, which are very numerous and well-built, and evidently inhabited by an industrious and well-to-do people. A great deal of land is under cultivation, the fields are carefully terraced, and signs of plenty and comfort are abundant. But the inhabitants, of course, have all fled. With their families, their flocks and their herds, they have betaken themselves across the mountains to some remote fastnesses, or possibly across the Afghan border, until this time of tribulation be overpast.

The last two days have been such a tax upon the transport that to-day, the 30th, Sir William has decided to halt, partly to rest the animals, and partly

to reconnoitre the onward road. The Arhanga Pass is now within five miles of us. It leads us into Tirah proper, the inviolate home of the Afridis. Will they defend it like men, or will they scatter and scuttle before our advance, as they, and their neighbours, the Orakzais, did yesterday? That is the question of the moment. Another twenty-four hours should see it answered.

CHAPTER VIII

THE CAPTURE OF THE ARHANGA PASS, AND THE OCCUPATION OF TIRAH

HEADQUARTERS CAMP, MAIDAN, TIRAH,
5th November.

HERE we are in the promised land at last! A land not exactly flowing with milk and honey, but extensive, fertile, highly cultivated, and capable of much development under a settled government. But of this more presently. The past week has been an eventful and important one, and I must hark back to its commencement and take up the thread of my narrative where I last dropped it.

I closed my last letter on the 30th October in the Mastura Valley, the day after that on which the Sampagha Pass was captured. Sir William Lockhart would gladly have gone on at once to the attack of the Arhanga Pass, and the troops would have cheerfully responded had he called on them for this effort, which at one time was at all events considered. But prudence dictated a halt for at least twenty-four hours. In the first place, the distance to the pass was uncertain, and its difficulties,

based altogether on native report, a matter of conjecture. In the next, it was absolutely necessary to let the transport close up, and give the Commissariat time to push up supplies. Many regiments, so great was the block on the Sampagha, did not get their baggage on the evening of the 29th, and spent the night *à la belle étoile* with only their greatcoats and the rations carried in their haversacks.¹ For these reasons Sir William decided to halt one day to rest the troops and the baggage animals, to allow supplies to come on, and to reconnoitre the approaches to the Arhanga, whose heights no European had heretofore scaled.

Thus, while the reconnaissance was proceeding on the 30th, the Commissariat and Transport Staff devoted their best energies to keep the stream of laden mules and ponies flowing throughout the day from Gundaki over the Sampagha into the camp at Mastura. Sappers and Miners and Pioneers toiled unceasingly to improve the road, and the whole of the 1st Brigade, under General Hart's personal direction, exerted itself to press on the important work by helping to control and direct the traffic. There were some who thought it would be impossible, so great was the block on the road, to make such arrangements by the evening as would

¹ "My great difficulty was the want of food, some corps having absolutely nothing in hand, and the steep and narrow track over the pass delaying the arrival of supplies. But by redistributing what there was, and making use of what could be collected from neighbouring villages, each man was eventually provided with two days' rations."—*Sir William Lockhart's Despatches*.


justify a forward move on the 31st. But Colonel Christopher, the Commissary-General with the force, is a resourceful man and a masterful. His spirits, too, are never-failing, and his way of always taking a rosy view of things, and of making the best of a situation, has the effect of reassuring his subordinates and making them cheerfully put their best work into the task of the moment. In Major Mansfield, too, the head of the Transport, he has a most efficient assistant; and it was enough for General Nicholson, the chief of the Staff, to intimate what were Sir William Lockhart's wishes regarding the advance on the morrow for Colonel Christopher to determine that, so far as his department was concerned, it could be arranged.¹

In the meantime, Sir William Lockhart himself, attended by the principal officers of his Staff, and escorted by General Kempster's Brigade, and a battery of artillery, rode out to view the road and examine the approaches to the Arhanga Pass, and, as far as might be, the enemy's dispositions. The party was fired on soon after leaving camp, but the enemy fell back as our skirmishers advanced, and careful observations were made almost up to the foot of the pass, on which Sir William was able to plan the attack for the morrow. The whole distance from camp to the summit of the pass is only about four miles.

¹ "Thoroughly acquainted with their work, and full of resource, these officers never raised unnecessary difficulties, and were always ready to meet military requirements."—*Sir William Lockhart's Despatches*.

It was at once obvious that this pass was an easier one to attack than the Sampagha. The approaches to it were not broken up by such frequent and deep ravines, there was more favourable ground for turning movements, and opposite the centre of the position was a low hill, which, at a range of barely 1300 yards from the crest of the pass, formed an ideal position for artillery. On the other hand, no enemy, certainly not an enemy with the reputation and the rifles of the Afridis, should have allowed himself to be driven from such a position as that formed by the Arhanga heights without inflicting terrible loss on the assailant. Behind the rocks and sangars on the crest-line, or sheltered on the reverse slopes of the mountain, they could not after all be very much hurt by shell-fire; while from their lofty vantage-ground they could note, and, if they willed it, prepare in good time to meet, every disposition made for the attack; while almost from the foot of the laborious ascent the troops advancing against them would be exposed to their effective rifle-fire. Thus there was certainly no balance of advantage on our side, and notwithstanding that they had not shown much spirit at the Sampagha, it was confidently expected that they would rally on the ramparts of the Arhanga, and defend desperately the last avenue leading to their cherished Tirah.

But again we were disappointed—pleasantly disappointed, if you will—because no one wants to see



MASTURA VALLEY, LOOKING NORTH.


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a long list of casualties, which may indeed be a proof of desperate fighting, but is not necessarily evidence of good generalship. The Afridis, in our own service, and under the leadership of British officers, have often shown themselves dashing and brave soldiers. But left to themselves, they are no better than any other wild tribe, and decidedly inferior to some—the Waziris, for example. Moreover, it is impossible not to doubt that they have been much impressed by the valour of our troops, and the splendid leading of the officers, on the Dargai heights, on the 18th and 20th October, while all reports tend to show that their own losses on those occasions were much heavier than has been generally supposed. So now, when from their eyries in the rocks they noted the General's skilful dispositions, the steady unwavering advance of the men, the numbers launched against them, and the deadly precision of our artillery fire, their hearts failed them, and they went.

Let me explain now what Sir William Lockhart's dispositions for attack were, and how they were carried out. The 2nd Division was to lead, General Yeatman-Biggs commanding. The advanced guard was formed by the 4th Brigade (Brigadier-General Westmacott), supplemented by the 3rd Gurkha scouts and a company of Sappers. Its special function was to drive in any outlying picquets of the Afridis, and take possession of the low hill in the centre, previously mentioned, in order to let the

massed batteries of the two divisions occupy it. The 3rd Brigade (Brigadier-General Kempster), also with a Sapper company, followed the 4th, and its orders were, after the artillery had come into action, to work round to the left of Westmacott's battalions, and demonstrate against the enemy's right flank. Next came Major-General Symons, commanding the 1st Division, with the 2nd Brigade under Brigadier-General Gaselee, to which was assigned the important duty of turning the enemy's left flank. This brigade, too, was accompanied by a company of Sappers, and the remaining Sapper companies, with the 28th Bombay Pioneers, followed close in rear of the centre, ready to push forward and commence work on the road over the pass directly opportunity offered. The 1st Brigade (Hart's) of General Symons' Division concentrated this day, the 31st, in the Mastura Valley, where it stood in reserve as a strong *point d'appui* between the two passes. The baggage of the advancing troops, as at the storming of the Sampagha, was stacked, and left in camp ready for loading, with orders that it was to be brought on directly a message to that effect was heliographed back.

Such were Sir William Lockhart's dispositions for the attack on the Arhanga, and as the Afridis noted the quiet business-like way in which they were carried out, the numbers sent against them, the menace to their flanks, and the searching fire of the guns, they must have considered their plight a



hopeless one from the first. By 5 A.M. the force was under arms and ready to move off from its bivouac, and by 7 o'clock the skirmishers of the advanced guard were in contact with the enemy, a few of whom had been thrown out as scouts as far as the foot of the slopes leading to the crest of the Arhanga. These were at once driven in, the low hill in the centre (called Unai, from the village on it) was occupied by the Borderers, and by 7.45 A.M. the three batteries of the 2nd Division (No. 9 British, No. 8 British, and No. 5 Bombay), under Colonel Purdy, R.A., had come into action on its summit, and were making excellent practice against the enemy, visible in groups here and there on the sky-line of the pass. The batteries of the 1st Division (No. 1 British, No. 1 Derajat, and No. 2 Kohat), under Colonel Duthy, R.A., arrived very shortly afterwards and prolonged the line to the right, so that Brigadier-General Spragge by 8.15 had a well-posted line of 36 guns pouring a most deadly fire on the Afridis (the range was never outside 1300 yards), under cover of which the infantry now advanced to the attack.

The order of the attack I have already explained. It practically devolved upon Brigadier-General Gaselee's Brigade to deal the stroke that should be decisive. Accordingly, while the guns, and Westmacott's Brigade, held the enemy in the centre, and while Kempster diverted attention by demonstrating against his right, the battalions of

Gaselee's Brigade (with whom for the day were the 5th Gurkha scouts, some eighty in number, under Captain Lucas and Lieutenant Bruce) climbed steadily up the ravines on his left, and at ten minutes to ten exactly their leading files reached the crest of the hill. The ascent was a very steep one, though well sheltered the greater part of the way from direct fire, and there was admirable rivalry for the honour of being the first to top the summit. As nearly as possible the Yorkshire Regiment and the 5th Gurkha scouts arrived at the same time, but the Queen's, the 3rd Sikhs, and the 4th Gurkhas were all close up, and the performance of the whole brigade was excellent.

The Afridis did not wait for the full development of this flanking movement. They were already in full retreat, "over the hills and far away," by the time that it was accomplished, and firing at once ceased. By 11 A.M. Sir William Lockhart was himself on the top of the pass, troops were being pushed down it into Tirah as fast as the narrow and precipitous road would permit, and the good news had been flashed back direct to Fort Lockhart, on the Samāna range, for transmission to the Viceroy and to the Commander-in-Chief, that the pass was in our possession.

The strength of the enemy on this occasion, or their losses, it is impossible to estimate. It was expected that they would muster in thousands for the defence of this particular pass, and that here, if

anywhere, they would make a great and gallant stand. But it may be doubted if even 1000 of them were actually in line when we attacked. The remainder were probably more concerned in removing their families and flocks and herds to places of safety and refuge than in meeting us in fair fight. It may be supposed that, as they have had weeks of warning, they might have done this sooner, but procrastination is characteristic of all Orientals, and possibly they could not bring themselves to believe, until literally the eleventh hour, that after centuries of inviolate seclusion, we should dare, or should be able, to "lift the purdah," and penetrate into their sacred valley. There can be no question, at all events, that they quitted in haste, for evidences of the fact abound. Their houses, for example, are full of grain and walnuts and potatoes, etc., which they might easily have removed at leisure had they thought of it; and they will soon feel the want of these things, for wherever they have gone, they cannot live on their neighbours very long. And if their strength on the Arhanga be represented by x , their losses may be expressed by y . They are absolutely unknown, and it is futile to guess what they may be. Blood splashes were found in many places along their line of defence, and undoubtedly some of them were killed and others wounded, chiefly by the artillery fire, but the actual numbers placed *hors de combat* must be a matter for conjecture.

To turn to our side, our casualties were practically *nil*. Captain Searle, of the 36th Sikhs, was wounded severely by a chance shot quite at the commencement of the proceedings, and there were four or five men hit—soldiers or battery drivers—during the attack. That was all. It is only to be accounted for by the reasons I have already indicated; but the insignificant losses do not in any degree detract from the credit due to the General, and to the troops, for the success attending a plan skilfully designed and resolutely executed.¹

From the crest of the Arhanga Pass we looked down on the promised land, Tirah, or rather on that part of it known as Maidan. The Mastura Valley, which we had just left, is also a part of Tirah, but is Orakzai Tirah; Maidan and the next valley to the north of us, Rājgal, which no doubt we shall visit shortly, constitute Afridi Tirah proper. No European has penetrated into these valleys hitherto, though one or two may have traversed the fringes of them, and it has been the proud boast of the Afridis from time immemorial that no enemy of whatever race or creed has ever attempted to cross the mountain barriers which shut them in, and to meddle with them in their own fastnesses. Well, we have changed all that now. The veil of their

¹ "That a more formidable resistance was not offered in the passes leading respectively into Orakzai and Afridi Tirah I attribute to the lesson taught those tribes at Dargai in the actions of the 18th and 20th October. They then learnt that their strongest positions could not avail them against the valour of British and Native troops."—*Sir William Lockhart's Despatches*.

temple has been rent in twain, and the mysterious interior has been rudely revealed. There was no lingering on the Arhanga when once the enemy had been driven off. Troops at once poured down the northern slopes to the fertile valley below ; sappers and pioneers were at work on the road before the last reverberations of the guns had died away among the mountains ; and the baggage being " helio'd " up, the stream of it set in with such violence that, unfortunately, on this and the succeeding night, some of the trains were overtaken by darkness, and raided by the enemy, with most serious loss to ourselves in men and material, as I shall relate immediately.

The place selected for encampment of the force was a locality about three miles due north of the Arhanga, near a hamlet, in about the centre of the Maidan district. There are no villages here strictly so called, nor in the Mastura Valley. But there are innumerable houses dotted all over the country. They occur every quarter of a mile or so, and are large, strong, substantial buildings, generally including a tower or keep, and capable of a strong defence so long as artillery is not brought against them. Guns would, of course, knock them to pieces at once. In each of these houses lives a family, or a group of blood relations ; in one, for example, several brothers, with their wives and children, and fathers and mothers, etc. ; in another a petty chief, with his immediate following, his sisters, cousins,

and aunts, and so on. But, needless to say, they are all empty now. With one accord the people have fled before our approach, and we have the valley to ourselves.

But not the surrounding hills. They are full of houseless and prowling marauders, and no party can leave camp in any direction without a skirmish, or an exchange of shots with them. Of all the Afridi clans the Zakka-khels are the most numerous, the most powerful and influential, and the most notorious for daring raids and treacherous attacks. They inhabit all Southern Maidan and important strips of country in Maidan, and in the Bara, Bazar, and Khyber Valleys. A glance at these places on the map will show that they hold a geographical position in Afridiland which gives them superiority and pre-eminent consideration in all Afridi councils. At present they are our immediate neighbours to the south, and, in fact, our line of communications with the Mastura Valley, *via* the Arhanga Pass, lies through Zakka-khel territory.

This fact was rudely brought to our recollection by the occurrences of the nights of 31st October and 1st November, which I will now describe. I have said that immediately the pass was captured on the 31st, the baggage was helio'd for from the rear, and, most unfortunately, on two days running, such a crowd was allowed to stream over the pass that it could not be cleared out of the dangerous defile on this side before darkness had set in. This was the

Zakka-khels' opportunity. Swooping down from the crags, on which all day they had kept patient watch, they rushed the weary trains and tired escorts at various points, and were only too successful in their raids on both occasions. The Queen's (Royal West Surrey Regiment) lost on the second night three men killed and four wounded, ten boxes of Lee-Metford ammunition (1100 rounds in a box), three rifles, and some 350 kits, together with 71 baggage ponies, which were carrying them, and which stampeded in the darkness as soon as the firing and shouting began. On the first night nine drivers were killed and wounded, and 188 kits belonging to the 15th Sikhs were carried off.

These were very unfortunate events. Not only were the losses serious, but the moral effect of them was bad. They ought not to have occurred. But the confusion attendant on a rapid advance after a successful action is unavoidably great, and the strict control necessary at points in rear, which must often cause a commander and his staff more anxiety than the enemy in front, is frequently lacking for the first day or two. However, the strictest measures have since been taken to prevent convoys and baggage from being benighted, and we must hope that some early opportunity may be afforded of getting even with the Zakka-khels.

In the meantime the force has settled down and is enjoying a few days' well-earned rest pending the next development of the situation. This will

probably take the form of some discussion with the tribes. In Sir William Lockhart's original proclamation to them he said that from the heart of their country he would announce to them the final terms of the British Government. The heart of their country is now reached, and as soon as the political officers can get into touch with their maliks these terms will be announced. The usual way of publishing announcements in similar circumstances is to send out copies by hand to the various clans and sections ; but they are an ignorant, illiterate people, and the documents thus distributed must then be read and interpreted to them by their Mullahs, who can, of course, and do, explain, suppress, add to, or distort their contents, as they please, and to suit their own purposes. For these reasons, the occasion being an important one, instead of sending out proclamations by messengers, the tribes have been summoned to send in their jirgahs, in order that they may be plainly told by ourselves what are the terms imposed. The jirgahs of the Samil Orakzais (who from the first have been ready to treat with us), and of at least three of the Afridi clans—the Malikdin-khels, the Khambar-khels, and the Kuki-khels—may be expected to arrive almost immediately ; but it is doubtful if the Zakka-khels will have any dealings with us just yet. At the same time, seeing us in possession, occupying their lands and devouring their stores ; and noting our determination and our power to punish ; with the



"Strings of mules go out every day, with sufficient escorts, and return in the evening laden up with freight."

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winter, too, coming on while they are wanderers on the bleak mountain-sides ; they must see the hopelessness of prolonged resistance, and we may reasonably hope that, within a measurable period of time, we shall induce them to meet us and to agree to terms. The temper of these wild tribes is, however, a factor *varium et mutabile semper*, and it is too early yet to forecast what line they will take.

Meanwhile, the troops pass the days in frequent reconnaissances and in foraging. The former are always accompanied by officers of the Intelligence Branch, and of the Survey Department, and, under the superintendence of Colonel Sir Thomas Hollidich, R.E., and Colonel More-Molyneux, A.Q.M.G. for Intelligence, the whole of the country we pass through or occupy is being rapidly mapped and exploited. The foraging parties are worked on a regular system, and with great success. Half the valley is allotted, for foraging purposes, to one division, half to the other. Each division then tells off particular sections to each brigade, and each brigade in turn points out particular lines to be worked by each regiment. Thus there is no confusion, and no waste of power or time. Strings of mules go out every day, with sufficient escorts, and return in the evening laden up with forage, which abounds, and with sacks of potatoes, wheat, Indian corn, pumpkins, walnuts, etc., of all of which enough is found to appreciably lessen the strain of supply on the commissariat. The fodder is taken straight

to the transport lines and stacked ; the food stuffs are deposited in the brigade store depots of each brigade, whence the commissariat officer in charge reissues them as rations in due course.

The foragers not infrequently find odds and ends of booty which they annex for themselves—to wit, old *jezails*, swords and daggers, and Korans. These are retained by the finders as mementoes of the campaign. Of Korans there are two kinds—the one printed in Peshawar or Lahore, and of no particular interest or value ; the other hand-written, and generally illustrated and illuminated. These are rare, and are very precious finds indeed. A few, however, have been taken.

One expedition from camp, undertaken on the day after our arrival here, was of more than passing interest, and I will briefly refer to it. There is a place a short three miles west from this spot called Bāgh. It is simply a mosque, or *musjid*, surrounded by a small grove of trees, but it is notorious as the place where the Afridis hatch most of their raids and forays ; it is the spot where the present uprising was originated and decided on ; and it has always been known as a centre of intrigue and fanaticism. Sir William Lockhart decided, therefore, to pay Bāgh a visit, to demonstrate to the Afridis our power to reach them anywhere, and to punish their mal-practices how and when we please. A small column, consisting of the King's Own Scottish Borderers, the 1st Battalion 3rd Gurkha Rifles, and No. 8

Mountain Battery R.A., the whole under the command of Colonel Dixon, King's Own Scottish Borderers, the senior officer, was accordingly despatched to carry out Sir William's orders. A few of the enemy were on the hills on our right as the column marched out, and they managed to knock over four of the Gurkhas before a few well-directed shells from Major Shirres's battery cleared them out. The famous mosque was then approached. In appearance it is a mean building, little better than a cattle-shed. It is, however, a place of worship, and therefore, as a matter of course, respected. It was not touched; but, as a permanent mark of the Sirkar's wrath and punishment, the trees surrounding it were all "ringed," which means that they will all be dead within the year. If the party had carried axes they might have been felled at once, but we had only the Gurkhas' *kukris*. These, however, served every purpose, and no doubt, now that the accursed Feringhi has made his mark on Bāgh, the place will lose its importance and sanctity.¹

¹ Captain T. G. Maclarens of the Borderers was slightly wounded in this reconnaissance.

CHAPTER IX

LIFE IN TIRAH—THE AFFAIR OF THE 9TH NOVEMBER

MAIDAN, TIRAH, *8th November.*

WE entered this valley on 31st October ; we are here still ; we may remain indefinitely. This is a situation which raises reflections. It cannot be regarded as a satisfactory one, from the *soldier's* point of view. So long as we were on the move, advancing, attacking, gaining ground, defeating and driving off the enemy whenever encountered, it was all plain sailing, and every one was happy. What though we had to take some hard knocks, and to rough it not a little? You cannot make omelets without breaking eggs, and you cannot make war in kid gloves. Our losses and our fatigues were all in the day's work, and were cheerfully endured. But now has come the unsatisfactory part of the business, the halt while we try to negotiate, and consider ways and means, and we are conscious that the delay and inaction involved thereby are as mistaken as to the motive for them (by our enemies) as they are irksome and unpleasant in their consequences to our-


selves. It is, however, unavoidable that we should rest here on our oars for a while, as there is a political as well as a military aspect of the campaign to be considered; and a halt is necessary while knotty points are discussed in all their bearings—Simla and the Foreign Office taking part, no doubt, in the discussions. But a savage and untutored enemy does not always understand why we halt, so I may usefully state some of its immediate effects upon him, and some of the considerations to which they give rise.

The first and immediate effect, then, of this pause in our active operations is that the Afridis recover their wind and their frightened senses, and bethink themselves to seek reprisals, and to get even with us as best they may for the defeats inflicted upon them, and for the insults and injury resulting from the invasion and occupation of their country. They are no simpletons, these Afridis. They know very well now that they cannot meet us in open fight. They recognise our superiority in organisation, in equipment, in leading, and above all in guns, and they give way as we advance, without attempting to offer an opposition which they feel would be fruitless. But when we halt and form big camps, and begin to think rather of feeding ourselves, and of maintaining safely our long line of communications, than of following and attacking them, then the Afridi sees his opportunity, and says softly to himself, “It is my turn now! There goes a convoy; let us ambuscade

it! There, my brethren, starts a foraging party; let us rush it! There marches a reconnaissance; let us harass it! There overhead is the wire on which these accursed infidels talk to each other; let us cut it! And, finally, there is their huge camp, which is eating us up, with its fields of billowy canvas, and its long rows of thousands of baggage animals; who wants a fairer mark for his rifle? Come, let us fire into it!" And all these things they do, and have done, with more or less success, during the last ten days. Almost every night since we have been here the telegraph wire has been cut, and a mile or two of it carried off. Convoys coming over the Arhanga have been raided; and reconnaissances and foraging parties are fired on when only a mile or two out of camp, and in some instances have even been rushed by swordsmen, and sustained serious loss. As to firing into camp by night, it has been a common occurrence, and it is miraculous that the casualties are not greater. It is extremely unpleasant, this whizz and spatter of bullets while you are at dinner, or trying to enjoy a pipe round a camp fire before turning in. If you have got to be shot leading your men in action, that is all right, and a proper and honourable way of being shot. You take, in fact, a legitimate risk which no soldier objects to. But to be potted in the dark is *autre chose*. There is neither glory for yourself, nor gain for your country, in achieving such an end to your career, and, as I said before, it

The Picquets on the Northern Slopes of the Arhanga Pass.
November - December 1897.

From a Sketch by Major A. Bewicke-Copley, K.R. Rif. C.
D.A. Q.M.G. for Intelligence.
2nd Div. T.E.F.



A.B.C.D.E.F. Night and Day picquets, strongly intrenched.
b.c.d.e.f. Day picquets.

Z.Z. Points from which enemy sought to attack convoys on the road.
The arrows show the ground covered by the fire of the picquets.

is extremely unpleasant to hear the ping of the shots, to see men knocked over (I was sitting opposite Captain Badcock when he was hit), and to feel that it may be your turn perhaps next.

To those who have not soldiered in these wild mountains it may seem astounding that measures cannot be devised to stop this night firing, and to render camps perfectly secure during the hours of darkness. Something, of course, can be done, and you may be sure that such precautions as are possible are not neglected. In a country like this it is, however, quite impracticable to put a camp down in a locality which is not commanded from at least two or three spots. These commanding spots are held by picquets, as a rule; but their posts may be, in their turn, so completely under fire from some adjacent height as to be almost untenable. Again, these tribesmen, wily, bold, and active as they are, think nothing of getting in on dark nights between a picquet and the camp, and in such a position three or four men with Martini-Henry rifles can easily "brown" the camp with forty or fifty shots before they can be dislodged. The whole country is a network of ravines, nullahs, and rugged hills, and is admirably adapted to the guerilla tactics which they profess and excel in, and so long as we are stationary we must put up with a certain amount of annoyance and loss from this night firing. On the night of the 6th it was unusually bad about dinner-time, 7 P.M., and amongst other casualties

Lieutenant Giffard, of the Northampton Regiment, was killed, and Captain Sullivan, 36th Sikhs, severely wounded by a shot through the left forearm. Poor Giffard had been sitting at the head of the table, and as the fire became hot, he shifted his seat to one which seemed a little more sheltered, saying, laughingly, "This isn't good enough; I'm going to move." He had hardly reached his new place when he was shot dead. It was very sad. His funeral the next day was attended by Sir William Lockhart, with the headquarters staff, and all the officers in camp not on duty. Captain Sullivan's luck in being hit was very bad. He was not long ago invalided to England from Suakin, but managed to pass the Board, and hurried out to India as soon as he knew his regiment was going to the front. He had succeeded in overtaking us this very day (the 6th) at about 11 A.M., and was shot, and of course placed *hors de combat* for the rest of the campaign, at six the same evening. Such is the fortune of war! On the next night but one, the 8th, Captain Watson, of the commissariat department, was shot dead by a stray bullet in the same way. He was a first-rate officer, and the best of comrades, and, I sorrow to say, leaves a widow and four children to lament his fate. War is indeed cruel! But it is not any pleasanter to be shot when out foraging or reconnoitring. Yet our casualties incurred on these duties since we came here on 1st October are steadily mounting up. I explained

in my last letter the system on which the collection of forage and supplies is conducted, and I might have added what is the fact, that these parties never go out without encountering marauding bands of Afridis, and becoming engaged with them more or less seriously. Success in one or two raids makes these men extremely bold, and they are as cunning and clever as they are audacious. They show much patience in watching and waiting for their prey, and great dash and impudence in their attacks when they make them. Nearly always they are beaten off, but sometimes drivers will get frightened, mules will stampede, and escorts will get separated. So that almost daily we lose a few men killed and wounded in these inglorious combats. It is doubtless true that we kill and wound some of them too, but we rarely have the satisfaction of being able to speak with any certainty on the point ; and, after all, they hold life very cheap, and think they have done well if at the cost of a few lives of their own they have slain some of us and have captured some of our mules and baggage. In any case, actions of this class are fought by us on the defensive. All the moral advantages and elation pertaining to the attack are theirs ; all the disadvantage and depression ours.

The question, then, of the hour, is *Quousque tandem?* How long is this situation to last ? When will it change ? In what direction will the next development be ? It is understood that as


soon as representative jirgahs of the tribes can be assembled the terms of Government will be announced to them. But we must first catch our jirgahs. At present they show small sign of coming in to parley with us. Some of the Samil Orakzais certainly have arrived, and it is said that some of the Afridi clans are also on their way in. But the most important and powerful of all of them, the Zakka-khels, openly defy us to do our worst, and urge the others, many of whom have reason to fear them, not to yield. Accordingly, we are doing our worst to them. Sir William Lockhart has hitherto issued the strictest orders to spare the houses and villages in the country we have passed through and in the valley in which we are halted. But the Zakka-khels do not understand clemency of this kind. They put it down to weakness. It is known that they are the mainspring of the revolt. They were the leaders of the unprovoked attacks on our forts in the Khyber, and carried off from them the bulk of the loot; and they are the section which has principally opposed our advance, raided our convoys, attacked our foraging parties, and fired into our camps. For these very sufficient reasons Sir William Lockhart has decided not to allow the Zakka-khels any more law, and all their fortified houses in Maidan, from the loop-holed walls and towers of which we are fired on daily, are to be burned and levelled to the ground. Whether this measure will have the effect of making them yield

valley in which the British were after the 1st

Line reached by the re-enforcement on the 9th November

Hill occupied by Artillery
during the Advance

Siam San Park



SIRAN SAN. 9TH NOVEMBER 1897.

To scale one mile 10

their submission, or whether it will exasperate them into making a big attack on our camp, time alone can show. We should all prefer the latter; but as to the justice of their punishment there cannot be two opinions.

10th November.

The events of the last two days have been such as to accentuate all that I have already written. I have, in fact, to record now an occurrence so unfortunate that the term disaster may almost be applied to it. An outline of what happened has, of course, been wired to you, but the fuller details one can give in a letter will not be without interest. There is a mountain a short five miles north-east of this camp, named Saran Sar. Its height is about 8000 feet. A rough but evidently much used road leads over it into the Upper Bāra Valley, and by this road when we first arrived, and almost daily since, Afridis have been seen going and coming—going, that is, on our approach, and coming, when they think they safely can, to remove from their villages and houses, at the eastern extremity of the valley, the grain, etc., left behind when they first hastily fled. Sir William Lockhart decided to pay Saran Sar a visit on the 9th inst., partly to look up these tribesmen, Zakka-khels all, and destroy their fortified houses and towers, and partly to have the adjacent country surveyed and mapped. Accordingly, Brigadier-General Westmacott was nominated to command the expedition, and the following troops placed under his

orders for the day :—The Northamptons and the 36th Sikhs, of his own brigade, and the Dorsets and the 15th Sikhs, of the 3rd (Brigadier-General Kempster's) brigade ; also the following Divisional troops :—No. 8 British M.B. R.A., No. 5 Bombay M.B., and No. 4 Company Madras Sappers and Miners. Sir William Lockhart himself rode out with his staff to witness the operations.

The troops breakfasted early and started at about 7 A.M. Within about two miles of camp they encountered opposition, and dispositions were made to attack. The artillery, escorted by the 15th Sikhs, climbed a steep hill on the right, and, coming into action against groups discernible on the lower slopes of the mountain, speedily dispersed them. The Dorsets were sent to the left to make that flank secure, the Northamptons and Sappers advanced in the centre, and the 36th Sikhs on their right. The enemy, as usual, gave way before this direct attack, and by 11 A.M. the summit of the mountain had been gained with only trifling casualties. The survey party at once got to work, and Sir William Lockhart arrived later and joined Brigadier-General Westmacott on the crest of the ridge, whence a fine view was obtainable of the country beyond. So far so good. If only we could always advance and never retire ! So long as we front our foes, and attack them, and press them, no matter what the odds, so long do they acknowledge our superiority and yield to the inevitable. But our first movement



"The men, however, rallied bravely round their officers."

To face Page 121.

in retreat is the signal for them in turn to become the assailants. And so it was now. At 2 P.M. the retirement commenced. The Sappers and the 36th Sikhs were first sent back to a position in rear, followed later by three companies of the Northamptons. Thus five companies of this regiment were temporarily left on the crest by themselves, more than enough to hold their own against any number of Afridis, for there was still plenty of daylight, and support was close behind. At this time hardly an enemy was in sight, but as these companies were gradually withdrawn the tribesmen appeared as if by magic, and, pressing on their heels, delivered a hot fire at close range, causing at once many casualties in the rearmost company, commanded by Captain Parkin. The men, however, rallied bravely round their officer, and, with great courage and coolness, kept the foe at bay, while all the wounded were picked up and brought along. Sergeant Lennon of this company particularly distinguished himself by his deliberate shooting, and set an excellent example of steadiness in a trying situation, which had the best effect. The result was that the supports in rear were at last safely reached, and the casualties up to this time were only ten or twelve men wounded. The 36th Sikhs, well posted now, allowed the whole of the Northamptons at this point to pass through them, and, when they had given them time to reach the foot of the hill, followed them down, easily keeping the enemy at arm's length, and incurring no

casualties themselves. At the base of the hill, however, they overtook the Northamptons, who, encumbered by their wounded, had been able to move only slowly ; so Colonel Haughton, commanding the 36th, again took up positions to cover their further retreat. At this point the ground breaks up into deep stony ravines. The Northamptons, unfortunately, elected to regain camp by marching through one of these which led almost directly home from this point. I say "unfortunately," because if attacked in such a situation the best and bravest men must be dreadfully handicapped. Companies and sections get broken up and separated, and regular control or united action becomes impossible. And something of this kind happened now. It was already close on six o'clock, and getting dusk. The camp was only a short two miles distant, and, slowly trailing its weary length over the difficult boulder-strewn bed of the stream, the head of the Northampton column was almost home, while the tail was still at the foot of the hill in touch with the covering 36th Sikhs. When Colonel Haughton was assured by a report sent to him that the Northamptons were fairly started, assuming them to be in line with the Dorsets and two companies of the 15th Sikhs, guarding their right flank, he withdrew, clear of the ravine, and eastwards of the hill on which the guns had been in action in the morning, in order to fulfil the *rôle* assigned to himself of safeguarding the left flank of the force on the homeward



"A search party found the bodies the next day."

march. Shortly after 7 P.M. he reached camp with his regiment.

In the meantime a tragedy had been enacted in the centre. A body of Afridis, who had from the slopes above marked the situation, swooped down on the Northamptons entangled in the ravine, and, firing from the high banks on the western side, they shot down the stretcher-parties who were nobly engaged in carrying off and protecting their wounded ; and though officers and men battled bravely for honour's cause, yet they were not fighting on equal terms, and the desperate struggle went heavily against them. At this juncture a company of the 36th Sikhs, under Lieutenant Van Someren (not one of those that had been with Colonel Haughton, but one that had previously been detached to support the guns), returned to their aid, and, taking the enemy in flank and rear, extricated the Northamptons from their perilous plight. On reaching camp, at about half-past seven, the roll was called, and it was found that Lieutenant Waddell and six men were killed, Lieutenant Trent and twenty-nine men wounded, and Lieutenant Macintire and eleven men missing. I may say here that these "missing" were all killed. A search party found their bodies the next day in the ravine where the fight occurred. They had, of course, been stripped of clothing and arms, and some of them slashed with swords, but their bodies had not otherwise been mutilated.

The further casualties incurred on the 9th were :

—Dorsets.—Lieutenants Ingham and Mercer and six men wounded. 15th Sikhs.—One man killed, and three wounded. 36th Sikhs.—Three men wounded.

Such is the plain, unvarnished tale of this unfortunate day. It is needless to say that in a great camp like this many and diverse opinions are held, not only as to what might, could, and should have happened, but also as to what did happen ; and no two men are agreed as to how the blame for the catastrophe should be distributed. I have, however, given you, I believe, a correct and impartial statement of the facts ; while as to blame, it is easy enough to say that the General should have done this, or that regiments should have done that ; but the simple truth is that the Northamptons themselves had not the training and experience, and the practical knowledge of the enemy's methods and tactics, necessary to enable them to carry out successfully that most delicate and difficult operation of war, namely, a retreat closely pressed by a savage foe, and conducted, encumbered by wounded, through a terribly difficult country. It was no question of dispositions by the General, of support by other troops, or of valour shown by themselves. It was simply lack of the right kind of experience which led them into errors, such as entering the ravine at all. The result was disastrous. It must, however, be said for Colonel Chaytor, that this was the route the regiment had advanced by ; that it was therefore

known to them all, and was the most direct road back to camp ; and that with a number of wounded to protect, and believing probably that it was flanked on the right and left by other corps, it was natural perhaps that he should choose it to retire by.

Also, in justice to the gallant Northamptons, it must be recorded that the way in which they stuck to their wounded, and brought them through that terrible nullah, was a display of heroism and devotion worthy of a regiment that fought at Albuhera. Surrounded by the enemy, exposed to a galling fire from the high banks to which they could not effectively reply, with dead and dying men on every side, and the horror of their desperate situation accentuated by the gathering darkness, they fought on resolutely and bravely, and sacrificed themselves without hesitation to protect and save if possible their wounded comrades who could not help themselves.

I cannot do better than conclude this chapter with some extracts from the *Pioneer* of Allahabad, which bear testimony to the noble conduct of officers and men on this memorable occasion.

The following extracts (says the *Pioneer*) are from a private letter written by one who was in the thick of the fray :—

Tirah, Maidan, 10th November 1897 : . . . Yesterday we had a fearful day, had to attack a pass and got there without any loss, but in retiring to camp the enemy seemed to rise up from the ground, and gave G Company of the Northamptons, which was

the rear company, an awful basting. As luck would have it, there were C, D, F and K Companies close by, and they at once went to the assistance of their comrades. It was here that Lieutenant Waddell and Sergeant Gofsey were killed. Sergeant Litchfield was shot through the knee and will lose his leg: Sergeant Underdown slightly wounded. Colour-Sergeant Hull shot through the ankle; he must lose his foot. Lieutenant Trent wounded in the thigh. It was too awful. The bullets rained about me like hailstones, and in retiring I had to keep covering the unfortunate wounded men so as to get them alive and if possible safely into camp. It was terrible to see their sufferings: they were bad enough when we could carry them comfortably, but when they had to be carried anyhow you can imagine what they went through. Sad to tell, Lieutenant Macintire, Sergeant Luck, and eleven men are missing. The battalion went out to look for them this morning, and I will not close this till to-morrow to wait for the battalion's return. . . . Sad news. The whole of the party missing are killed. Total killed, twenty; wounded, twenty-eight. They have brought in the bodies, which are to be buried to-night. — — is fearfully cut up. I never saw any one so terribly affected as he was at the loss his regiment has sustained. . . . The only consolation their relations have is that they died protecting our wounded men. No one can say enough in praise of the men of the Northamptons who were in the engagement. They were literally fired at from every side at once, but they were as cool and deliberate as if they were on an ordinary field day. General Westmacott in command of our brigade is full of praise of the Northamptons, and says, "I never could have believed a regiment could have under such circumstances behaved with such pluck and coolness."

Again :—

Lieutenant Trent was hit; there were only three stretchers with the company and they were all full, but one man who was only slightly wounded said he could walk, and Lieutenant Trent, who was shot in the thigh with a Lee-Metford Dum-Dum bullet, was put in. Lieutenant Macintire, a sergeant, and eleven men, were now the last of all, and they were urgently ordered to retire,

but Macintire said he could not leave the wounded, to whom he stuck, and he and all his men were killed. By this time the rest had reached the village, and there was not a man left to return the fire of the enemy, every man being either wounded or carrying a wounded man on his back or a stretcher. They therefore made a slight detour to avoid the village, and while doing so the stretcher in which Lieutenant Trent was being carried broke; the men carrying it put it down, and coolly repaired it under a hail of bullets, one man having a button of his coat on his chest shot off, and the other two bullets through his clothes. The behaviour of the Northamptons that night was truly magnificent, calmly returning over open ground, carrying their wounded men under a galling fire without being able to retaliate.

CHAPTER X

STILL IN TIRAH—THE TERMS TO THE ORAKZAIS—THE AFFAIR OF THE 16TH NOVEMBER

MAIDAN, TIRAH, 12th November.

IN order to get even with the Zakka-khels, to continue the destruction of their fortified houses, and to complete the survey of the eastern portion of this valley, Sir William Lockhart ordered Brigadier-General Gaselee's brigade,¹ supported by artillery, to visit the Saran Sar again yesterday. Sir William again himself accompanied the troops. On this occasion there was no mishap of any kind. General Gaselee, long well known as the Colonel of the 5th Gurkhas, and an officer of vast experience in frontier fighting, directed the movements with great judgment, and though the Afridis again followed up the retirement, they never got a look in at all. The Queen's shot uncommonly straight, the artillery too; and the 3rd and 4th Gurkhas, with the 3rd

¹ Scouts : 3rd and 5th Gurkhas, the Queen's R.W. Surrey Regiment, the Yorkshire Regiment, the 4th Gurkhas, and the 3rd Sikhs. The 3rd Gurkhas moved out in the afternoon to co-operate in the retirement. The batteries ~~not~~ were No. 1 M.B. R.A., and No. 2 (Derajat) M.B.



"Sir William Lockhart received them in camp to-day."

Sikhs, forming the rearguard, the enemy were kept thoroughly well at bay, and lost at least thirty men killed and wounded. A great many of their defences were burned, including the fortified residence of Chikkun, one of their principal maliks. Our casualties were trifling—Lieutenant Wright, Queen's, slightly wounded, one man of the Queen's killed, and one of the 3rd Gurkhas slightly wounded. It was an entirely successful and satisfactory day, and in a brigade order General Gaselee conveyed Sir William Lockhart's appreciation of the day's work by the troops.

Yesterday, somewhat unexpectedly, the Gar Orakzai jirgahs came in. The whole of the Orakzai clans being thus fully represented, Sir William Lockhart received them in camp to-day. Sir William was attended by Brigadier-General Nicholson, the Chief of the Staff; by Sir Richard Udny and Mr. L. White King, his chief political advisers, and by the whole of the headquarters staff, and escorted by a guard of honour of 100 rank and file of the Gordon Highlanders. When all was ready the jirgahs were ushered in, and ranged in a semi-circle by clans by Sir Richard Udny's assistants. They were nearly all venerable old graybeards of the tribes, and there was certainly nothing either warlike or truculent in their bearing or demeanour. About 100 of them were admitted, of course without arms. They are our guests while with us. A conveniently neighbouring village is allotted to them to

live in, picquets are placed over them for their protection, and supplies are sent to them from our camp.

The proceedings opened by Sir William Lockhart rising, and requesting Sir Richard Udny to say that, now that we had established ourselves in the heart of their country, the terms offered by Government would be announced to them, and to explain that they must be fully complied with within fourteen days; also, that in any event he intended to visit every part of their country, and that it would depend upon themselves whether he came as a friend or as an enemy.

Sir Richard Udny, who is a most practised and fluent Pushtu scholar, fully explained all this to the jirgahs, and clearly and with emphasis announced the terms of Government to the expectant throng. These were :—

1st. Full restoration of all arms and property, etc., looted from the Khyber forts, or taken from us on any subsequent occasion.

2nd. Surrender of 500 breech-loading rifles.

3rd. Payment of a fine of 30,000 rupees.

4th. Absolute forfeiture of all subsidies and allowances granted to the tribes in the past.

5th. Formal submission to be tendered in durbar.

The Maliks listened with marked interest and attention while these terms were announced to them. But it was not to be gathered from their countenances, or from anything they said, whether they thought them severe or lenient. There can be

no question that, considering the unwarrantable and unprovoked nature of the outbreak, the loot carried off, and the damage done to life and property, and the enormous expense that Government has been put to in the effort to restore order and re-establish its authority, the conditions imposed are extremely easy. I shall be very much surprised if they are not promptly accepted.

This was the whole of the ceremony. The jirgahs withdrew as they had come, and the proceedings terminated. If the Orakzais submit now, as it may be reasonably hoped they will, it is improbable that the Afridis will continue the struggle much longer by themselves. There are indications, indeed, that they have already had enough of it. They cannot doubt our power, or that whatever petty successes they may here and there score, in the long run we must beat them and bring them to their bearings. For the last three nights not a shot has been fired into our camps, and even the telegraph wire has not been touched, so perhaps a little ray of light can be seen ahead, and the outlook is more hopeful than when I commenced this letter.

15th November.

The Orakzai jirgahs have come and gone. They are allowed until the 26th inst. to comply with the terms offered them. Opinion is a good deal divided as to whether they will accept and comply with them or not. Personally I have little doubt that their answer will be affirmative, and that they will do their

best to carry out the conditions imposed within the time fixed. There can be no question that they were all immensely relieved to find that their country is not to be permanently occupied or annexed by us ; and, assured of their independence, they are not disposed to haggle now over any minor point, their punishment being, as a matter of fact, an extremely lenient one. They have now asked our political officers to help them to divide fairly between their Gar and Samil factions the amount of the fine, and the number of the rifles demanded ; because, left to themselves (they say) they would certainly quarrel, and never come to an amicable agreement as to the share to be produced by each. Accordingly, Mr. White King, under whose special political charge the Orakzai clans are, aided by Messrs. Hastings, Donald, and Blakeway, having talked the matter over with the leading Maliks of each faction, a decision was speedily arrived at, that each should pay half, they being practically equal in numbers, in importance, and in wealth. They then dispersed to their homes, and it is to be sincerely hoped that within the next few days we shall receive from them some substantial proofs that they are earnest in their expressed desire to "kiss and be friends."

Meantime, on our side, Sir William Lockhart, anxious to be conciliatory, and to show consideration to those evincing any disposition to yield or to treat, has let it be generally known that from this time, and until some definite answer is submitted by the

jirgahs, payment will be made for all forage and supplies taken by the troops, or collected, or brought in for their use by the tribes. This is a wise and considerate measure, and should have a good effect. But, on the other hand, they have been given to understand that the supplies and forage we must have, and that if any obstruction is offered to the collection of it, or if our parties are fired on, swift and severe punishment will most assuredly follow. Although up to the present it is only the Orakzai jirgahs that have been admitted to an audience, yet the same method has been extended to those Afridi clans whose jirgahs are in waiting—viz., the Malik-din-khels, the Khambar-khels, and the Adam-khels; and as “they are a most avaricious race, desperately fond of money”—*vide* “Official Gazetteer”—the hope of gain may for the time being keep them quiet and make them ready to help.

But there is no reliance whatever to be placed on the word of an Afridi :—

Ruthless, cowardly robbery, cold-blooded, treacherous murder, are to him the salt of life. Brought up from his earliest childhood amid scenes of appalling treachery and merciless revenge, nothing can ever change him. As he has lived—a shameless, cruel savage—so he dies. And it would seem that, notwithstanding their long intercourse with the British, and the fact that very large numbers of them are, or have been, in our service, and must have learnt in some poor way what faith, and mercy, and justice are, yet the Afridi character is no better than it was in the days of his fathers. . . . Much has been said of their fidelity in fighting against their own people for us, but when it is remembered that an Afridi generally has a blood feud with nine out of ten of

his own people, the beauty of this attachment fades. They have always been more noted in action for a readiness to plunder than to fight. On the whole (says Elphinstone) they are the greatest robbers among Afghans, and have no faith or sense of honour whatever.

A cheerful picture, is it not? but not, I fancy, overdrawn.

The boom of guns and the crack of rifles, showing that in some directions, at all events, our foraging parties are not finding it all plain sailing, are punctuating my sentences as I write. Still, there are indications that even the Afridis have had enough of it now, and would be glad to see our backs; and motives of self-interest may prompt them to climb down at no very distant date. They know by this time that we do not mean to annex their country. That, no doubt, has been their great and haunting fear. Other considerations are of a secondary importance to them. The money fine, whatever it may be, the rendition of loot, and the surrender of arms, they will put up with without much fuss. The forfeiture of all subsidies will, of course, be a nasty pill to swallow, because the sum paid them by Government in the past, for maintaining order on the Khyber route, has been considerable, about 100,000 rupees per annum; and of this aggregate, the Zakka-khels, our present bitterest opponents, have been used to take the largest share. But, great as may be the sacrifice involved by giving up this grant, it is better than being kept indefinitely out of lands and homes, and seeing their

defences levelled, and their substance devoured, with the certainty that they must be beaten in the long run, and that their eventual punishment will be the severer the longer they resist.

For these reasons, there is some room to hope that ere long we may see our way to some settlement which will enable us to withdraw from this inhospitable country. We cannot expect the present fine dry weather to last much longer, and a change to rain or snow will at once send large numbers of men and followers into hospital. Moreover, the strain on the Commissariat and Transport is daily becoming more severe, and the question of feeding this large assemblage of men and animals is constantly assuming a more serious aspect; so for every reason we shall be glad to cast out our shoes over Tirah, and bid the Afzidi a long farewell.

17th November.

Since the above lines were penned an event has occurred which distinctly discounts the sanguine expectations expressed. The future, it is written, is always full of "precious possibilities," and nowhere can this saying be more applicable than on this wild frontier amid these savage surroundings, where truly no man can say what the next twenty-four hours may not bring forth. I have already told you that when conveying to the jirgahs the terms on which Government would accept their submission and pardon their offences, Sir William

Lockhart informed them that, in any event, he intended to visit every part of the Afridi-Orakzai country, and that it would depend upon their own behaviour whether we came as friends or foes. Partly in pursuance of the policy thus declared, partly to carry out survey operations, and partly to continue the punishment of the Zakka-khels by destroying more of their fortified villages, and notably the residence of the Mullah Sayid Akbar, Aka Khel, the principal leader of the revolt, Brigadier-General Kempster was sent on the 13th into the Waran Valley, *via* the Tseri Kandao Pass, with a force which comprised the Gordon Highlanders, the Dorset Regiment, the 15th Sikhs, the 2nd Gurkhas, No. 8 British Mountain Battery, No. 5 Bombay Mountain Battery, No. 4 Madras Sappers and Miners, and No. 4 Company Bombay Sappers and Miners. The 36th Sikhs, now well known to fame as the brave defenders of Forts Gulistan and Saragheri on the Samāna range in September last, were also placed at General Kempster's disposal to hold the Tseri Kandao Pass during the two or three days during which he would be absent, and to preserve communication between him and the main column in Maidan.

There was practically no opposition to the advance of this force. The tribesmen, as usual, allowed it to proceed to its destination without offering serious resistance, preferring to harass it when settled down in its camp, and to attack in

earnest whenever it should commence its return march. These are their invariable tactics. The point aimed at by General Kempster was only a short four miles down the valley east of the pass, and, as it was only about four miles from this camp (Maidan) to the summit (it is quite a low pass), the whole march was only some eight miles. Yet such are the extraordinary delays and difficulties attendant on moving with mule and pony transport on a single narrow hill road that, although a start had been made from Maidan at daylight, the last of the baggage and the rearguard were not in the new camp until half-past nine o'clock at night. The four miles of road on this the western side are pretty fair going, because our Sappers and Pioneers have been at work on them, and have ramped the ravines and nullahs, and improved and widened the bad places. But on the far side the country was a *terra incognita*, and the track (for it was nothing more) was stony, steep, narrow, and difficult, dipping after the first mile suddenly down into a boulder-strewn, dry bed of a torrent between high, precipitous banks, beyond which on either side the hills towered up to a considerable altitude. These heights, of course, had to be held while the main body and baggage passed through the defile I have described, and thus the march was a difficult and trying one, though its actual length was insignificant.

However, it was safely accomplished, and that night, though one or two shots were fired into it,

the camp was practically unmolested. During the next two days, the 14th and 15th, the survey of the adjacent country was completed, and reconnaissance and foraging operations were successfully carried out. Several Zakka-khel fortified houses were destroyed, also some belonging to a section known as Zia-ud-din-khels; and the residence of the notorious Mullah Sayid Akbar, the chief instigator of the revolt and preacher of rebellion and sedition, was visited and levelled. The mosque attached to it was, however, let alone. Before destroying the Sayid's house it was searched to discover whether it contained anything of interest or value. Little was found, however, except a certain amount of correspondence, which was taken charge of by the political staff,¹ and a *mimbar*, or kind of rude pulpit, from which, no doubt, the Mullah used to make his frenzied addresses to his rude audience. It is fitted with a staff on one side, on which is fixed an iron bracket intended, apparently, to hold a lamp or light of some kind. It was brought away, and will be kept as an interesting memento of the visit.

To resume. On both these days, the 14th and 15th, there was some skirmishing when the troops were out. On the latter date the enemy were numerous and vigorous in their movements, but the brigade was well handled, and all went well,

¹ Some of the letters found are extremely interesting, and will repay perusal. Translations have appeared in some of the Indian papers; selections are given in an appendix to this chapter.

while the casualties were trifling. The camp was a good deal fired into on the nights of the 14th and 15th, and three or four casualties resulted.

On the 16th the brigade returned to Maidan to rejoin the main column, and this was not a successful day. The whole of the baggage was fairly started by 9 A.M., the main body with it. The rearguard, under the command of Colonel Eaton Travers, of the 2nd Gurkhas, collected its outlying pickets at about half-past nine, and shortly afterwards commenced its movement in retreat. Colonel Travers had with him his own regiment, the 2nd Gurkhas, one company of the Gordon Highlanders, one company of the Dorsets, five guns of No. 8 British Mounted Battery, and the 3rd Gurkha Scouts—a sufficient and compact force for the purpose in hand. The enemy at this time were visible in groups here and there on the adjacent heights, but contented themselves with long shots, and the retirement proceeded without serious interruption for about a mile and a half, when, finding he was gaining ground too quickly, Colonel Travers took up a strong position across the valley, which he maintained until about one o'clock in the afternoon, when, noting that the main column was now well on its way up the final ascent, he resumed his retrograde march. The enemy now for the first time displayed some vigour in pursuit, and the left of Colonel Travers' line was severely pressed. The Gurkhas who were here, were, however,

thoroughly steady, and, though they were under a hot fire and had several casualties, they held the Afridis in check until the summit of the pass was gained safely by about 3 P.M.

It was shortly before the summit was reached that poor young Wylie of the 2nd Gurkhas was killed. He was the brightest and best of boys, a great favourite in his regiment and out of it. Shortly before he was hit he had been exposing himself somewhat recklessly, but, in deference to a friendly suggestion from his colonel, had got under cover, lying flat behind a rock. In this position he incautiously raised himself on his elbow while he turned round to speak to his men a little in rear of him. His head must have shown above the rock, for he was instantly shot through the brain, and, of course, killed on the spot. Captain Macintyre, his great friend in the regiment, seeing him drop, at once went out under a heavy fire and brought in his body, which was carried into Camp Maidan the same evening.

When the force under Colonel Travers reached the top of the Tseri Kandao Pass it was much exhausted, for, though the direct distance from camp was short, yet the ground was extraordinarily difficult, and the necessity for continually occupying commanding heights to the right and left of the route, to say nothing of the watchfulness and vigour necessary to stave off the enemy's incessant attacks, had added immensely to the fatigues of the day.

All this had been foreseen by General Kempster, and it had been pre-arranged, therefore, that from this point the 15th Sikhs, under Colonel Abbott, should cover the retirement. They were, in fact, in position on the heights north and south of the pass when Colonel Travers and his troops arrived. These, accordingly, passed through now, and followed the main column to camp, and the 15th Sikhs took up the rearguard duties.

These duties at once claimed their pressing attention, for the Afridis now swarmed down from the heights of the Saran Sar, and, skilfully availing themselves of the screen provided by the timber which is thick on the northern side of the pass, closed round the 15th with a determination and boldness which compelled them to stand fast, and think rather of defending themselves and their numerous wounded with resolution, than of risking any movement in retreat until assured of some support. The fire of the mountain guns at this juncture would have been welcome music to this gallant regiment, but an order sent by the General for a battery to come into action at a particular spot, where it would certainly have rendered signal service to the hard-pressed infantry, was misunderstood, and no help came from this quarter. But the brave Sikhs, splendidly led, fought on with grand resolution. Their comrades, the 36th Sikhs, under Colonel Haughton, were already retracing their steps to support them, and, encouraged by the approach of this reinforce-

ment, they battled bravely against the hordes that assailed them ; and, inflicting on the enemy losses more than equal to those sustained themselves, they gradually withdrew from their advanced position. It was about this time, between 4 and 5 P.M., that, elated by the offensive *rôle* they were assuming, some hundred Afridis left the shelter of the trees and attempted to rush the retreating 15th. They were met by such a well-aimed and steady fire, and such a prompt counter-attack, that few of the hundred lived to regain the protection of the wood ; and probably in no engagement since this expedition started have their losses been so severe as on this occasion.

The 36th had now come up, half the battalion only, under Colonel Haughton, and with them a handful of the Dorsets under Lieutenant Cowie. The other half was still behind, under Major Des Vœux. Colonel Abbott had been severely wounded in the face and neck by gunshots in the fighting above described ; the command of the party, therefore, devolved now on Colonel Haughton. It was rapidly getting dark, the ground was precipitous, broken, and difficult, the enemy thick on every side, and the camp still four miles distant. Moreover, the supply of ammunition was running short. The situation was, therefore, distinctly serious, and its gravity was suddenly accentuated by a volley from a cluster of four houses¹ directly in the path of the retiring

¹ These houses had been burned earlier in the day, and were still smouldering, their outline showing a dull red against the darkness.

column. There was only one solution of this difficulty. Colonel Haughton at once gave the order to fix bayonets and charge. This was promptly done, and, with loud shouts and cheers, the hamlet was bravely carried, the enemy in it shot, or bayoneted, or driven out, and the place captured. It was in this operation that Captain Lewarne, of the 15th Sikhs, was killed, and Lieutenant Munn, of the 36th, wounded. Captain Custance, of the 36th, had been shot through the thigh some little time previously. As the wounded were now numerous, some five-and-twenty altogether, and as darkness had now set in, Colonel Haughton decided to stay where he was for the night. Under his orders all at once set to work to make their position as secure as possible, and to do what they could to render first aid to the wounded, and to make them comfortable for the night. Fortunately, from this time the enemy's fire became desultory, and by about 11 P.M. his attack died away, so that the night was passed in comparative peace. This fact alone is sufficient proof that the Afridis had been very roughly handled, for otherwise they would never have let the troops alone.

I must explain here that Major Des Vœux, with the rest of his own battalion, and a weak half-company of the Dorsets, under Captain Hammond, who had come up in time to take part in the gallant charge above referred to, had seized a house across a nullah, about 400 yards away from Haughton's party, and at once intrenched himself as well as he

could. Hardly were his rough preparations completed, when the Afridis swarmed up out of the nullah, hoping to occupy this very house, from which they could have effectively enfiladed Colonel Haughton's position. They met, however, with such an unexpected and hot reception that they soon drew off, shouting threats against Major Des Vœux's Pathan servant, whom they apparently recognised, and promising to cut his throat when they got hold of him!

But there had, unhappily, been serious misfortune in another direction. When the 36th Sikhs had been sent back to help the 15th, two companies of the Dorset Regiment had been at the same time detached to support the 36th. One and a half of these companies were ordered by the senior officer, Captain Hammond, to take post in a house on the line on which the Sikhs were presumably falling back. The other half-company, with Captain Hammond and Lieutenant Cowie, went on and, as we have seen, joined, some Colonel Haughton, and some Major Des Vœux. These men thus got through, the night safely. But the others were shortly afterwards attacked, and, considering their position untenable, they, unfortunately for themselves, left their post and attempted to retreat to camp. In the gathering darkness they missed the road, got entangled in ravines, very much as the Northamptons did on that fatal 9th, and, assailed on all sides by the Afridis, were soon broken up into little

knots and groups, which defended themselves indeed with courage and desperation against their savage assailants, but, as may be imagined, with small chance of success. On such ground, and in such circumstances, the Pathan is probably a better man than the Britisher ; and the result of this deadly struggle in the dark was that in twos or threes during the night a poor remnant of these Dorsets struggled wounded and weary into camp, their blood-stained bayonets and battered gun-stocks attesting the desperate nature of the conflict in which they had been engaged. But eleven of them, including their two officers, Lieutenants Crooke and Hales, were left behind dead, and the rifles of these men fell, of course, into the hands of the Afridis, who by this time have got quite a good stock of our Lee-Metfords, and plenty of ammunition.

It is only fair to say, when speaking of *companies* being detached, that I am informed on the best authority that the party with Lieutenants Crooke and Hales consisted of only twenty-eight men all told.

The actual casualties on this 16th November were :—

Dorsets.—Killed, Lieutenant Crooke (attached from Suffolk Regiment), Lieutenant Hales (attached from East York Regiment), and nine rank and file ; wounded, ten rank and file.

15th Sikhs.—Killed, Captain Lewarne, and seven men ; wounded, Colonel Abbott, three native officers, and fifteen men.

36th Sikhs.—Killed, six men ; wounded, Captain Custance, Lieutenant Munn, and seven men.

2nd Gurkhas.—Killed, Lieutenant Wylie, and three men ; wounded, five men.

At daybreak on the 17th Brigadier-General Gaselee's brigade went out to meet Colonel Haughton and his gallant Sikhs, and found them already on their way in, with all their wounded.

In the evening the officers and men killed were buried on the outskirts of the camp, Sir William Lockhart, and every one off duty, attending. It was sad to see the long procession of stretchers carried past, but after all, to die in battle "facing fearful odds" is a befitting death for a soldier, and events march too rapidly here, and casualties have been too frequent, to admit of much time being spent in vain regrets. Hardly, in fact, had the remains of our late comrades been committed to the grave when the usual firing into camp commenced, and each of us was reminded that their fate to-day might be ours to-morrow.

I should mention that before the funeral (which did not take place until dusk), Sir William Lockhart saw the Dorsets and Northamptons on parade, and addressed them a few words of commendation for courage in most trying circumstances, and of encouragement and advice for the future. "We must remember," said Sir William, "that we are opposed to perhaps the best skirmishers, and the best natural shots in the world, and that the country they inhabit

is the most difficult on the face of the globe. The enemy's strength lies in his thorough knowledge of the ground, which enables him to watch all our movements unperceived, and to take advantage of every height and every ravine. Our strength, on the other hand, lies in our discipline, controlled fire, and mutual support. Our weakness is our ignorance of the country, and the consequent tendency of small bodies to straggle and get detached. The moral of all this is that careful touch must be maintained, and that if by mischance small parties do find themselves alone they should as much as possible stick to the open, and shun ravines and broken ground, where they must fight at a disadvantage, and run every risk of being ambuscaded and cut off. I trust," said Sir William in conclusion, "that we may soon meet the enemy and wipe out all old scores with him, and I am confident that when that time comes you will all behave with a steady courage worthy of the best traditions of your corps. In the meantime there is no occasion to be depressed because some of us have been surprised, outnumbered, and overwhelmed on bad ground."

Afterwards addressing the Sikhs and Gurkhas, Sir William Lockhart praised them highly for their gallant conduct, and said he was proud to have such regiments under his command. He explained to them, too, with what interest and sympathy the Queen personally watches the progress of events in these wild regions (and, indeed, Her Majesty's

frequent and gracious inquiries are warmly appreciated by all ranks), and said to them, as he had said to the British regiments, that he hoped they would soon have an opportunity of meeting the enemy again on better terms, and paying off all old scores with interest.

P.S.—The following extracts from a private note written for me by an officer who was present throughout this affair, will be read with deep interest :—

Meanwhile darkness had come on, and it was exceedingly difficult to keep touch with each other. The ground was cut in high terraces, down which we clambered as best we could, the men tripping, sliding, and falling over each other, for no path existed, and it was too dark even to distinguish the drop from one terrace to the next. The difficulty of bringing our wounded along, under such circumstances, may be imagined, but cannot be described.

The Afridis were completely taken aback by our sudden charge and onslaught, just when they thought they had got us on the run, and very few waited for the bayonet, but Munn, who was the first man to reach the centre house, got his sword through one of them, and several more were shot as they bolted. The scene of excitement and confusion at this moment was indescribable. The only light came from the smouldering houses, and it was almost impossible to distinguish friend from foe. When we had pulled ourselves together, and were able to look round, the situation was not very encouraging. There was practically no cover; the enemy were still firing at us from three sides, and casualties continued to occur, and many of us had narrow escapes, bullets going through our helmets or clothes. However, it would have been madness to attempt any further move, so Colonel

Haughton made the best dispositions he could under the circumstances. The men were made to lie down in groups round the house, and the wounded were placed in the only bit of cover available, between a high bank and the smouldering ruins of the house, the warmth from which undoubtedly helped to save some of their lives. Wherever it was possible we made rude stone breastworks, etc., but materials were sadly wanting, and many of the men were wholly unprotected on the eastern side, whence the enemy still kept up a desultory fire. Fortunately the darkness prevented their aim being good, and most of their bullets whizzed harmlessly overhead. About 11 P.M. they left us altogether, and we settled down to endure a long and bitter night as best we could. The cold was intense, and the men had no greatcoats with them ; and nothing to eat, for we had expected to reach camp that evening. The only way they could get any relief was by taking it in turns to huddle together on the still warm rubble which had fallen from the burning houses. It was an anxious time for the officers, for it was anticipated that the enemy might find courage to make another attack when the rising moon should reveal the weakness of our position. But the coolness and confident bearing of Colonel Haughton kept us all in good heart, and made us feel perfectly certain that we should come out right side uppermost.

Still it was with feelings of intense relief that we saw the pale gray dawn appear, and knew that we could soon be up and doing. Communication was at once opened with Des Voeux, across the nullah, and all the ground near by was carefully searched to see if any of our men had been left behind, killed or wounded, in the hurry and tumult of the events of the night. Then we commenced our movement on camp, sending on the wounded first under a strong escort. The enemy opened fire on us from the surrounding hills at once, but in the uncertain light their aim was bad, and no one was hit. We sent the wounded along the main nullah running past the camp, and covered them on one side with the 15th Sikhs, and on the other with a company of the 36th Sikhs and the few Dorsets who were with us. These latter, a mere handful of men, showed great gallantry and steadiness all through the affair, and although they

suffered much from the cold and exposure, responded cheerfully to every call made upon them.

We had not gone far when we met a force coming out from camp to help us ; and right glad we were to be able to march straight in without any further trouble.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER X

THE CORRESPONDENCE OF THE MULLAHS

(From the "Pioneer" of Allahabad)

THE following are translations of letters found in Saiyid Akbar's house in the Waran Valley :—

Translation of a letter from the Mullah of Adda to the Mullah of Sipak, the Mullah of Aka Khel, Badshah Sahib, Malik Amin Khan, Malik Sher Muhammad Khan, the Kamar Khel, Khambar Khel and Aka Khel Maliks, Maliks Yar Muhammad, Feroz, Wali Muhammad Khawas, Samandar and other people of Tirah, dated the 7th Rabie-us-Sani 1315 H.= 5th September 1897.

After compliments.—On the 1st Rabie-us-Sani 1315 H.= 30th August 1897, I determined with a *lashkar* to go out for a holy war and defend the religion of the Holy Prophet. When I reached Lashkar Killa, and was staying there for the night, I received a "firman" from "Zia-ul-millati-uddin," the King of Islam, in reply to my petition, and understood its contents, which were to the following effect :—

"You should wait for a few days in your former place, so that I may hold a consultation with the Khans, Maliks, chiefs, and respectable men about *ghaza* and decide what steps should be taken. I will then either come myself or send to you my son for *jehad*, with our victorious troops and supplies, such as rations and food, and will let you know again. I will, with the greatest

pleasure, make exertions in the way of *jehad*." I therefore write to you people that I have postponed my intentions for the reasons given above, but that you should, on receipt of this letter, consult among yourselves and let me know faithfully of your decision, so that I may come to you with the Mohmand people, the Khan of Nawagai, and other Mussalmans. You should try your best to save the religion of the Prophet. I shall await your reply.

Translation of a letter, without date, from the Daulatzai and Sturi Khel Mullahs to the Aka Khel Mullah and other Afridi Mullahs.

After compliments.—We attacked the Muhammadzai post on Thursday and destroyed it. We killed many Government servants and returned with success to Ublan. Our casualties were two wounded, who have not yet died. Please let us know whether we should stay on here committing raids on Kohat, or should dismiss the lashkar to their homes, because we have no supplies here. Please also let us know by the bearer if we are wanted there, or if you will send us reinforcement here. The Shia Sipahs are afraid lest their property may be looted. We have stood surety to them that none of the Afridis or Zia-uddins will cause them any injury. We have made peace with the Sipahs in order that they may join us in the *ghaza*, and you should see that none of the Sipah property or animals are interfered with.

Translation of a letter, without date, from the Mullah of Adda to all the Mullahs and elders of the Afridi and Oraksai tribes.

After compliments.—The Kafirs have taken possession of all Mussulman countries, and, owing to the lack of spirit on the part of the people, are conquering every region. They have now reached the countries of Bajaur and Swat, but, though the people of these places showed want of courage in the beginning, they have now realised their mistake, and having repented and become ashamed (of their former deeds), they attack them (the Kafirs) day and night, and have quite confounded them. I have myself informed the people of Lughman, and Kunar, and the

Mohmands, Ningraharis, and Shinwaris, and they are all prepared to take part in the fighting. They are simply waiting for the summer to pass, as the country of Bajaur is without water and shade, and common folk cannot afford to arrange for the necessities of *jehad*. It is difficult for them to fight in summer. I inform you also that you may try your best to further the cause of *jehad*, which is the best of all devotions, and the truest of all submissions, so that we may not be ashamed before God on the day of judgment, and be glorious before His Prophet. Though these men have no means, yet as the holy verse runs that "victory and triumph rest with God," it is possible that God may give us victory and power to recover the country of Mussalmans from the hands of Kafirs, but, if we fail, we shall have done our best, and can bring a reasonable excuse before God on the day of judgment, because God does not expect a thing from a man which is beyond his power. I have deputed Mullah Abdulla Akhundzada of the Mohmand country, to attend on you, and, God willing, he will reach you. Please let me know whatever decision you may unanimously arrive at, so that it may be acted upon. If you decide to send for me there, I am willing to come; but, if you wish to come here, I also agree. If you choose to commence fighting there, and desire me to fight in this direction, I am ready to do so; but it is necessary to fix the time and day of fighting, so that, by the grace of God, the work be accomplished. And as it is said that the only thing a man can do in a matter is to try his best, and that the accomplishment of the matter rests with God, so to leave everything in the hands of God is the best thing of all, and all *Mumins* (true believers) must trust in God. May God, the Almighty, lead us all to the path of virtue at our last moment, and save us from the punishment of the next world. And may He enable us to do an act which may be acceptable to Him. Peace be upon all believers!

Translation of a letter from Sufi Sahib to the Mullah Sahib of Sipah, the Mullah of Aka Khel (Saiyid Akbar), Badshah Sahib, Malik Amin Khan, Malik Sher Muhammad Khan, Maliks Yar Muhammad Khan, Feroz, Wali Muhammad Khan, Khawas Khan, Samandar, and the Maliks of

Kamar Khel, Khambar Khel, Aka Khel and other Maliks and people of Tirah, dated the 7th Rabi-us-Sani 1315 H. = 15th September 1897.

After compliments.—I started with the people of the Kot Valley, of Mohmandarra, of the Hisarak Valley and of the whole of Ningrahar, for *jehad* in that direction, but on reaching the limits of Batikot with the *lashkar*, I received a letter from my spiritual leader, the Akhundzada Sahib (of Adda), the perusal of which gave me pleasure, and I understood its contents. He wrote to say that I should return to my residence, with the Ningrahar *lashkar*, and should wait for a few days, when, he said, he could let me know again. In compliance therefore with his instructions I returned to my place. I now write to say that on receipt of this letter you should assemble together, exert yourselves in the way of *jehad*, and let me know faithfully of the result (of your meeting), so that I may understand it. God willing, the "Pir Sahib" (Adda Mullah) with his *lashkar* of Bajauris, the Khan of Nawagai, and the people of the Ningrahar, and myself too, will start at once in that direction and will try our best to save the religion of the Prophet. Consider it an urgent matter.

Translation of a letter from Fakir Shah (? probably some Afghan official in Ningrahar) to the (Aka Khel) Mullah (Saiyid Akbar), dated the 14th Rabi-us-Sani 1315 H. = 12th September 1897.

After compliments.—I received your letter and understood its contents. I hope you will write daily the news of that side and send it to Mullah Idris, who will forward it to me, so that I may remain informed of the state of affairs in that direction, and sympathise with the Prophet. Rest assured in every way from this side, and always send us news of that side.

Translation of a letter from Adam Khan (Khambar Khel) to his brother Muhammad Zaman Khan (sent from Kabul), dated the 18th Jamadi-ul-Awal 1315 H. = 15th October 1897.

After compliments.—I also joined the Afridi and Orakzai *jirga*, which was well received by the Amir. His Highness

asked us about the causes which led to the quarrels between the Afridis and the British Government. We stated that the British Government were day by day violating the former agreements, were forcibly encroaching upon our limits, and were realising fines and compensations from us for the arms which were stolen in the Khyber by their own servants, and that these naturally led to the disturbances. His Highness said that if he could he would try to make peace between us and the British Government. We stated that, if the British Government agreed to give up all frontier territories forcibly taken possession of by them, and did not ask for the return of arms looted by us in fair fight, we would make peace. The Amir then communicated our statement to the British Government, and a reply to that is awaited. We are staying here, and every consideration is paid to us by the Amir. Rest assured. Till the result (of our mission) is known, take care that you are not deceived by the English, whom you should not believe.

Translation of a letter from Kazi Mira Khan, and other Adam Khels composing the Afridi jirga at Kabul, to Mullah Saiyid Akbar, Aka Khel, dated the 28th Jamadi-ul-Awal 1315 H. = 25th October 1897.

After compliments.—Let it be known to you that having been appointed by you and other Mussalman brethren as a *jirga* to attend on His Highness the Amir, we arrived here, and held an interview with His Highness, who advised us not to fight with the British Government, and this was, and has been his advice ever since. We said we accepted his advice, but that our wishes ought to be met by the British Government. We were ordered to record them in detail, when His Highness said he would, after consideration, submit them to the British Government, and see what reply they would give. We put down our wishes in detail, and presented them to His Highness, who submitted them to the British Government, but no reply has yet been received. We shall see what reply comes.

There is a British Agent at Kabul who has on his establishment many Hindustani Mussalmans. One of these became our acquaintance. This man is a good Mussalman and a well-wisher

of his co-religionists. He has given us a piece of good and correct news, which is to the following effect:—

“ You, Mahomedans, must take care lest you be deceived by the British, who are at present in distressed circumstances. For instance, Aden, a seaport, which was in possession of the British, has been taken from them by the Sultan. The Suez Canal, through which the British forces could easily reach India in twenty days, has also been taken possession of by the Sultan, and has now been granted on lease to Russia. The British forces now require six months to reach India. The friendly alliance between the British and the Germans has also been disturbed, on account of some disagreement about trade, which must result in the two nations rising in arms against each other. The Sultan, the Germans, the Russians, and the French are all in arms against the British at all seaports, and fighting is going on in Egypt too against them. In short, the British are disheartened nowadays. The Viceroy, and the Generals who are to advance against you, have received distinct orders from London that the operations in the Khyber and Tirah must be brought to an end in two weeks' time, as the troops are required in Egypt and at other seaports. In the case of the Mohmands, and people of Gandab, who had killed ten thousand British troops, and had inflicted a heavy loss of rifles and property on them, the British, in their great dismay, concluded a settlement with them for twenty-four rifles only, whereas thousands of rifles and lakhs of rupees should have been demanded. This peace with the Mohmands is by way of deceit, and when the British get rid of their other difficulties they will turn back and demand from the Mohmands the remaining rifles, and compensation for their losses. They will say that, as the Mohmands have become British subjects by surrendering twenty-four rifles, they must make good the remaining loss too. The British are always giving out that their troops will enter Khyber and Tirah on such and such dates, but they do not march on those dates and remain where they are. This is deceitful on the part of the English, who wish to mislead Mussalmans by a payment of 5 rupees and seek for an opportunity to make an attack by surprise. I have thus informed you of the deeds and perplexities of the English.”

We, the *jirga* people, consider it necessary to inform you of this, so that you may be aware of the distress, confusion, and deceitfulness of the British, and may communicate the information to all the Mussalmans of the *lashkar*, in order that they may be on the alert against being cheated by the British in any way. You should also send us daily news for our information, and see that no attacks are made on you by surprise. Also appoint a few clever men as messengers to bring us daily news and letters from you and *vice versa*. Send us by the bearers all news of that side, and in future, too, send us fresh news daily by other messengers, as it is important that we should know about each other.

Translation of a letter from Sherdil Khan and Abdul Rahim, son of Malik Sinjab Khan Orakzai (of Barki), to Malik Sinjab Khan, dated the 28th Jamadi-ul-Awal 1315 H.=25th October 1897.

The Amir received our *jirga* of the Orakzais and Afridis with great honour and respect. He asked the causes which led to the commencement of the hostilities between the Orakzais and Afridis on the one side, and the British on the other. In reply to his inquiry we stated that the British had encroached upon our frontier limits by taking forcible possession of the Samāna and other like places, and that they (the British) were demanding compensation and fines from us for the arms stolen in the Khyber by their own troops from the middle of their own army, and that these were the causes which naturally led to the quarrels between the two parties. The Amir then said that if he could he would try to effect peace between us and the British Government. Upon this we said that, if the English gave up our frontier territories, and abandoned the idea of re-occupying them, and would not demand the restoration of arms taken by us in action from British troops, we would make peace. After this the Amir, for the welfare of Mussalmans, communicated all that we had stated to the British Government, and a reply to this is expected. We are now staying here, and the Amir treats us with great consideration. You must therefore rest assured for us. Do not negotiate with the British, and take care that you are not taken in by them. Do not believe them. For the rest all is well.

CHAPTER XI

THE MOVE TO BĀGH—TERMS TO THE AFRIDIS— THE RECONNAISSANCE TO DWATOI

BĀGH, TIRAH, 26th November.


STILL in the Maidan Valley, but at last, we are thankful to be able to say, on the move. It was a weary wait of nearly three weeks in the last camp, Maidan. But our halts and our marches are dictated not so much by the military exigencies of the situation as by political considerations. It is for "the powers that be" in Simla and at the India Office to order, for us to obey; and it is to be presumed that the long halt in Maidan was arranged, partly, to allow Government to make up its mind as to what terms should be exacted, and what policy pursued; and partly, in the hope that, seeing us in possession, the Afridis would throw up the sponge, and come in. We know now that anything like annexation is not, and probably never was, contemplated; and we also know now that to wait for our friends the Zakka-khels to climb down was a mistaken and vain idea. So far they have not only defied us, and

held their own against us with quite a fair measure of success, but also they have had influence enough with other sections of the tribes, notably with the Kuki-khels, the clan next to themselves the most numerous, and the most powerful, to prevent them up to date from even offering to make any terms with us.

At the same time, our prolonged sojourn in one spot has been their opportunity. It has resulted in daily skirmishes and rearguard affairs in which they have often got the best of it. They have absolutely nothing to learn from us, these Afridis, in irregular methods of fighting. Contrariwise, their dashing and bold attack, the skill with which they take advantage of ground, the patience with which they watch for a favourable moment, and their perfect marksmanship—all these qualities have again and again won our admiration, and made a sensible impression upon our men. And as the proof of a pudding is in the eating, so if we go through the record of our three weeks at Maidan, and total up our gains and losses, moral as well as physical, and estimate what theirs have been, and then strike a balance, I fancy it will not be very much in our favour. Our actual casualties in battle up to the present time, including those sustained by the Peshawar and Kurram columns (an insignificant percentage), are well over 650, and if an equal number of the enemy have been put *hors de combat* by us, we have not the satisfaction of *knowing* it. And when we consider, in addition, the

rifles and ammunition we have lost, the baggage that has been raided, and the transport animals, etc., that have been carried off, then it becomes obvious, and outside argument, that in the class of warfare involved by sitting down in a stationary camp, and trying to keep open a long and difficult line of communications, and to live (to a great extent) by forage, we are at a great disadvantage compared with our savage foe.

Let us be glad, then, that that trying period is past. The force broke up from its old bivouac on the 18th. On that, and the next three days, the whole of the troops, and an enormous accumulation of stores were moved to this present spot, Bāgh, mentioned by me in my letter of 5th November (Chap. VIII.), and described as the place famed for its musjid and sacred grove, in which the Afridi rebellion and the Khyber raid were planned, and in which fanaticism, intrigue, and sedition have always been hot-bedded and nourished. Bāgh is rather in Khambar-khel and Malikdin-khel country than in Zakka-khel territory, and only a short four miles west of our late camp. But short though the march, and notwithstanding that the jirgahs of the two sections named came in recently, the flanks of the route had to be strongly guarded during the movement, and the new camp was laid out under a perfect *mitraille* from sharpshooters ensconced under cover in every adjacent house. There were numerous casualties, of course, but fortunately no officer



"Every house in this valley . . . is a little fortress."



was hit, though many had miraculous escapes.¹ I say "officer" only because officers have already fared so badly, the percentage of losses sustained in the commissioned ranks being extraordinarily high. Hundreds of these Afridis, be it remembered, have been in our service, and they not only easily recognise our officers by their conspicuous head-dress and gallant leading, but they well know their value, and undoubtedly they select them for their attentions, and pick them off.

Every house in this valley, and there are hundreds of them, is, as I have described elsewhere, a little fortress. Each has thick strong walls, loopholes, and one or more lofty towers. When these amiable savages are not driven by necessity to unite to face a common danger, they are continually warring among themselves, and it is no uncommon occurrence to find one-half of a village carrying on a skirmish with the other half, which may last for several consecutive days, the parties firing upon each other from towers, or from behind rocks or other shelter. When all their ammunition is ex-

¹ "One of the gun-layers was picked off while he was laying the gun, and hardly a second after Brett, who had been showing him the 'target,' had got up from the same position. Another gunner was knocked over at my feet, and as I knelt over him I got a bullet through my breeches. Brett next had his ear chipped by a splinter, and Robinson's sword-scabbard was struck by a bullet. These were fairly close shaves. It was a hot corner while it lasted. Our left section was much exposed, and at last I had to retire it. In coming away it had to run the gauntlet of a heavy fire, but by trickling away one mule at a time at a trot I got them all away untouched. I don't think the Afridi is good at a moving object."—Extract from a letter from Captain Parker, R.A., commanding No. 2 (Derajat) M.B.

hausted, or after seven or eight casualties have occurred on either side, the quarrel is generally settled by an interchange of marriages!

These fortified houses have, therefore, been a standing danger to us, and as the troops have been repeatedly fired on from them, and serious losses sustained, Sir William Lockhart reluctantly ordered them—that is, all those groups of them adjacent to our camp, or to our main communications with the Mastura Valley, *via* the Arhanga Pass—to be destroyed. The houses have accordingly been burned, and the towers blown up by the Engineers, and if the consequence be to punish some innocent with the guilty, it must be borne in mind that the measure was not prompted by anger or malice, but dictated by stern necessity, and the instinct of self-preservation.

Just before leaving camp Maidan, Sir William Lockhart once more specially addressed the 15th Sikhs to bid them good-bye, and to assure them that he sent them back only in their own interests. The regiment is sadly reduced in strength in officers and men, as it has been in the forefront of all the fighting in this part of the world since August last, and has suffered many casualties. Its companies were barely twenty files strong as it stood on parade now. Sir William, speaking in Hindustani, again referred to the splendid endurance and pluck shown by all ranks on the 16th inst. (fully described in my last letter), and told the men they were worthy

representatives of the great Sikh Khalsa, and that in placing them temporarily on the line of communications he was only giving them a well-earned rest, but that should occasion require it he would gladly send for them again. The gallant 15th were visibly gratified by the Chief's appreciation and soldierly praise, and cheered loudly as he concluded.

The 30th P.I., who have all this time been holding the twice-captured Dargai heights, are coming up in their place. The 2nd P.I. are also on their way to the front, and the Royal Scots Fusiliers too, their places being taken on the line of communications by regiments from the reserve at Rawal Pindi.

On the 21st Sir William Lockhart received the jirgahs of four Afridi clans—the Malikdin-khels, the Khambar-khels, the Adam-khels, and the Aka-khels. The Zakka-khels and the Kuki-khels were, of course, conspicuous by their absence; but news travels quickly in the East, and it would not be many hours after the dismissal of the four jirgahs named before the terms imposed by Government would be known to all the absentees. These terms, as announced by Sir Richard Udny, were:—

1. Restoration of all arms, property, etc., plundered at the sack of the Khyber forts, or on any other occasion.
2. Surrender of 800 breech-loading rifles.
3. Payment of a fine of 50,000 rupees.

(The foregoing terms to be fully complied with in seven days.)

4. Formal tender of submission in open durbar.

Further, the jirgahs were told that Government reserved the right to decide hereafter the question of the management and administration of the Khyber Pass route, but that whatever order they might give in the matter the tribes would be required to comply with it. Sir Richard Udny, who is a fluent and forcible speaker, then went on to say that amongst the letters found in the Mullah Sayid Akbar's house in Waran was one foolish one from their own deputation in Kabul informing them that the English were in a bad way, that they had lost Aden and the Suez Canal (!), that their trade was ruined, and that they were threatened by complications at home and abroad which required the speedy presence of their troops elsewhere.¹ The Afridis, therefore, might continue to fight against the English confident that they could not do them much harm, and that they would very soon have to evacuate their country, willy-nilly. Sir Richard begged them, if they had ever placed any reliance on this precious effusion, to believe now that it was an utterly mendacious statement. We had come into their country with deliberation and purpose, and they might rest assured that we had the power and the intention to remain in it until our just demands were complied with. With this exhorta-

¹ See Appendix to Chap. X.

tion the proceedings came to an end, and the members of the jirgahs dispersed to their homes. Amongst them were men who had seen service in our own ranks, and one old fellow had no less than four medals on his breast—Afghanistan, 1878-80; North-West Frontier, India, 1887; and the Egyptian and Khedive's medals, 1882.

Although the political officers are not very sanguine in their present estimate of the situation, I cannot help thinking there is room to hope for an early and amicable settlement. It may be true that the Zakka-khels, thanks chiefly to their geographical situation in relation to the other sections, are the most powerful of all the Afghani clans, and that they still defy us and continue recalcitrant. Also, that the Kuki-khels, another strong division, have not "come in" yet. But these Khambars and Malik-dins, who have come in, are almost as important, and numerically very nearly equal to the two first-named, and there can be no doubt that they are sincere in their desire to make terms with us, and to see us depart. We have no final answer from them yet—there has not been time for that; but I quite expect that when received it will be a friendly one, though doubtless they may ask for a little more time for compliance with the conditions imposed: and that will not be unreasonable, as the looted arms and property, for example, must be scattered over a wide area, and will take time to collect. In the thorough destruction of the Zakka-khels' towers

and defences, and of many of their own too, they have received now a stern object-lesson, and they are convinced of our power to give further illustrations if they drive us to it. Moreover, we daily receive fresh evidence that in the memorable fight on the 16th inst., described in my last letter, the losses inflicted were very severe indeed. Reliable reports place them at 293 killed and wounded; and independent testimony from the Peshawar side has reached us fully corroborating this estimate, and speaking of the engagement as the most costly in life to them that they have yet been engaged in.

There is, therefore, good reason to believe that ere long submission will be generally tendered, particularly as the tribesmen note the steady determination with which Sir William Lockhart is carrying out his publicly-announced plan to visit every part of their country in turn, it resting with themselves whether he comes as a friend or an enemy. We were no sooner established here (Bāgh) than a three days' expedition was arranged to visit the Rājgul Valley and look up the Kuki-khels. Sir William himself accompanied this party, the command of which was intrusted to Brigadier-General Westmacott, whose troops included the King's Own Scottish Borderers, the 3rd Gurkhas, 36th Sikhs, 28th Bombay Pioneers, No. 4 Company Madras Sappers, No. 3 Company Bombay Sappers, the Gurkha Scouts, and No. 5 Bombay Mountain Battery. The idea was to march to Dwatoi (lit. the two rivers)



THE DWATOI DEFILE.

"A deep gorge formed by precipices which rise up sheer several hundred feet on either side.

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on the 22nd, reconnoitre and map on the 23rd, and return to Bāgh on the 24th. The district to be visited was absolutely unknown, but it had been ascertained that the road to Dwatoi lay through a long, dangerous, and difficult defile, and it was fairly certain that the Kuki-khels, who chiefly inhabit Rājgul, would oppose the movement. The troops therefore moved on the lightest possible scale, taking nothing but their great-coats, water-proof sheets, and a couple of blankets, one day's rations in their haversacks, and two more carried for them on mules; officers ditto; while Sir William Lockhart was attended by only one A.D.C.; and of his staff only Brigadier-General Nicholson, Captain Haldane, Sir Richard Udny, and Lord Methuen accompanied him.

The distance to Dwatoi proved to be about seven miles, but it is almost impossible in words to adequately describe the difficulties of the road to it. Within a couple of miles of Bāgh it suddenly plunges, following the stream which drains the Maidan basin, into a deep gorge formed by precipices which in places rise up sheer several hundred feet on either side, and are topped by rugged heights which, on the day of the movement, were crowned by the Yorkshire Regiment on one hand, and by the 2nd Gurkhas on the other. To call it a road now is only a *façon de parler*. It is a mere stony track scrambling along the river bed, sometimes on the right bank, sometimes on the left, and as often as not in mid-stream in ice-cold

water up to the knees. The water was nearly two feet deep now. After rain, when the stream is in flood, this route must be quite impassable for hours, or possibly days, together. Sometimes the gorge opens out a little, and the road runs out of it on to higher ground, when, needless to say, the troops or transport following it at once come under fire from the heights above. There are about three miles of this pleasant walking, and then the worst part of the defile is past, the last mile and a half into Dwatoi, though still following the river bed, running through a more open and an easier country.

To force a defile like this, and take a strong brigade through it with its baggage, requires circumspection and dash. The first step was, of course, to crown the heights on either side, and drive off the enemy who held them. This was done in excellent style by the specially detailed troops, the Yorks and 2nd Gurkhas, who started in the bitter cold before daylight, and, breasting the climb in gallant fashion, accomplished their task with but few casualties, which, however, included Lieutenant Jones, killed, and 2nd Lieutenant Watson, severely wounded, both of the Yorks, while bravely leading on their men. The heights being thus in our hands, Westmacott's Brigade advanced, the Gurkhas leading the way, and by four in the afternoon Dwatoi was occupied, the enemy offering throughout a desultory resistance, which, as usual, such excellent long shots are they, cost us a few men wounded.

Sir William Lockhart himself, and some of his staff, did not escape by any margin to speak of, from being picked off by some sharp-shooters who had securely established themselves in an eyrie on the rocks above, whence they made one particular crossing on the road below them extremely dangerous. Four of the Borderers were knocked over on this one strip, and eventually Sir William sent up his personal escort, a few files of the 3rd Sikhs, to dislodge these marksmen, which they did.

But though the troops, after a most toilsome and exhausting march, had reached Dwatoi, their baggage did not arrive, and such were the extraordinary difficulties of the road that none of it came in that night. It was five o'clock on the following afternoon before the last of it, escorted by Colonel Haughton and his splendid Sikhs, the 36th, reached the bivouac. Consequently the General, and his staff, and the men, all alike, had to lie out on the hill-sides during that bitter night, the thermometer registering 20 degrees of frost. Every one, be it remembered, was wet to the skin almost up to the waist, and, arriving on the ground only a little before sunset, there was no time to dry even one's socks and boots ; while as to fires, a few well-directed bullets from the enemy soon scattered the shivering groups that had crowded round them.

As a matter of fact, the largest proportion of the men had at once to climb the adjacent ridges, drive the enemy off, and hold them during the freezing

night. This they did with a cheeriness and dash which were admirable. The Borderers in particular were sharply engaged before they established themselves on their ground, and were conspicuous by the resolution and spirit with which they attacked and captured their point. It was not a cheerful night either for the baggage, away some two miles in rear, and it was an anxious time for the rear-guard commander. When darkness came on Colonel Haughton parked all the mules on some terraced fields, and, placing strong picquets round them, like St. Paul, "waited for the day." Owing to the good arrangements made, neither the baggage nor the main body was seriously attacked during the night.

During the 23rd reconnaissances were made in various directions, and valuable mapping was carried out by survey parties, all of it under fire, for on all sides the enemy were active and evidently collecting for attack. During the night the camp was a good deal fired into, but not much harm done; and long before daylight on the 24th the baggage was loaded up and the return march to Bāgh commenced. The intensity of the cold, which was accentuated by a wind that pierced like Röntgen rays, may be imagined from the fact that the spray from the water splashed up by wading, froze as it fell, while moustaches became mere blocks of ice, and the horses' tails as they swished them about in the stream were covered immediately with long spiky

icles. Several cases of frost-bite occurred before camp was reached.

The heights on either side of the defile previously described were still held by the Yorks and 2nd Gurkhas, who never quitted them after capturing them on the 22nd, until the returning troops had all passed safely through ; and the rear-guard of the brigade was composed of the 3rd Gurkhas and 36th Sikhs, with two companies of the Borderers, the whole under the command of Colonel Haughton. The enemy, of course, pressed these troops severely during the retirement, and many casualties occurred, particularly amongst the 36th, on whom the brunt of the fighting fell. But the men, admirably handled by Haughton, bravely led by their officers, and encouraged by the presence of Brigadier-General Westmacott, who was constantly with them throughout, were as steady and cool as if they were manœuvring on a field-day, and returned the Afidis' fire with a judgment and precision that most effectually disconcerted them, and kept them at arm's length. It is quite impossible to describe the difficulties and risks of taking a long baggage train through a long and dangerous defile such as this is. Nothing but individual courage, high training, perfect discipline, and calm judgment will pull troops through successfully, when acting as rear-guard in such a country, and opposed to such an enemy. All these qualities were exhibited now in a high degree by commander and men alike, with the result that the

enemy were eventually beaten off, leaving for once in a way some of their killed behind them, and allowing even three of their rifles to fall into our hands. Before sunset the whole force was safely in camp, and a most interesting expedition had been brought to a most successful conclusion.

The manner in which the Yorks and 2nd Gurkhas were withdrawn from the heights on the flanks was also admirable. Sir William Lockhart was extremely pleased with the soldierly spirit shown by all ranks on this occasion. There was enough fighting, hardship, and exposure on these three days to satisfy the keenest warrior; but everything was faced and endured with patience, pluck, and cheerfulness, and General Westmacott, who was in command of the brigade, is to be congratulated on the complete success of the enterprise.

The casualties during this retreat were: 36th Sikhs, two men killed, twelve wounded, and one officer, Captain Venour, 5th P.I. (attached to the 36th), slightly wounded; Borderers, two wounded; 3rd Gurkhas, one killed and three wounded.

CHAPTER XII

THE 1ST BRIGADE IN MASTURA — THE PUNISHMENT OF THE CHAMKANIS — PREPARATIONS TO LEAVE TIRAH

BAGH, 3rd December.

I MAY refer now for a moment to the doings of the 1st Brigade, which, it will be remembered, when we advanced into Tirah, was left in the Mastura Valley to keep an eye on the Orakzais, and to maintain communication between Khangarbur in the Khānki Valley and the headquarters in Tirah. Under Brigadier-General Hart's vigorous administration, the Mastura Post, as it was called, was soon converted into a strong position, and large convoys of stores and supplies coming up, and of wounded and sick going down, were passed through daily with ease and regularity. Foraging parties were sent out frequently, and successful reconnaissances were freely pushed in all directions (notably one on the 25th November to the summit of the Torsmats Pass, 7970 feet high), which resulted in the acquisition of much valuable information regarding the

surrounding country, which has now been all thoroughly explored and mapped. The Orakzais in the Mastura Valley were not so aggressively hostile at this time as the Afridis in Tirah. Still, skirmishes with them were of constant occurrence, and the troops had plenty of practice in fighting and marching, to prepare them for the sterner work which this brigade, with the rest of the 1st Division, under Major-General Symons, was shortly to undertake.

On 8th November, for example, a party of the 1st Gurkhas, on duty on the southern slopes of the Arhanga Pass, succeeded in surprising some of the enemy who were lying in wait to attack convoys near the village of Unai,¹ and inflicted heavy loss upon them ; and on the 13th, when some hundreds of Orakzais pressed an attack upon one of our foraging parties in the valley, close to the Mastura Post, they were repulsed decisively, with many casualties to them, and at the cost of only six wounded to ourselves ; which included, however, two officers, Captain Bowman of the Derbyshires, and Major Money, 18th Bengal Lancers. The troops on this occasion were commanded by Major Smith-Dorrien, Derbyshire Regiment, who handled his force with considerable skill.

In my last letter I described the reconnaissance to Dwatoi. Sir William Lockhart rejoined head-

¹ This was our artillery position in the attack on the Arhanga Pass. See CHAP. VIII

quarters at Bāgh on 24th November, and allowing himself only two days for office work and correspondence—and it is astonishing how even in the field papers and telegrams do accumulate in a very short time—started again on the morning of the 27th for a longer and more extended tour through the Chamkani-Massozai-Mamuzai country. These are sections, lying due west of our present camp, about two or three marches only, but separated from this valley by a range of precipitous hills called the Durghai Ghar, across which there are several unexplored and difficult passes, between 7000 feet and 8000 feet in height. The Chamkanis and the Massozais—the latter particularly—were, in the beginning of this trouble, exceedingly bumptious and aggressive. When Sir William Lockhart published his first proclamation to the tribes, announcing his coming and his purpose, the Massozais sent an insolent reply, stating that they had their own orders from their Mullahs; that they protested altogether against the occupation of the Khyber, Samāna, and Swat; and that they would certainly oppose our advance. They have since fully kept this promise, and have throughout been actively hostile in the Khurmana Valley,¹ keeping us constantly on the

¹ Here I may mention that on 7th November Colonel Hill, commanding the Kurram column, made a reconnaissance in force from Sadr, through the Khurmāna defile, to Hissar, in order to explore the ground through which his column would move in the event of operations being subsequently undertaken against the Chamkanis. The following troops accompanied him:—Central India Horse, 100 lancers mounted, 100 dismounted; 12th Bengal Infantry,

alert at Sadda (or Sadr), and regularly firing on our patrols and picquets whenever they got the chance.

For these reasons, as well as because it is Sir William's declared policy to visit and explore thoroughly every part of their country, it was essential to look up these Chamkanis and Massozais and Mamuzais, who, notwithstanding that their jirgahs had been received, and that they had practically agreed to the conditions imposed, showed no disposition to submit and pay up their fines.

The command of the troops in this expedition was intrusted to Brigadier-General Gaselee, who started on the 26th with the Gurkha Scouts of the 3rd and 5th Gurkhas, the Queen's Royal West

100 men ; 5th Gurkhas, 250 men ; Kapurthala Imperial Service Troops, 100 men ; Kurram Militia, 400 men ; and the maxim gun, Royal Scots Fusiliers.

The defile was found to be seven miles in length, and passable for cavalry. The enemy being taken by surprise did not oppose the advance.

On the return of the column to Sadr the same day, the enemy, who meanwhile had collected in considerable numbers, followed up the rear-guard, but being driven back with heavy loss by the 5th Gurkhas, discontinued their attack, and the last five miles were traversed without a shot being fired. Our casualties, so far as known at the time, consisted of two native soldiers killed and four wounded, but the next day, the O. C. Kapurthala Infantry reported that one native officer and thirty-five men of his regiment were missing. It appears that a picquet of fifty men had been directed to occupy a hill on the flank of the column, and when recalled by signal, which was duly acknowledged, it moved off to join the rear-guard. Thirty-five men with a Subadar, taking what the native officer must have believed to be a short cut, became entangled in bad ground, and found their further progress barred by a jungle fire which had been lighted early in the day. They turned back to regain the road by which they had ascended the hill, but the enemy had discovered their predicament, and assembling in strength, succeeded in shooting down the whole party. In the meantime, the remainder came in safely, and believing the Subadar and his party to have arrived ahead of them, a report of "all present" was made to Colonel Hill, who knew nothing of what had happened until the following day.

Surrey Regiment, the 3rd Sikhs, 4th Gurkhas, 28th Bombay Pioneers,¹ No. 1 Kohat Mountain Battery, and Nos. 3 and 4 Companies Bombay Sappers and Miners—a very compact little force. But this was not the whole of it. It was only intended on this first day to advance about five miles up to the foot of the Kahu, or Durbi Khel Pass, 8700 feet, leading into the Massozai country, for it was known that the road would require a lot of improving both up to that point and beyond it; hence the large proportion of Sappers and Miners accompanying the brigade. So Sir William Lockhart, in order to gain an extra day for his own work in camp, left Bāgh himself, with his staff, on the 27th, taking on with him the York Regiment, a wing of the Royal Scots Fusiliers (who had only marched in the day before), the 2nd Gurkhas, and No. 2 Derajat Mountain Battery. These troops overtook General Gaselee in the forenoon of the 28th, and the combined column, under his orders, crossed the pass safely, with all its baggage, the same day. There was no organised opposition, but between Bāgh and the summit of the pass the country is thickly studded with houses and towers, and some of these on both days had to be cleared of the enemy's sharp-shooters before the main body could proceed.

As the road entered the low hills fringing the foot of the pass, the ground was all in favour of the

¹ This regiment returned to Bāgh after completing work on the road to the foot of the Durbi Khel Pass.

enemy and several casualties occurred. But our men and officers are now every day improving in the skirmishing attack and defence methods essential to success in this kind of warfare, and they steadily drove the Afridis before them, shooting several as they ran, and burning the houses from which we had been fired at. At one point on a rocky ridge some of the enemy had sangar-ed themselves strongly, and held their ground very doggedly. But a company of the Queen's, led by Lieutenant Engledue, went for them in dashing style, and made them vacate at the bayonet's point, killing six of them actually in the sangar, and securing their rifles, rare trophies with us. Our total casualties on the two days were one man of the Queen's, and two of the Yorkshires, killed, and eight Yorkshires, one Royal Scots Fusilier, four 4th Gurkhas, two Gurkha Scouts, two Sappers, and one doolie-bearer wounded.

On the 28th all the troops and baggage had crossed the pass, and the force concentrated the following day at Dargai. The Massozais, who had hitherto blustered exceedingly, were apparently startled to find themselves suddenly invaded, and their principal village occupied by our troops : and almost as we marched in their jirgahs appeared on the scene, and tendered submission. Their country seems extremely fertile, with much pasturage, and many well-built villages, which no doubt they were anxious to save. There are also splendid forests of



"A company of the Queen's, led by Lieut. Engleue, went for them in dashing style."

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oak, fir, birch, and walnut. The jirgahs promised to pay up their fines at once, and, as a matter of fact, brought in an instalment of thirty rifles the next day.¹

The Khani Khel Chamkanis, however, further to the west, showed no sign of coming in, so Sir William arranged to look them up without delay. Leaving Lieutenant-Colonel Spurgin, Royal Scots Fusiliers, in command at Dargai, with one battery, a wing of his own regiment, the Yorkshires, 2nd Gurkhas, and the two Sapper Companies, with orders to improve the road to Khānki Bazar, in which direction it was intended to march later, Sir William himself, with Brigadier-General Gaselee, and No. 1 Kohat Mountain battery, the Queen's, the 4th Gurkhas, the 3rd Sikhs, and the Gurkha Scouts, marched to Hissar, and there joined hands with Colonel Hill,² with whom helio communication had been opened the previous day, and who had come up from Sadr, through the Kharmana defile, in compliance with orders previously sent him from headquarters.

¹ A few shots were fired into the headquarter's camp on the night of the 29th, and two of Sir William's personal escort were wounded: also his extra aide-de-camp, Sir Pratap Singh of Jodhpur. The following reference to this incident is from *Despatches*:—"I take this opportunity of expressing my thanks to Lieutenant-Colonel His Highness the Maharaj Dhiraj Sir Pratap Singh, G.C.S.I., who was attached to me throughout the expedition as extra aide-de-camp. This very gallant Rajput nobleman was wounded on the 29th November, and characteristically concealed the fact until I discovered it by accident some days after the occurrence."

² Colonel Hill had with him 100 mounted men and 300 dismounted of the 6th B.C., and the Central India Horse; 400 rifles 12th B.I., 200 rifles 5th Gurkhas, and 200 rifles Kapurthala Infantry.

It had been quite expected that the Mamozaïs and the Massozaïs would show fight, and that the Chamkanis, a small and insignificant section, would submit quietly. But, as is often the case, it was the unexpected which happened. The Massozaïs and Mamozaïs tendered their submission, and paid up their fines, as soon as our columns appeared on the scene ; while the Chamkanis, on the other hand, hurled their defiance at us, and promptly dared us to do our worst ! They were accordingly tackled at once (on 1st December), their punishment being intrusted to Colonel Hill.

Colonel Hill's force consisted of 200 of the 5th Gurkha Rifles, 12th Khelat-i-Ghilzai Regiment, the Kapurthala Infantry, the 4th Gurkha Rifles, 400 dismounted cavalry (6th B.C. and Central India Horse), the Kohat Mounted Battery, two Maxims (Royal Scots Fusiliers), and last, but not least, the Gurkha Scouts. His objective was the principal Chamkani settlement of Thabi, about seven miles to the north-west of Hissar, and his orders were to burn and destroy every fortified post and tower either in it or on the road to it. This programme was not, however, fully carried out on the 1st, because, owing to the extremely difficult country, and the stubborn resistance offered by the enemy, unexpected delays occurred ; and, thorough co-operation between the two columns, into which for the purpose of attack Colonel Hill had divided his troops did not take place : moreover, it was

necessary to return to Hissar during daylight, to avoid the risk of an attack on the rear-guard after dark by the Massozais. The casualties on our side on this day were eight killed and seventeen wounded. Amongst the former was Richmond Battye, of the 6th B.C.,¹ and in the latter were included Villiers-Stuart, 5th Gurkhas, severely wounded; Vansittart, 5th Gurkhas, and Pennington, 12th B.C., slightly wounded.

On the next day, the 2nd, Sir William directed a fresh attack to be made, Colonel Hill again commanding, taking with him half a battalion of the Queen's, and half a battalion of the 3rd Sikhs, the 4th and 5th Gurkhas, the Gurka Scouts, and the Kohat Mountain Battery. On this occasion complete success attended the operations. Some commanding heights, from which the attacking columns had been much harassed on the previous day, were scaled in great style by the Gurkhas, the Scouts leading; and though the Chamkanis fought well they were driven from ridge to ridge and suffered heavily, leaving many of their dead behind them, so hot-foot in pursuit were the Scouts under the bold leading of Captain Lucas and Lieutenant Bruce. Mirak Shah, the chief Malik of

¹ With reference to the death of Lieutenant Battye, the *Pioneer* wrote:—“It is now almost a tradition with the Battyes that all shall die on the battle-field; but one may nevertheless regret the death so early of yet another of this gallant family. Richmond Battye was a young officer of only eight years' service, eager, active, alert, and conscientious in the discharge of his duties, of a sound understanding, and full of a generous enthusiasm for his profession.”

the Khani Khels, and Mahmud and Saidu, two other important Maliks, are said to have been among the slain. The defences of Thabi were razed to the ground, and the return march to Hissar was unmolested. Our own casualties on this day were nominal.

The Chamkanis having been thus effectively punished, Colonel Hill, with the troops of his own command, and taking with him all the sick and wounded, was directed to return to Sadda (or Sadr), where he arrived on the 5th without interruption by the way, and resumed his duties as Warden of the Kurram Valley while these frontier disturbances last; and Sir William Lockhart, marching leisurely *via* Khānki Bazar¹ and the Chingakh Pass (7700 feet), returned to Bāgh on 6th December.

Here, in accordance with instructions previously issued, every preparation had been by this time completed for the evacuation of Tirah. For the cold here is already intense, and winter is coming on us now with rapid strides. Directly snow falls it would be impossible to maintain ourselves in these bleak highlands, which the Afridis themselves always abandon during the winter months. It was

¹ At Khanki Bazar a column joined which had come up the valley from Khangarbur, with supplies for Sir William Lockhart's force. It consisted of the 30 P.I., 2nd P.I., 4 guns, Kashmir Mountain Battery, and a squadron 18 B.L., the whole under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Maisey. No opposition was encountered by the way. When Sir William Lockhart marched for Bāgh this column returned to Khangarbur, with the exception of the 2nd P.I., which now joined Brigadier-General Gaselee's brigade.

decided, therefore, to move to a milder clime while the weather continues fine, and by sending off well beforehand, *via* Shinauri and Kohat, all heavy baggage and surplus stores, all sick and weakly men, and even all Staff and departmental officers, and officers not absolutely required on the march with the headquarters of the army, or of divisions, it was arranged that everything should be ready for a start the day after Sir William Lockhart's return from his excursion into the Chamkani-Massozai country. The troops remaining would then move on the lightest possible scale, without tents, as the success of the impending manœuvres must depend largely upon the mobility of the columns engaged in them. The scheme is, briefly, to change the base of operations from Kohat to Peshawar. The 2nd Division, General Yeatman-Biggs commanding, and Sir William Lockhart and Staff accompanying, will march, *via* Dwatoi, down the Bāra Valley, to Barkai. General Symons, with General Gaselee's and General Hart's Brigades, will start from the latter's camp in the Mastura Valley, and move down the Mastura, destroying on the way the defences of the Aka Khel villages, in the Waran Valley: thence they will cross the Sapri Pass, and join the 2nd Division near Barkai or Bāra Fort. Here the whole force will link up with General Hammond's "Peshawar column," and be within easy reach by a good road of Peshawar itself; and at Bāra, also, we should pick up again all our heavy

baggage, etc., and be rejoined by all those who are now travelling round by Shinauri-Kohat-Pindi to Peshawar.

Finally, the Peshawar column, which hitherto has remained in the vicinity of Peshawar, has been directed to advance as far as Barkai by the 8th December, and there to select camping-grounds and store supplies, for the main column, and to improve the roads between Barkai and Bāra fort.¹

By thus sweeping down the Mastura and Bāra Valleys (Waran being visited *en route*) the whole of the Afridi-Orakzai highlands will be explored from end to end: and, on the completion of the march, the force will be concentrated about Barkai-Bāra-Jamrud, conveniently close to Peshawar, in a position to operate with effect against the Afridi settlements in the lower Bāra and Bazar Valleys, and to reoccupy the Khyber.

Seeing us thus established in positions dominating their country, and within striking distance of those lower valleys into which they themselves are driven by the approach of winter, the Zakka-khels, the most implacable of our foes, must see the futility of prolonging a struggle so disastrous to themselves, and which, if persevered in, will in all probability result in a permanent weakening of their power by depriving them of the premier position which un-

¹ "On my arrival at Barkai on the 14th December, I found that my instructions on these heads had been most thoroughly carried out."—Sir Wm. Lockhart, *Despatch*.

doubtedly they hold now, and always have held in the past, among all the Afridi clans. For amongst most of the other sections there appears to be a genuine inclination to accept our terms, and to bury the hatchet ; and should the Zakkas, by obstinate resistance to the bitter end, protract the anxieties and hardships and sufferings of all, it is quite on the cards that the Malikdin-khels, the Khambar-khels, and others (between whom and the Zakkas there is no love lost) will make separate terms with us, and, as the quickest way of relieving their country of our presence, will combine with us to compel compliance by the Zakkas.

These, however, are only what the gifted "Ali Baba" used to describe as "precious possibilities."

It only remained at this juncture to notify to the tribes why we were leaving Tirah, and the subjoined proclamation was accordingly circulated among the clans by special messengers sent out by the political officers :—

"I am going away from these highlands of Maidan," wrote Sir William, "because snow is coming, and I do not wish my troops to be exposed to the cold of winter. But I am not going to leave your country. On the contrary, I shall remain in your country until you fully comply with the terms of Government ; and it is my intention to attack you in your other settlements during the winter. Whatever your evil advisers may tell you, I say that the Afridis attacking the English is like flies assailing a lion ; and, as an old friend of many of you, my advice to you is to submit, and so let your wives and families return from the cold mountains to their homes."

CHAPTER XIII

THROUGH THE DWATOI DEFILE AGAIN, AND DOWN THE BARA VALLEY

MĀMANAI, 15th December.

LEAVING to our friends the Zakka-khels, and others, this document to think over, the movement, *via* the Dwatoi defile, down the Bāra Valley was commenced on 7th December. The force, which consisted only of the Second Division, under General Yeatman-Biggs and Army Headquarters, had been cut down, as I have explained, in the way of baggage to the lowest possible scale, and was rationed only up to 14th December, by which date therefore it was essential that a junction should be effected with Brigadier-General Hammond and the Peshawar column somewhere about Barkai. The whole distance to be traversed was only about forty miles, and but little was known about the road except that it was bad; opposition throughout its length was certain; and a margin had to be allowed for delays in getting through the Dwatoi defile, and for an *expedition en route* to attack the Kuki-khels in

Rajgul. Thus, to take only seven days' supplies with the column was cutting it rather fine, but the difficulties of transport are a ruling factor in all these matters, and, carrying only this small provision, the baggage animals with the troops numbered nearly 12,000 mules and ponies.

The advance was led by Brigadier-General West-macott's Brigade, Sir William Lockhart and staff accompanying. I have described before the defile between Bāgh and Dwatoi. My first estimate of its vast natural strength and appalling difficulties is not diminished, but rather strengthened and confirmed, by a second inspection of it. Literally one might say of this place—

In yon strait path a thousand
May well be stopped by three.

But, most fortunately, our passage through the most dangerous portion of it was not opposed by the enemy at all. The Malikdin-khels, who claim lordship over the country through which lie the first few and worst miles, had been happily squared by our energetic political officers,¹ and on the promise that their houses in the neighbourhood should be spared they agreed not to obstruct our march. Notwithstanding, no military precaution to insure a safe

¹ Colonel Warburton's influence is very great with all Afridis, and, chiefly through his efforts, eight of the Malikdin Maliks came in on the evening of the 6th, and promised to post unarmed picquets of their own men on the heights through which our road lay to Dwatoi. This they did, and for three days and two nights, that is, until our troops were clear of the defile, not a shot was fired in it.

transit was neglected. The thermometer registered 21 degrees of frost on the morning of 7th December, but long before daylight the troops of the advanced guard, under Lieutenant-Colonel C. Pulley, 3rd Gurkhas, had scaled the towering heights on either flank of the advance, and made secure the most important points. Colonel Pulley's force consisted of his own splendid battalion, half a battalion of the 2nd Punjab Infantry, the 28th Bombay Pioneers, a company of Madras Sappers, and a Mountain Battery, which last, of course, had to follow the river bed. The Pioneers and Sappers worked at the road as they went along, while the flanking parties were furnished chiefly by the Gurkhas. Close behind the troops of the advanced guard came the rest of Westmacott's Brigade, and then followed the transport of the division, a surging mass of struggling animals and shouting drivers that blocked the narrow pass for miles and for hours, or rather for days, but which came through safely, nevertheless, by the evening of the 9th, under the protection of General Kempster's Brigade, which formed the rear-guard of the division.

I may mention here that, as General Kempster's Brigade left Bāgh for Dwatoi, General Gaselee's Brigade (just returned with Sir William Lockhart from the Massozai country) started, *via* the Arhangā Pass, to join its own division (under Major-General Symons) in the Mastura Valley; so that on 9th December the evacuation of Maidan was completed,

and General Symons with his division commenced his march down the Mastura simultaneously with our movement down the Bāra.

To resume. Although the passage of the defile was not opposed by the enemy, yet we were fired on as soon as we emerged from it and headed for our camping-ground. A brisk advance, however, under General Westmacott's own direction, soon drove the enemy off, and strong picquets were at once posted on all the surrounding heights, while the main body occupied their bivouacs, and the transport slowly filed on to the ground. Night by this time had come on, but there was nearly a full moon, which made it as bright as day. This was all in our favour, and enabled our tired troops to stave off successfully every attack made on them (and they were numerous up to midnight),¹ and prevented

¹ "We (F. Company, K.O.S.Bs.) rushed this position (heights above Dwatoi) with pipes playing. The enemy now retired to another *sangar* in a clump of trees, slightly below us, about 300 yards away, and held other *sangars* beyond, and commanding it. We had to lie close here, as bullets were coming in thick. As this was to be our post for the night (it was now only 3 P.M.), we entrenched ourselves as well as we could, and Captain Macfarlane, who commanded us, posted one section under Sergeant Watson in a small *sangar* about sixty yards to our right. We left loopholes in the walls we built up, so that the sentries could look out without exposing themselves. It was a bitter cold night, and we were all wet through with wading during the day.

"When it got dark the Afidis began to fire at us, but we didn't reply. Suddenly one of the sentries called out, 'Stand to! They're on us!' We all sprung to our posts, and opened fire independently on a mob of men who were charging down with loud shouts. Some of them were within twenty yards. Our fire checked them, and they drew off. We could hear groans, and the noise made by bodies being dragged and carried away. One dead man was left within ten yards of our wall.

"They now established themselves under cover all round us within very

much of the loss and confusion amongst the transport which otherwise would have ensued from being benighted on the road.

On the next day, the 8th, our fine weather deserted us at last. There had in fact been a drizzle during the night, and when we roused in the morning the hills all round us were dusted with snow. The highlands of Tirah had not been evacuated a day too soon. It would have been disastrous indeed, to be caught up there by the snow, which lies thick in a severe winter for weeks together, and we congratulated ourselves that we were well out of it.

The only incident of note on the 8th was a brilliant little dash by a detachment composed of 3rd Gurkhas and 36th Sikhs, supported by the fire of some mountain guns, to capture a peak about a mile up the stream, which was strongly held by the enemy, and which completely commanded the road up the valley by which it was intended on the following day to push a punitive reconnaissance. The men had already been marching and fighting for

short ranges, fired frequently, shouted abuse in *Hindustani*, and threw stones, by which several of us were hit. We took no notice, by Captain Macfarlane's orders, but waited to give them the bayonet should they come on.

"Twice men were seen by the sentries trying to crawl up close ; and each time as the sentry rose to bayonet them, he was shot dead through the head by marksmen who were on the look-out. The men killed in this way were Privates Waits and Young. Up to 10 P.M. we were much harassed, and constantly threatened by rushes, but after midnight they let us almost alone. It then came on to snow. At daylight they fired briskly again, but none of us were hit ; and later in the day, when the Gurkhas and Sikhs captured a hill which commanded their position, they cleared out altogether. We were relieved at noon by H. Company."—*From a letter by an Officer with the Picquet.*

more than thirty-six hours at a stretch when they were ordered to fall in for this attack, but they started at once light-hearted and cheerful, and, splendidly led by Lieutenants West and Van Someren, breasted the tremendous climb in the most gallant style and captured the hill-top right away, with a loss of only four men killed and wounded.

On the 9th, General Kempster's Brigade having come in and taken over the picquets, General West-macott marched his brigade up the Rājgul Valley, Sir William Lockhart accompanying, with the object of mapping the country, which is all a *terra incognita* to our surveyors, and of punishing the Kuki-khels by destroying their towers and defences. I speak of the Rājgul Valley, but in reality it is throughout its length (three or four miles) more a defile than a valley. Shut in on either hand by lofty hills, whose wooded spurs run down until they almost meet in the stream at their feet, it is a place in which troops must be handled with the greatest caution. But the 4th Brigade are seasoned warriors now, quick to understand their general's instructions, and alert and resolute in carrying them out; and so, without a hitch or falter, they worked steadily up the valley, crowning height after height on the flanks, taking advantage of the ground like the practised skirmishers they are now, driving the enemy back with only trivial loss to themselves, and holding them in check until the Sappers and Pioneers

behind them had accomplished their work of destruction and the survey parties had finished their maps. The mountain guns again were well to the front and of the greatest service in expelling the enemy from the shelter of their sangars, and supporting and covering the infantry attack. The batteries out on this day were No. 8, under Major Shirres, and No. 5, under Captain Money, and the accuracy of their fire was the subject of general remark.

The retirement to camp was as usual actively pressed by the Afridis, but the handling and working of the troops were admirable, and the enemy made no impression on them whatever; while their own losses must have been severe. The 3rd Gurkhas, 36th Sikhs, 2nd P.I., 28th Bombay Pioneers, Scottish Borderers, and two companies Royal Scottish Fusiliers were the troops engaged.

And now, on the 10th, commenced our difficult and arduous march down the Bāra Valley. The stages were—Dwatoi to Sandana, eight miles; to Sher-khel, ten miles; to Narkandai, eight miles; and to Swaikot-Māmanai (about one mile east of Swaikot) eight miles.

From the above you will see there were only four comparatively short marches to make before joining up with General Hammond and the Peshawar column. It sounded so simple, but I think most of us understood that it meant four days of the sternest work and stiffest trial that the force has had yet. For though *we* knew well enough that our march



"The mountain guns again . . . were of the greatest service."

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was not, in the accepted sense, a movement in retreat, yet it was quite certain that such was the construction *the enemy* would put upon it. We knew very well that we were sweeping down the Bāra and Mastura Valleys merely by way of carrying out part of a thought-out programme, that the march Pesha-war-wards was only *reculer pour mieux sauter*, and that the measure was only preliminary to fresh raids up the Bazar and Khyber Valleys. But the Afridis, intelligent though they be, would not look at our ulterior aims. They would only consider the situation of the present and the opportunity of the moment. Their Mullahs would tell them that we were flying from their country, defeated, and unsuccessful in our venture, and would urge them to follow close on our tracks, and to strike hard for vengeance' sake, and for their faith.

And, indeed, they did all this, and played their own game throughout the retirement with a determination and boldness and skill which often compelled our admiration, although it cost us dear. But I must not anticipate.

Our march commenced at daylight on the 10th. The general arrangement was that the 4th Brigade, Westmacott's, should lead the way, and the 3rd Brigade, Kempster's, bring up the rear, the whole of the baggage and hospitals, etc., moving between the two brigades. The Bāra Valley is nowhere a mile in breadth, and in many parts narrows in to very much less than that. Down the centre of it

runs the Bāra stream, a muddy torrent almost knee-deep, 30 to 40 feet wide, brawling over a rocky bed, winding like a great red snake backwards and forwards from one bank to the other, anon breaking up into a dozen smaller branches, and then collecting again into one channel as it rushes through a rocky gorge. The average width from bank to bank of the river-bed is less than half a mile, mostly laid out in terraced rice-fields, and though above the river on the left bank there is a narrow bridle-path, the whole of the transport was kept below, partly because of the broad front on which it could there move, and partly because of the protection afforded by the banks. Beyond the river banks are rice-fields again in terraces, and beyond these again the hills, rising abruptly into peaks and ridges which run up to 9000 and 10,000 feet, all thickly covered now with recent snow. Throughout its length, therefore, the valley is commanded by the heights on either side, and as every yard of our progress was fiercely contested, it is easy, or, rather, it is not easy—to realise the tremendous exertions, and I may add, risks, involved in clearing these, mile by mile, in holding them while the baggage passed through, and, finally, in withdrawing from them.

It must be remembered that never before on our North-West Frontier have we had to deal with an enemy armed with long-ranging breech-loaders, as these Afridis are. It may be much argued where they got them from, but the fact remains that they

possess them. The majority have Martini-Henry rifles, with which they shoot very straight up to 1200 and 1500 yards. But in addition they have a few Lee-Metfords, fifty or sixty probably, taken or stolen from us at various times, notably on the 9th and 16th of November, and their supply of ammunition is apparently unlimited. Consequently, the work thrown on flanking parties now is extremely heavy. In the days when the enemy had nothing better than the *jezail* and a few Enfields and Sniders, it was practically enough to keep them a good half-mile clear of the line of march. Now the flankers must go much farther afield than that, and points have to be occupied and held fully a mile away on either hand before the road can be considered safe.

To accentuate the difficulties of the march under the conditions I have indicated, it rained and sleeted and snowed throughout the night of the 9th and during the 10th; and that rain made a cruel difference to the wretched transport animals, and shivering drivers, and hospital kahars, who (like every one else, for that matter) had to lie out in it without tents or shelter. For it not only drenched them to the bone, and froze them to the marrow, but it also converted the rice-fields, across which they had to plough their way, into veritable bogs, and in these many a poor beast plunged up to his girths, and, too exhausted to get on his legs again, was left behind and lost. The ice-cold river, too, had to be

forsaken ten or a dozen times in every mile, and long before Swaikot was reached many unhappy followers, frozen by the cold, and terrified by the bullets whistling overhead, collapsed and died by the way, in spite of the efforts of the escorts to keep them all together, and bring them safely along.

However, we had to take the country as we found it, and the weather as it came, and war cannot be waged without losses of this kind occurring. As a matter of fact, on this first march, on the 10th, the casualties were not very numerous, either amongst the troops or the followers—about twenty only in the two brigades amongst the former. It was on the next day, the 11th, that the weather was at its worst, the fighting more severe, and the losses considerable. The enemy seemed to realise that they had a great chance now, and they attacked the rear-guards, who were terribly delayed and embarrassed by the transport, and particularly by the hospitals, with great determination. The wretched kahars, hardly able to carry the doolies when empty, seemed quite unable to bear them when loaded with the weight of a wounded man. Yet they had to be brought along, and the troops had often to fight desperately to hold the savage pursuers at bay while the dooly-bearers got safely away with their precious burdens. At last night came on while the tail of the rear-guard was still nearly three miles from its bivouac with the main body. It consisted at this time of 100 men of the Gordons, 220 of the 2nd Gurkhas,

30 of the 2nd P.I., and 30 of the Dorsets, and was commanded by that good soldier Major Downman, of the Gordons.

Encumbered as he was at this time with twenty-one wounded men, and with darkness approaching, while scores of the enemy surrounded him on every side, Major Downman promptly decided to seize a house, and intrench himself for the night. A clump of huts on the right bank of the river seemed to afford the shelter sought for, and his little column made for them. The enemy, noting his intention, attempted to forestall him in the possession of this vantage-ground, but Captain Uniacke, with a handful of Gordons, made a brilliant dash and got in first. The rest of the party soon followed, and the detachment was safe for the night. They had been fighting from daylight to dark, and were thankful to get some rest. The men had behaved with steadiness and resolution in the most trying circumstances, and the officers had set a most brilliant example of courage and endurance. Among the wounded this day were Lieutenant Williams, Hants Regiment, transport officer, and Captain Norie, 2nd Gurkhas, whose left arm was shattered into matches by a bullet which struck it high up near the shoulder.

When day broke on the 12th Major Downman heliographed in for help to Sher-khel, and General Kempster went out with a couple of regiments and a battery, and brought his gallant little detachment in. The total casualties on the 11th were not less

than fifty or sixty amongst the troops ; and, owing to the inclement weather and the dreadful state of the flooded country, there is no doubt that a number of followers were lost, and that considerable quantities of stores and baggage and animals were abandoned, and fell into the hands of the enemy.

On the 12th Sir William Lockhart halted. A rest was imperatively necessary, for, what with constant marching and fighting and heavy picquet duties, the strain had been incessant since the 7th inclusive. From this point, too, the order of march was changed. The 3rd Brigade was directed to lead the advance and the 4th Brigade to undertake the rear-guard duties.

The enemy by this time had increased in numbers and daring, until it was plain they thought they had us on a "down grade." They fired into our crowded camp on the night of the 11th with considerable effect ; and parties sent out to forage during the day, though very strongly guarded, were engaged in a skirmish more or less severe all the time. All the sections of the Afridis were represented in the hungry crowd, attracted no doubt by the hope of plunder, but the bulk of them were Zakka-khels and Aka-khels, and they had not forgotten to bring their Lee-Metfords with them ! It was actually necessary, as the only way to disperse these prowling guerillas, to pitch a few shells into them, where on the mountain side fully 2500 yards away a little knot of marks-

"On the 13th the march was resumed."



men had established themselves across the river, whence they kept up a most harassing fusilade on the camp throughout the day and far into the night.

On the 13th the march was resumed. Fortunately the clouds had now cleared away, and once more the weather was bright and fine. The cold, however, was intense, and the river had as usual to be forded many times during the day. Rarely have troops been engaged in severer fighting than Westmacott's Brigade on this memorable 13th of December. Encouraged by their recent successes, and with their appetites for plunder whetted by the stuff that had fallen into their hands on the 11th, the Afridis plunged into the fray now with a keener zest than ever. Before even the picquets had been withdrawn, and while we were still not clear of the camp at Sher-khel, they were pressing their fierce attack, and were only held at arm's length by the most determined fighting. But Westmacott's men were comparatively fresh, and with a full reliance on their General, who was ever amongst them, animating them by his presence and his words, they hardened their hearts for a stiff day's work; and disputing stubbornly every inch of ground, fell back slowly and steadily, firing on the crowding enemy with deadly effect whenever a chance offered, and backing and supporting each other with a coolness and judgment that was admirable to a degree. The Scottish Borderers nobly bore their share in the

day's operations, and the Northamptons were engaged also, but the brunt of the fighting fell on the 36th Sikhs and on the 3rd Gurkhas, more especially on the last-named. And never did Gurkhas or Sikhs behave more valiantly than on this trying day. The former, under Lieutenant-Colonel Pulley (who commanded his battalion on this occasion with conspicuous ability), and the latter under Major Des Vœux (of Gulistan fame), Colonel Haughton being temporarily sick, displayed a coolness and courage that could not be surpassed. Pressed by the enemy, who was unrelenting in his attack, and desperate in his efforts to work round the flanks and drive it home, encumbered by numerous wounded men whom they had to carry along with them, and often running short of ammunition, these two grand regiments held their own more than successfully against all comers, and defeated every attempt of the foe to break their line or even to hurry their retreat. They were splendidly supported by the Borderers, under Colonel Dixon, one of the finest regiments in the Force, while the artillery, as usual, rendered inestimable service, pouring in a deadly fire from every coign of vantage ; so that, when darkness at last put an end to the struggle, heavy though the casualties of the Brigade had been, the General and his men could lie down conscious that their duty had been thoroughly and bravely and effectively done, and also that the enemy had been very severely handled.

His losses this day were well over 300, at a very moderate estimate, while ours must have been between fifty and sixty in the rear-guard alone, and included the gallant Lieutenant West, of the 3rd Gurkhas, who was killed on the spot by a shot through the heart, and Captain Bateman-Champain, of the same regiment, wounded. The Gurkhas had besides six men killed and sixteen wounded; the Borderers, two killed and twelve wounded; and the 36th Sikhs, three killed and nine wounded.

That evening the whole Division bivouacked at a place called Narkandai (Spin Kamar in the *Despatches*). About $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles from Sher-khel we left the valley of the Bāra, and followed a track across the hills on the left bank, in order to avoid a dangerous defile which lay ahead. About $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles along this track, and then night coming on, a halt was called. We were here far from any water, but the men had been warned to replenish their water-bottles before leaving the river, and with that to drink, and such food as they had in their haversacks, they lay down to sleep just as they were. There was no village near us—the name Narkandai is the name of the locality merely—and we passed a comparatively quiet night.

I should mention that communication was opened with General Hammond this day by helio, and, in compliance with a request previously forwarded to him by special messenger from Sher-khel, he had sent out to meet us a large number of extra kahars

and doolies, of which we now stood sorely in need.

On the next day, the 14th, the march was renewed, and the fighting, the same troops taking the rear-guard. But the enemy, though still active in pursuit, kept at a much more respectful distance; and though it was again a hard day, with several casualties, it was not nearly so trying as on the 13th, and, at the same time, was quite as successful. Four miles out of Swaikot (or Barkai) Brigadier-General Hammond met Sir William Lockhart, and by five in the evening we were all comfortably encamped at Māmanai, inside his brigade. That night, free from care, we slept the sleep of the just, and joyfully thought of the morrow, when we should see our heavy baggage once more, and enjoy, perchance, the luxury of a tub and a change of clothes.

Here, too, we were glad to learn that General Symons' Division had arrived safely in the neighbourhood of Bāra, and to hear the details of his interesting march down the Mastura, of his brilliant raid into the Waran Valley *en route*, and of his successful passage of the hitherto unexplored Sapri Pass. His march had been chiefly through Orakzai territory, and, therefore, had been practically unopposed; but the Waran expedition against the Aka-khels, which had been entrusted to General Hart's Brigade, had been most skilfully managed (the casualties on our side being very few, while the punishment of the enemy was very thorough), and

the crossing of the Sapri, a most difficult pass, had been carried out with enterprise and judgment.¹

Sir William Lockhart's whole force now stood united about Swaikot (Barkai), Bāra, Jamrud, and the first phase of the Tirah campaign was ended. It may be confidently asserted that in no expedition or war in India since the great Mutiny has there been such severe and constant fighting, or such heavy losses. Hardships and frequent exposure, too, of no ordinary kind, have been incurred daily and nightly, and the strain on the troops has been incessant. We are too much accustomed to think

¹ "The 1st Division, while moving from Mastura to Bāra, met with comparatively slight opposition, but the march was an arduous one, and in all respects was carried out in accordance with my wishes."—*Sir William Lockhart's Despatches*.

The Passage of the Sapri Pass (5350 feet): "On the 11th the column halted about two miles from the foot of the pass. The rain came down steadily all that day and the following night, and as we were mostly encamped on rice-fields and boggy ground, it was not a cheerful time. Our column (Brigadier-General Hart's) included 7300 troops and followers, and about 5000 transport animals. Throughout the 11th the Sappers and Pioneers worked hard to improve the road ahead, but it was desperately bad, and the dreadful weather increased the difficulties of their task. Long before daylight on the 12th the advanced guard made a start up the mountain-side, but so slow was the progress made that though the leading troops, with Major-General Symons, got through to Sapri (twelve miles) on the same day, the rest of the column was benighted when only some nine miles had been accomplished, and halted at a place called Khwāja Khidder. It was quite dark at 6 P.M., and as the transport was not then all in, General Hart had a long line of bonfires lighted, stretching four miles, from the summit of the pass right into camp. By the cheery blaze of these beacons the tired animals were safely guided through the dark forest, and not a load was lost. It was a sight that will not be easily forgotten by those who saw it—the lurid leaping flames, the black dancing shadows, the endless procession of pack-animals and drivers, and the groups of armed men keeping watch and ward. Fortunately the enemy made no serious attack during the night. Only a few shots were fired, and we only had a couple of men wounded."—*From a Staff-Officer with the 1st Brigade.*

of the tribes on our frontier as an undisciplined rabble to be treated with contempt, and brushed aside with ease, whenever we choose to advance against them in lordly fashion. We have learned now that the conditions no longer exist which warranted such a belief. We have seen that the Afridis and Orakzais are practically as well armed as ourselves, except that at present they possess no artillery ; that they can shoot as straight as our own men ; that they can skirmish a great deal better than most of them ; and that they are enterprising and bold, and thoroughly understand how to make the best use of the natural advantages which their woods and mountains and rocky defiles, and their freedom from the cares of transports and hospitals, and such like *impedimenta* give them. Such a foe is to be treated with respect ; and the next time we approach him, our generals, and our staff officers, and our men will be better prepared to tackle him (for forewarned is forearmed) than some of them at least were in the commencement of the present campaign.

The 2nd Division will now be given a much-needed rest, stationed about Bāra-Barkai. Nearly all the hard fighting has fallen to its lot, and in killed and wounded alone its losses since the commencement of the operations are little short of 1000 men.¹ General Yeatman-Biggs himself

¹ "During the march from Bāgh, through Dwatoi, down the Bāra valley, the troops of the 2nd Division were almost unceasingly engaged with the

is ill, and only devotion to duty, and determination to see the thing through, has kept him at his post at the head of his splendid Division during these trying weeks of fighting, hardship, and exposure.¹

The 1st Division, under Major-General Symons, with Brigadier-General Hammond's column, which is quite fresh and yearning for the fray, will concentrate at Jamrud, preparatory to moving up the Khyber and Bazar Valleys. This will probably be a ten days' affair, and undoubtedly there will be more hard knocks going, as the Zakka-khels appear to be still full of fight. A start will be made about the 23rd, and Sir William Lockhart will accompany the expedition himself.

several sections of the Afridis through whose country they passed ; and towards the end of the march they were followed up by a large gathering representing every section. The flanking, picquet, and rear-guard duties in the presence of such an active and enterprising enemy were exceedingly onerous, while the line of march was along the bed of a river, the water of which was of icy coldness, and had to be repeatedly forded. The followers and kahars suffered most from the cold, and to assist the latter wounded men had to be frequently carried by their own comrades."—*Sir William Lockhart's Despatches.*

¹ Major-General Yeatman-Biggs died at Peshawar on the 4th January, lamented as an accomplished gentleman, a gallant soldier, and a good friend, by every one who knew him. The following general order was issued from Headquarters on 10th January :—

"The Commander-in-Chief has it in command from the Viceroy and Governor-General in India to express to the army His Excellency's deep regret at the loss which it has sustained in the death of Major-General Arthur Godolphin Yeatman-Biggs, C.B., and his high appreciation of the services rendered to the State by that officer.

"The record of General Yeatman-Biggs' services covers a period of thirty-seven years, during which he was employed in the following campaigns and military expeditions—

"The operations against the Taeping rebels in China, 1862 ; the South

When this operation is completed the troops will all go into winter quarters and await developments. Some regiments will be relieved by others from India,¹ and some will probably return to their stations without relief. Doubtless, too, the Headquarters Staff and the Divisional Staffs will be, to a great extent, reorganised and reduced, as, even if it should be necessary to resume active operations in the spring, they will not be on the same scale.

African war, 1879, during which he commanded one of the parties sent in pursuit of Ketchewayo, and subsequently served as Staff-Officer of the Lydenburg column against Sekukuni; and the Egyptian campaign of 1882. In August 1897 General Yeatman-Biggs was intrusted with the command of the troops in the Kohat and Kurram Valleys, then threatened by a formidable combination of the Afridi and Orakzai tribes, and he conducted the operations on the Ublan Pass, as well as those on the Samāna, which ended with the defeat of the tribesmen and the relief of Gulistan.

"On the formation of the Tirah Expeditionary Force he was appointed to the command of the 2nd Division, which he held until a few days before his death. The Commander-in-Chief shares the regret which will be felt by the army at the premature death of this gallant officer."

¹ The Devons were relieved at once by the Royal Sussex Regiment, the Dorsets by the Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry, and the Northamptons by the King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry; all "having been much weakened by losses in action, or by sickness."—*Despatches*.

CHAPTER XIV

THE BAZAR VALLEY EXPEDITION AND REOCCUPATION OF THE KHYBER—THE AFFAIR AT SHIN KAMAR —THE END OF THE CAMPAIGN

IF the Afridis were under the impression that with the evacuation of Tirah we had done with them, they were now to be undeceived. Sir William Lockhart had warned them before starting on his march down the Bāra that he had no intention of leaving their country until they had fully complied with the terms imposed by Government; and he now proceeded without a day's delay to carry out his threat, failing their submission, to attack them in their other winter settlements. On the 15th and 16th December the Peshawar column, under General Hammond, marched from Swaikot for Jamrud, where it was concentrated by the 17th, and joined on the 19th by the 1st Division and the Gurkha Scouts, under Major-General Symons.

A reconnaissance into the Khyber on the 18th, by General Hammond, as far as Fort Maude, showed that the road had not been injured. The

telegraph line, of course, had been wrecked, and everything combustible in the fort itself had been burned. No one was seen or met during the day, and Ali Musjid, about four miles further up the pass, appeared to be deserted.

The operations now about to be undertaken comprised measures for reopening the road through the Khyber Pass (which had been closed ever since the end of August 1897); for reconstructing the Khyber posts, which had been destroyed by the Afridis, including the defensible *serai* at Landi Kotal; for restoring the Landi Kotal water-supply; and for destroying the defences of all Zakka Khel villages in the Khyber. At the same time, the Bazar Valley was to be visited and swept with the besom of destruction.

On the 21st and 22nd December the Sappers and Pioneers were busy making roads to selected artillery positions at the mouth of the Khyber Pass. On the 23rd General Hammond's column advanced to Ali Musjid, the 9th Gurkhas, and Captain Barton's Khyber Rifles, leading the way, and crowning the heights on the flanks. No enemy, however, was encountered, and the village of Lāla China, near Ali Musjid, was without any sign of life. Its towers were blown up the next day, and large quantities of forage and fuel taken out and brought into camp. As regards the fort of Ali Musjid, the mischief done to it was not so great as was expected. The roofs and wood-work of the buildings inside it had been burnt, but the

walls were for the most part standing, and in good order.

On the next day the 1st Division marched out from Jamrud, and encamped at Lāla China. Sir William Lockhart arrived at the same time, accompanied by General Sir Havelock-Allan, V.C., M.P., who had come out from England to have a look at the Frontier, and had been invited by Sir William to join him during the Bazar expedition. A few shots were fired into camp this night, and one man was wounded.

On the 25th, Christmas day, the 1st Division entered the Bazar Valley in two columns. Sir William Lockhart himself accompanied the left column, which consisted of the regiments of General Gaselee's Brigade, No. 1 M.B. R.A., No. 2 (Derajat) M.B., the Gurkha Scouts, and No. 3 Company Bombay Sappers and Miners. This column marched, *via* the Chora Pass, to Chora village; about eight miles through low hills covered with brushwood, by a fairly easy road. No opposition was encountered, and the next day the column reached China, its objective, eleven miles, which of course was deserted. The rear-guard had a skirmish on this march with small parties of the enemy, and two men were killed and four wounded. The next day the towers and defences of China were destroyed, and the column returned to Chora. The enemy on this occasion attacked the rear-guard with some pertinacity, but were

repulsed with heavy loss to themselves, a noted Mullah, named Idris, being among the killed.

Meantime Brigadier-General Hart's Brigade had been having an arduous time. In the advance of the division into the Bazar Valley it formed the right column, and its march was directed, *via* the Alāchi Pass, to Karamna. Major-General Symons accompanied this column in person. Karamna should have been reached on the 25th, for General Hammond was co-operating by holding the Aspoghar heights on the right flank of the 1st Brigade, and the village of Alāchi itself. But the pass was found very much more difficult than had been anticipated, and an endless string of camels encountered in the Khyber interfering with the march of the troops, soon after they had started from their bivouac, the movement was so much delayed that the whole of the transport had to spend the night *à la belle étoile* to the *east* of the Alāchi Pass, where, under the protection of the Royal Sussex Regiment and the 1st Gurkhas it remained safe. The next morning it came on, all well, to Karamna, and the same day the force pushed on another three miles to Burg. Opposition was encountered throughout, and a few casualties were sustained; but the enemy were easily driven off, and considerable loss inflicted upon them. Communication was now opened with the left column, and while, on the 27th, the bulk of the troops stood fast at Burg, a strong detachment under Lieutenant-Colonel Cafe, Royal Sussex Regi-

ment, moved out towards Walāi, to picquet the heights and protect the flank of General Gaselee's brigade during its withdrawal from China to Chora, already described. These picquets were attacked by the Afridis, and lost three men killed, and an officer, Lieutenant Julius, Royal Sussex Regiment, and four men wounded.

I should mention here that from Karamna a road leads *via* the Bori Pass to a place called Lāla Beg in the Khyber Pass, not far from Landi Kotal. Sir William Lockhart had originally intended to join the 1st Brigade on his return from China, and march with it to Ali Musjid by this route. But on Christmas day General Symons, who had reached Karamna with the leading troops of the brigade comparatively early, reconnoitred the Bori Pass and the road leading over it, and found the physical difficulties so great for laden animals that Sir William, on his report—knowing, too, that there was great difficulty about water at Karamna—gave up the idea, and both columns eventually withdrew from the Bazar Valley by the same route by which they had entered it. By the 30th December the division was again concentrated at Jamrud. The 2nd Brigade returned without opposition, but the 1st Brigade was constantly engaged in skirmishes more or less severe, and sustained some loss, inflicting more, however, on the enemy. The total casualties in the 1st Division during these operations in the Bazar Valley were one British

officer,¹ six British soldiers, and four native soldiers killed ; and one British officer, thirty British soldiers, and seventeen native soldiers wounded.

While the 1st Division had thus explored the Bazar Valley, General Hammond's column had proceeded, on the 26th December, to Landi Kotal. The walls and gates of the *serai* were found to be intact ; but, inside, all the buildings had been wrecked, the roofs, the iron-work, the wood-work either removed or burnt, and all movable property and stores carried off. The quarters in which Captain Barton, the Commander of the Levies, used to live, were a ruin, and everything they contained had, of course, been destroyed or looted. The piping of the water-supply was breached, and many of the pipes carried off, but the great tanks about a mile and a half below the Kotal, constructed at a cost of three lakhs of rupees, £30,000, had not been touched. Government have already decided to rebuild and repair in the Khyber wherever necessary, and Landi Kotal, being the most important point on the line, the work there will be put in hand forthwith.

On the 27th a reconnaissance was pushed from Landi Kotal towards the Bori Pass, as Sir William Lockhart wanted information about the state of the road on the Khyber side as well as on the Bazar side. It was soon ascertained to be quite imprac-

¹ Lieutenant C. R. Tonge, R.E., killed by the premature explosion of a dynamite charge.

ticable for the passage of a brigade, as a portion of the defile through which the track ran was found to be a winding passage, in places only four feet wide, flanked by perpendicular cliffs.

General Hammond's troops were from this time employed in working parties on the Fort, in foraging and demolishing village defences of the Zakka-khels all along the line of the Khyber, in picqueting the hills which command the route throughout, and in convoying supplies and material sent up from the base. These seem trivial duties when written down, but they mean incessant work and watchfulness for those who have to execute them, surrounded, as the whole locality is, by a keen and enterprising and relentless enemy. Encounters were, of course, of daily occurrence, and every now and then a few casualties would occur. On the 30th December, however, an engagement somewhat more serious than usual took place. The picquets of the Oxford Light Infantry were fired into and attacked in earnest while they were being withdrawn for the day. Three men were killed, and three officers (Lieutenant-Colonel Plowden, Captain Parr, and Lieutenant Owen)¹ and eleven men wounded.

¹ The forward picquet in the valley commenced to retire at 3.30 P.M., and was joined by the section under Captain Parr, and also by the section from the Buddhist tope, which latter retired as a support to the two former in extended order. After passing the Buddhist tope by about 250 yards a volley was fired into them from the left rear and three men were wounded. The sections then got under cover in a nullah on their left as they retired; two of the wounded who could walk were sent along the nullah to the medical officer of the regiment, while the third was dressed by Colonel Plowden on

News of this misadventure was brought into Landi Kotal at half-past five in the evening by a bugler of the Oxford Light Infantry, who galloped in on Colonel Plowden's charger with a note asking for help. General Hammond at once set out with reinforcements, extricated the Oxfords from their dilemma, and brought them all safely into camp, with all their dead and wounded.

The Ali Musjid picquets were attacked on the same day, and as the attitude of the Zakka-khels seemed to be now increasingly hostile, Sir William Lockhart strengthened the force occupying the pass by ordering the 1st Brigade from Jamrud to Ali Musjid, and reinforcing the Landi Kotal garrison with the 45th Sikhs and the 4th Gurkhas.

It may be mentioned here that on the 30th December, on which date the pass seems to have been alive with Afridis, General Sir Havelock-Allan was killed. Sir William Lockhart thus describes the sad incident in his *Despatches* :—

the spot, under cover from fire. When all the wounded had got clear away the rest retired, and in so doing had to cross a bit of open ground where Corporal Bell was hit in the head and killed on the spot. Colonel Plowden, Lieutenant Owen, and Lieutenant Fielden dragged him away up the nullah, and all retired under cover of the banks until the nullah broke away on their left flank and again exposed them to fire. Here Private Butler was hit in the leg, and Captain Parr and Lieutenant Carter having dressed his wound, the last-named officer took him on his back and carried him across the exposed bit of ground ; but in the middle of this Private Butler was again hit and killed, Lieutenant Carter being knocked over by the force of the blow. Fielden then came to the rescue and both officers got him under cover, while Colonel Plowden and Lieutenant Owen carried Bell's corpse across the dangerous bit, and were both wounded in doing so.—*Special Correspondent of the "Pioneer."*

He left me at Lāla China (on the 28th), and with my permission proceeded to Landi Kotal, arrangements being made to provide him with a sufficient escort. I deeply regret to report that on December the 30th, as he was returning to Jamrud, he unfortunately left his escort near Ali Musjid, and riding down a ravine by himself was shot by the enemy. Every precaution had been taken to secure his safety, and on bidding him good-bye at Lāla China I had impressed upon him the necessity of invariably remaining with the troops detailed for his protection.

While these events had been taking place in the Khyber and Bazar Valleys, the 2nd Division had been enjoying a well-earned rest at Māmanai and Bāra; and it would not have been necessary to refer to its doings again but for a most unfortunate affair in which the 4th Brigade was involved on the 29th January. On that day an expedition was planned to surround, and capture if possible, the Afridi flocks and herds, with their attendant guards, which, it was reported, were brought down daily in large numbers to graze on the Kajurai plain, a locality due west of Bāra, and enclosed on the north, west, and south by low spurs from the main range which separates the Bāra and Bazar Valleys. To effect this four columns were ordered out simultaneously on the 29th January—one from Bāra to strike across the plain due west; one from Jamrud, and one from Ali Musjid, as "stops" on the northern boundary; and one, to be furnished by the 4th Brigade at Māmanai, to ascend the Shin Kamar Pass and block escape in a westerly direction.

Although the utmost secrecy was observed about

this enterprise, it may be surmised that news of it was in some way conveyed to the Afridis, for after a weary tramp of many miles, the Ali Musjid, Jamrud, and Bāra columns returned to camp without seeing anything or any one. The Māmanai column did not fare so well. It was commanded by Colonel Seppings, King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, and consisted of Colonel Sepping's own battalion, 200 rifles 36th Sikhs under Colonel Haughton, and two guns of No. 5 (Bombay) Mountain Battery. The advance of this force was, as usual, hardly opposed by the enemy; but directly retirement commenced they assumed a vigorous offensive, and crowded to attack with great boldness.

Owing to a mistake in transmitting, or in receiving an order by Colonel Seppings, a company of the 36th was prematurely withdrawn from a commanding knoll to the west of the pass. This vantage-ground was instantly seized by the Afridis, and as a part of the force with Colonel Haughton was at this time still down the far side of the pass, where it had been sent to explore some caves about a mile below the crest, it was imperative to re-occupy it. Two companies of the King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry attacked, therefore, at once, gallantly led by Lieutenants Dowdall and Walker, and driving the enemy back, established a footing on the knoll, but only to find themselves confronted by scores of tribesmen in a still stronger position about 150 yards farther back, and against

SHIN KAMAR,

29th January 1898



REFERENCES

A 2 Co. York L.I. B. 1 Co. 36th Sikhs. C. 1 Co. York L.I.

D E F G H K Positions occupied by companies York L.I. during successive retirements

+ Spot where Lt. Dowdall and Walker fell.

+ + Spot where Col Haughton and Lt. Turing fell

* Crest of the Pass

the hot fire delivered by these men at this short range they could barely hold their ground. A third company of the King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, Captain Ottley's, held a small knoll on the east of the pass, and the whole were under the command of Major Barter, King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry.

In the meantime Colonel Haughton, with his Sikhs, had returned. Sending three of his companies down the pass, he remained on the crest himself with one company, and his adjutant, Lieutenant Turing, to support the retirement of the Yorkshire Light Infantry, who were now ordered to withdraw from the heights on the right and left. But the two companies on the left were now so encumbered by wounded, and so fiercely attacked by the enemy, that compliance with this order was almost impossible. Colonel Haughton's company, and Captain Ottley's, were, at this time, both engaged in keeping off a fresh body of tribesmen who were now assailing the pass itself by a direct attack from the north ; and an urgent message for help was therefore sent back to the main body below at the foot of the pass.

A reinforcement under Major Earle, King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, soon arrived, but in the meantime disastrous casualties had occurred. Lieutenants Walker and Dowdall, of the Yorkshire Light Infantry, had been killed ; also the gallant Haughton and Lieutenant Turing ; and many men of the Yorkshires had been struck

down. Even after Major Earle's arrival the fighting was desperate, and at such close quarters that the officers repeatedly used their revolvers with effect. But the Yorkshires in this trying situation showed the utmost resolution and courage; and though they had to abandon their dead, they eventually brought away their wounded, and held the savage foe successfully at bay until all had been safely sent to the rear. Before they were clear of the fatal pass many more casualties had occurred, Lieutenant Hughes, Yorkshire Light Infantry, being among the killed, and Major Earle, Captain Marrable, and Lieutenant Hall, all of the same regiment, wounded. The total casualties were twenty-seven killed and thirty-two wounded, a heavy list indeed.

Two miles out of the pass the column was met by General Westmacott, with reinforcements from camp; and under cover of these troops Colonel Sepping's exhausted force completed its homeward march in safety.

The death of the brave Colonel Haughton in this unfortunate affair, after he had successfully, and with such credit and fame to himself, survived the perils of the Samāna fights in September, and the desperate actions on the 9th and 16th November, previously described, besides all the chances of an arduous campaign, was an event most deeply and universally lamented. His courage was conspicuous always, and his coolness and judgment were never

disturbed by the clash of arms and the scenes of bloody strife by which he was so often surrounded. His men, as brave as himself, simply idolised him, and for years to come, *Harton Sahib*, as they called him, will be a name to conjure with where the 36th Sikhs are concerned.

An officer who was present writes to me—

—All fought well. Haughton and Turing died like heroes. Haughton, apparently, went forward with half-a-dozen men to see what was going on on the left, and how he could best help the Yorkshires. Turing followed with a couple of Sikhs. One of these was killed by his side, and as men were dropping fast, and the enemy getting quite close, Turing proposed a charge, but was almost immediately shot dead. Haughton was himself using a rifle at this time to keep the enemy in check. He evidently saw it was no use, for turning to a Yorkshireman near him, he said, “We will fire a few more shots, then charge, and die like men !” He fired five times, and then fell, shot through the head. A better and a braver man never lived. Turing was a splendid little fellow, and the loss of these two officers is a terrible blow to the 36th.

There is no doubt the Yorkshires were in one of the tightest corners in the campaign, and were very highly tried. But they came out of it well. They were kept together, and well handled by their officers, and fought like men. The grim work was all new to them, for they had only just come up to the front, and none of them had been in a fight before. They must have a rare lot of officers. The battalion is a better battalion now than it was a week ago.

The Sikhs also did well, as usual. Young van Someren assumed command when the others were killed, and kept his men steady and well together. It was a great trial for him. His clothes were torn by bullets.

There is little else to record. It was feared at one time that this Shin Kamar affair would break off

abruptly all negotiations for a peaceful settlement, and necessitate perhaps a resumption of active operations. But happily this has been avoided. Throughout January, February, and March there was outwardly little change in the attitude of the Afridi clans, but by slow degrees they were realising that they have been playing a losing game. The blow to their prestige, the material losses they have suffered, the hardships they and their people have endured, and above all, the determination and method and patience and judgment with which the operations have been directed against them by Sir William Lockhart: these have all been powerful factors in convincing them that to prolong the struggle was only to prolong their own misery, to weaken themselves permanently, and to make their punishment in the end severer, and their abasement more complete.

Influenced, no doubt, by these considerations, convinced of our determination and our power to enforce our will, and dreading a second invasion in the spring, one section after another has come in and tendered its submission, and finally even the Zakka-khels, the most truculent and redoubtable of them all, have at last climbed down, and paid in the fines and rifles demanded from them.

There can be no question that this happy result, by which further bloodshed is avoided, is in the main due to Sir William Lockhart's own personal influence amongst these wild tribes on the border.

To many of their leading men he is known well; by all he is liked and *respected*. For years past he has been a tower of strength on the frontier. His patience, and judgment, and firmness in dealing with these Afridis during these long and weary weeks, since we emerged from the Bāra Valley, have not been less conspicuous than his energy and decision while active operations were in progress. And they knew him for a man of his word, and felt that if he was compelled to strike again, he would do it, and would strike hard.

Well, that necessity has been happily avoided, and no more convincing evidence of Sir William Lockhart's personal share and dominant influence in achieving a peaceful end to the negotiations could be cited, than the extraordinary fact that when released at last from duty on the 5th April, and about to start from Peshawar for England, to enjoy a much-needed change and some well-earned repose, crowds of Afridis, four or five hundred at least, with Zakka-khels in numbers amongst them (*mira-bile dictu!*), surrounded his house, in cantonments, wanted to hoist him on their shoulders, and drag his carriage to the station, and finally sent him off with shouts and cheers that made the welkin ring, vowing that in future they would be the friends of the English, and fight on their side! Surely no campaign had ever such a remarkable ending !!

I cannot do better than close this narrative with an extract from Sir William Lockhart's final *De-*

spatch, and a copy of his farewell order to the troops. He writes—

I wish to record my high appreciation of the conduct of the British and Native troops serving with the Tirah Expeditionary Force. Up to the present date (26th January) their losses have amounted to 1050 killed and wounded. They have been subjected to great hardship and exposure, harassed at night by assaults at close quarters or by distant rifle fire, and engaged in long and trying rear-guard actions. Their duties on picquet and in guarding foraging parties have been particularly onerous. Hardly a day or night has been passed without casualties, and whether we advanced or retired, every soldier had to be constantly on the alert against enemies who made no stand in the open, but were unrivalled as skirmishers and marksmen. The operations were carried out in a country which offered every natural advantage to the tribesmen, and imposed on the regimental officers, and the rank and file, the necessity for individual initiative, unremitting watchfulness, and personal activity. I am glad to say that the troops responded nobly to the call made upon them. Cheerful and soldier-like under exceptionally trying circumstances, officers and men have upheld to the utmost the traditions of their corps and the honour of Her Majesty's Army.

The following was Sir William Lockhart's farewell order to the Force—

TIRAH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE ORDERS BY GENERAL SIR W. S. A. LOCKHART, K.C.B., K.C.S.I., COMMANDING.

Camp Peshawar, 4th April 1898.

Special Order.

On relinquishing the command of the Tirah Expeditionary Force, which is about to be reduced to a single Division, I thank all ranks for the work which, through their bravery and devotion, has been successfully accomplished in the past six months.

From the beginning of October to the middle of January the Force was engaged in active operations, and seldom have troops been called upon to undergo greater fatigue, or to meet a more vigilant and enterprising enemy. After long marches in cold and wet, harassed by distant rifle-fire and by assaults at close quarters, the columns bivouacked in positions which had to be protected by numerous strong picquets posted on commanding heights, and those picquets were always liable to determined attacks, and to molestation in withdrawal. There was, in fact, little or no rest for the force, the most carefully chosen camping-ground being generally open to long-range fire from scattered individual marks-men, armed with the most accurate weapons.

The boast of the tribes was that no foreign army, Moghal, Afghan, Persian, or British had ever penetrated, or could ever penetrate their country ; but, after carrying three strong positions, and being for weeks subsequently engaged in daily skirmishes, the troops succeeded in visiting every portion of Tirah, a fact which will be kept alive in the minds of future generations by ruined forts and towers in their remotest valleys.

In this recognition of the gallantry and devotion of all ranks, British and Indian, I include the contingents sent by the Princes and Chiefs of India, corps which have fought side by side with the troops of the regular army, and have shared in the dangers and hardships of the campaign.

For the past two and a half months the troops have been employed on the tedious duties of a blockade, and their discipline during this period is deserving of high commendation.

I congratulate the soldiers under my command on the successful result of the operations. In no previous campaign on the North-West Frontier have the difficulties to be overcome been more formidable ; in none has the punishment inflicted on the tribesmen been more exemplary, or their submission more complete.

W. S. A. LOCKHART, General,
Commanding Tirah Expeditionary Force.

CHAPTER XV

TACTICAL LESSONS AND CONCLUDING NOTES

MY narrative of the campaign in Tirah is ended, but I venture, before dismissing the subject, to add a few notes made during the progress of the operations, which may be useful to soldiers of all ranks should they, on some future occasion, find themselves fighting on the north-west frontier of India.

The first essential fact to be recognised—one which I think many of us did not fully appreciate at the commencement of the campaign—is that the tribes on the frontier (not all of them perhaps, but the Afridis certainly) are now fairly well armed with the Martini-Henry rifle. As to the means by which they have become possessed of these arms of precision there has been much discussion, and there is still much diversity of opinion. Some think they are exported from Birmingham or Belgium, and thence find their way *via* the Persian Gulf to the Indian frontier; some imagine that they are obtained from the Amir's workshops in Cabul; and some believe that they are stolen in India, and sold for fancy

prices across the border. Probably from each of these sources the supply is maintained ; but, whence-soever they get them, it is certain that the Afridis now possess Martinis in large numbers, and have besides an apparently unlimited stock of ammunition. They have, too, a good many Sniders, the bullets of which inflict frightful shattering wounds ; and in the recent operations they obtained forty or fifty Lee-Metfords, and made uncommon good use of them.

But not only have they got these arms of precision now in large numbers, and not only are they thoroughly expert as marksmen, but also, it must be borne in mind, that hundreds of them enlist in our service, and when they take their discharge, and return to their homes, carry with them all the experience and confidence of men who have been carefully trained by British officers, and have marched, and often fought side by side with our own troops. I do not mean for a moment to imply that familiarity has in this case bred contempt. The truth is probably far otherwise. But these men cannot have served in our ranks without acquiring an insight into our military system and methods,¹ which in the day of battle they are bound to turn to useful advantage. I have previously said that we met amongst them several old much be-medalled pensioners, and it was a common thing

¹ One of our best companies of Sappers and Miners is recruited from Afridis.

to find our drill-books and musketry regulations—*Urdu* editions—in their deserted houses!

It must also be remembered, when considering the conditions of fighting and the tactics to be employed against these Afridis, that they are mountaineers of the best type. Bred and born amongst steep and rugged hills, and dark and dangerous ravines, inured to extremes of heat and cold, and accustomed from childhood to carry arms and to be on their guard against the wiles of the treacherous kinsmen by whom they are surrounded, it is small wonder that they are hardy, alert, self-reliant, and active, full of resource, keen as hawks, and cruel as leopards.

Further, it is to be noted that their country is, like Caledonia, “stern and wild”: high mountains, precipitous cliffs, dangerous defiles, wild ravines, and rushing torrents everywhere; while roads of any kind are conspicuous by their absence—a country, therefore, in which strict “formations” and precise “manœuvres,” as we find them described and defined in our drill-books, are impossible; and in which marches must be performed under conditions in which they become slow, exhausting processional movements, the long trailing flanks of which are dangerously exposed to attack from start to finish.

The difficulties and dangers and risks involved in waging warfare against such a foe in such a country are obvious. In former days when

expeditions have been launched against the tribes on our frontier, we have found them for the most part armed with *jezails*, and a few Sniders and Enfields. The extreme effective range of the best of these weapons was barely 1000 yards, so that if the flanks of a marching column were protected by detachments pushed out half a mile or so, the column was fairly safe. But the Martini is effective up to *a mile*, and the Lee-Metford up to *two miles*, particularly when the target is a mass of troops and transport crowded into a river-bed, and covering several miles of road. Consequently, flanking detachments must be pushed out to right and left for a full mile or more before safety can be assured. Every march made in a country like Tirah is practically a march through a defile from beginning to end. The road followed is the bottom of the valley, the river-bed. This valley is sometimes wider, sometimes narrower—generally narrower, and is commanded throughout by the hills on either side. It may be imagined, then, what toils are involved to the troops, what delays, and what risks in crowning these successive heights during even a short march of eight or nine miles.

Yet no advance can be made until the flanks are thus made safe. The enemy, who know every inch of the ground, occupy the summit of every commanding knoll with great skill, and invariably intrench or *sangar* themselves. A company or two is sent up the bare and rugged slopes to dislodge

them. It is bravely done, but not without incurring casualties. The enemy retreat higher up the mountain side. The lower spurs are now held by our men. The column passes on, more positions in succession being captured in like manner as it advances, by other detachments, from the advanced-guard. At last, the rear-guard comes in sight, probably hotly engaged with skirmishing bands, who are following it boldly, eager for plunder, and anxious, if possible, to secure a much-prized rifle or two. The flanking detachments are now one after another withdrawn, and join the rear-guard. It is during this withdrawal that the greatest risks are run. The watchers above swoop down at once. The ground is all in favour of their guerilla tactics, and they know every dip and break in it. Two or three soldiers are wounded. They cannot be left behind to the tender mercy of the Afzidi. They must be carried. Four men are thus at once put out of action to each man wounded ; and as many groups as there are wounded men are immediately formed, to become excellent targets to the pursuing enemy.

Let any one try to picture this scene to himself, and he will have some faint idea of the stern reality, of the pluck and devotion of the men, of the coolness and judgment of the officers, and of the endurance and hardihood of all, which enable them, not once or twice, but repeatedly, and day after day, to face such situations with resolution, and to emerge from them with success.

Regiments new to this savage mountain warfare, which have only practised drill-book methods of attack and retirement, find themselves seriously handicapped when brought suddenly face to face with the conditions I have described. The drill-book makes no allowance for wounded men who must be picked up as they fall, and carried along by their comrades ; nor does it presuppose a *terrain* in which the activity of a goat is necessary for the individual soldier, and in moving over which a company is certain to be broken up into almost as many units as it has men. The drill-book, moreover, apparently assumes a slow and dignified pursuit on the part of the enemy, and accordingly directs that "retirements should usually be performed in *quick time*," and that "in moving from cover to cover *an upright position* must be maintained"! But the drill-book was not written for frontier fighting. Yet it is the guide for us all in India, as in England, and if these are the only methods constantly practised on cantonment parade-grounds, it must be impossible to shake them off at a moment's notice, and it is small wonder that across the border the attempt to do so does not always lead to satisfactory results.

As a matter of fact, it was found in practice in Tirah, that while *in attack*, an advance could not be too deliberate, in order to prevent scattering and exhaustion, and to give time for échelons in support to close up, and for out-flanking movements to be developed,—the surest way of making an enemy

quit ; *in retirement*, movements had frequently to be made *at a run*, otherwise the enemy would be on the top of the retreating skirmishers before they had made good their point.

The Pathan of the present generation seems quite to have given up the practice of charging sword in hand, for which he was once famous. As the quantity and quality of their firearms have increased the necessity for close combat has diminished. The clansmen find it is now more easy, and much less dangerous, to shoot you from behind a rock several hundred yards away, than to rush in with a sword, and try to slay you by cutting you down. Also, the hill-man, despite his fierce nature and fanaticism, has the bump of caution very highly developed, and never takes risks that he can avoid. Consequently, so long as even a few men, well-posted, are lying down, and firing steadily at him, he is extremely shy of coming on ; and it was the practice, therefore, with those regiments who knew the business best, in a retirement, to cover the withdrawal of companies by *selected* men, who fired independently until their company was established in its new position in rear, and then rising all together after a final volley, *raced back* to their support, and invariably got away safely before the Afridis realised that they had gone.¹

¹ "The 29th of December was a particularly hard day. We were the rear-guard, and the enemy, apparently knowing it was their last chance at us, followed us up very boldly. We have got very cunning by this time at these rear-guard actions, and had only fifteen casualties (I believe there were one or two in other regiments as well) as the result of being chased for several

In attack, on the other hand, great deliberation was enjoined. Officers were directed not to lead too quickly, but to regulate the pace by the difficulties of the ground and the condition of their men, the great object being to maintain a steady advance without getting scattered or unduly separated from supports. All "attack formations," as laid down in the drill-book, are, of course, entirely inapplicable to hill-fighting. To attack a position on a mountain top an extended line of skirmishers used to lead the way, an officer always with them, and each company followed its own skirmishing section, itself not extended, but with files well opened out. Other companies followed *closely* in support, and generally more or less in *échelon*. Great *depth* in attack was not considered necessary, as it is in civilised warfare,

hours by the Zakka. That does not sound dignified, but it is exactly what happened. The way we have found most paying to conduct these retirements is as follows:—The rear-guard is formed in successive lines, one behind the other, each on the most suitable bit of ground possible, generally the crest line of a ridge. When the moment to retire begins the line nearest the enemy doubles straight down as fast as it can past the other lines and takes up a position behind the rearmost one. The line immediately behind the retiring line covers the movement by its fire. These beggars move so fast over this country that the only practical method is, when once a retirement is begun, for the retiring men to run like hares, otherwise one gets caught in the undesirable position of having one's back to the enemy. The time when things begin to be serious is when one or two are hit between the time of leaving a position and reaching the next line. For many reasons it is impossible to leave dead or wounded men behind, as would be done in European warfare, and a retirement through this country, which is quite difficult enough for an active man to get over unhampered, is, when there are several wounded men to be helped along, not all joy. This has been pretty nearly the only sort of fighting we have had ever since the Sampagha was taken, and we none of us love it; the chances are very one-sided, and the enemy know this just as well as we do."—*Extract from a letter from an Officer in the Derbyshire Regiment.*

but the importance of an *enveloping* attack was not to be over-estimated. Directly the tribesmen thought there was the slightest danger to their flank or line of retreat, they were off.

As a general rule the Afridis never await a charge, but if ever a position is stubbornly held, and must be carried by assault, there is no doubt that the whole of the troops in the front line should charge together, their supports following close. To send them forward in detachments or driblets is disastrous. This was fully exemplified at Dargai on the 20th October. Up to the time the Gordons arrived no attempt to cross the decisive zone had been made by any body of troops larger than a company at a time. These detachments suffered such terrible losses in crossing the fire-swept space that they pulled up at the next cover they reached. When the Gordons charged, they sallied out, with the 3rd Sikhs in close support, practically all in one mass. That ended the affair. The enemy saw they were not to be denied, and they evacuated the position in which for several hours they had defied a whole brigade.

Dargai was the only instance in which the Afridis made a resolute stand against a serious attack. Their losses on that occasion were probably more heavy than we supposed at the time, and taking the lesson to heart, they did not again during the campaign attempt to meet us in the field, or to defend, with any appearance of being in earnest,

even such strong positions as the Sampagha and Arhanga Passes, or the heights of Saran Sar. But one must beware against being lulled into any false sense of superiority or security by the small resistance offered to an advance, or by the ease and trifling loss with which such immensely strong positions are won. The tribesmen's tactics are not dictated by timidity. They do not know what fear means. But they have plenty of common sense, and conscious that they cannot stop us if we really mean to come on, they quietly fall back as we advance, and patiently await their turn, which they know will come as soon as we begin to retire.

That instant they assume the offensive. Where only three or four men have been seen before, they now appear in dozens. The rapidity of their movements now is quite extraordinary ; and their marksmanship and the skill with which they skirmish from rock to rock, availing themselves of every feature of ground, and constantly threatening to work round the flanks, are marvellous. To retire successfully before such an enemy requires great coolness and judgment. If there is any mistake made, or any sign of hesitation or wavering, it is instantly taken advantage of, and in a moment, where all was going well the minute before, disaster may ensue.

So much moral elation pertains to the rôle of assailant, and so much depression to that of the soldier who has constantly to defend himself against

attack, that, with all Orientals, whether dwellers in the hills or plains, it is most necessary to assume a vigorous offensive whenever opportunity offers, and whatever are the odds. In a great standing camp, however, such as we had for some weeks in Tirah, it was unavoidable that we should constantly afford the Afridis the opportunity of attacking, while we were compelled to assume a defensive rôle. Because, every day our foraging parties, strongly escorted by never less than a brigade, with artillery, had to go far a-field to collect fodder and supplies, returning to camp by sunset; and on these occasions they were invariably followed up by the enemy, who were, no doubt, as invariably beaten off. Still for the time being they attacked while we defended, and hardly a day passed without a few casualties being sustained in this most trying kind of warfare.

One point that must strike every one where hill fighting is in question, whether attack or defence, is the great difficulty of exercising superior control or supervision. A General may have half a dozen gallopers at his disposal, but on such ground they are useless. Messages must be carried by men on foot, and that takes a long time. Sometimes, but not always, they can be signalled. The difficulty, therefore, in transmitting orders is extreme, and the delay in getting them executed, or in learning what is happening, is often serious enough to make a commander desperately anxious. It is most necessary, therefore, for every officer to know

beforehand what is the "general idea," so that even when isolated, and without orders, he may intelligently co-operate. In no other kind of warfare will company and section commanders find such unlimited scope for the exercise of individual initiative and control; and much or everything may depend upon the judgment and decision which they display at critical moments.

The safety of camps and bivouacs by night is a subject on which a few words may be usefully said. Here, too, the drill-book, admirable as are its maxims, was not of much help to us; and here, too, the fact that the Afridis now possess long-ranging arms of precision compelled the posting of picquets outside the camp at distances far exceeding anything found necessary in previous expeditions. One great source of annoyance and loss to the troops in Tirah was the firing into camp by night, vulgarly known as "sniping"; and the only way to stop it was to hold all surrounding commanding points, within a range of 1500 yards to a mile, by strong picquets. Even then, on dark nights, prowling marauders would get in between the picquets and the camp, and make it extremely unpleasant for us while their ammunition lasted; or until, in their turn, they were stalked and ejected by the Scouts, of whom I shall speak presently.

But as regards the picquets themselves, it may be noted that their strength was always such that they were independent of support, which, indeed,

on a dark night, and over ground which was a network of precipices and ravines, it would have been impossible to send to them. For the same reason the picquets were always instructed to fight where they stood, and never under any circumstances to attempt to fall back on the camp. The positions occupied by them were generally held by the enemy when we marched on to the ground. These positions were at once attacked and captured. Half a company, or a whole company, was then left as a picquet to hold each of them, or as many of them as were considered necessary, and the rest of the troops were at once withdrawn. The picquets then promptly intrenched themselves strongly, and placed such obstacles round their posts as they could improvise. They quite understood that they had only their own watchfulness and efforts to depend upon to see them safely through the night. They were often fiercely attacked, but they always held their ground successfully, and generally with very few casualties, and there was no instance during the campaign of a picquet being overpowered. Their sentries were always placed inside the intrenchment. The rest of the men slept on their alarm-posts. Patrolling of any kind in the night was, of course, entirely out of the question, and was never attempted.

I have more than once in the course of this narrative referred to the splendid services of the Artillery. We had six Mountain Batteries with us, and the way in which they were handled, the pre-

cision of their fire, and the wonderful effect of it, were the admiration of all onlookers. At Dargai on the 18th and 20th October, and at the attacks on the Sampagha and Arhanga Passes, the batteries were massed, and their fire concentrated, with marked effect. But, speaking generally, and remembering that these guns can follow infantry over almost any ground, greater effect can usually be obtained by dispersion of the guns, and by splitting up even a single battery to work by sections. An officer of great experience with mountain artillery writes to me as follows :—

My idea is to push on a couple of guns, with the infantry, to every height and ridge which they occupy, under cover of the fire of those in rear, and then to push the rear-guns on in turn (by sections), spreading them over the whole line of advance, and so firing on the sangars from many directions instead of directly from one only. In country such as we have been fighting in, I never work my six guns together if I can help it. By splitting them up good positions are more readily obtained, the guns afford a smaller mark to the enemy, they can be more easily and rapidly pushed forward, or withdrawn, under cover of each other's fire, and their converging fire from different directions is, I feel sure, more effective against a strong position than the concentrated fire of double the number of pieces firing *directly* from one spot.

In advanced-guard work two guns can always be safely kept with the most advanced infantry, and in rear-guard affairs with the most hotly pressed. But in either case, a whole battery is too big a unit to be worked thus in the fighting line in hill warfare, for it takes too long to advance, or retire it, *as a whole*.

I am a firm believer in our present gun, the 2.5-inch, for mountain battery work, *provided* the gun is new, and not old or worn out. I have seen it now in Burmah, Hazāra (1891),


Samāna (1891), Chitral (1895), and in Tirah, and have been with my present battery for ten years, so can speak with some little confidence of its merits. The gun shoots as straight as a die up to all useful ranges, and never gets out of order if new at the commencement of a campaign. It stands any amount of knocking about, and throughout the Chitral and Tirah expeditions my artificers seldom had to put a hand to gun or carriage.

I cannot help asking why every one is full of its praises *during* an expedition ; and why, as soon as it is over, do they set to work to abuse it in the papers or elsewhere ? They say it can't knock down sangars. They started saying this after the Malakhand in 1895. But the sangars there were enormous natural *boulders* which a 40-pounder could not have moved ! Personally, I never try to demolish sangars. I try to kill the men inside them, and it is on record that we did this with some success at the Malakhand. On the 14th September 1897 we brought down the Tsalai tower with two percussion shrapnel, and sent the stones of the Saragheri sangars flying high in the air. Firing at houses in Maidan and Bagh, our shells would go through the walls, and burst inside, which is exactly what is wanted ; and on two occasions we set buildings ablaze by our fire.

These are some of my reasons for my faith in the gun. I have no belief in the outcry for a howitzer. If we get both in the same battery, the Lord help us !

Lastly, why are we constantly kept to roads, and then pitched into for taking up so much room ? and offered many useless and impossible suggestions for reducing the number of our mules ? We claim that we can go wherever an infantry soldier can, so long as he does not go on his hands and knees. Many Generals and Staff Officers do not realise this, and so we lose many chances.

One last word : there is one first principle which wants to be widely known and strictly observed by all, but more especially by Staff Officers. It is this : *Don't speak to the C.O. of a battery when his guns are in action, any more than you would speak to the man at the wheel.* They all do it ! and I had to





From a Photograph by Bourne & Shepherd, Simla
GURKHAS--THE RAW MATERIAL.

Between



From a Photograph by Bourne & Shepherd, Simla.
GURKHAS—THE FINISHED ARTICLE.

pages 238 and 239.

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explain firmly to one man who assailed me with suggestions, that with only *four* guns I really could *not* fire at more than *six* different objects at one and the same time !

The GURKHA SCOUTS have been so often mentioned, and have been so much in evidence, during the campaign in Tirah, that a few remarks on their organisation and work will be appreciated. They included a body of about 120 picked men of the 3rd and 5th Gurkha Regiments, under Captain Lucas of the 5th Gurkhas; and Lieutenants, the Honourable C. G. Bruce, 5th Gurkhas, and A. B. Tillard, 3rd Gurkhas, specially trained to work on the steepest hill-sides, and selected for their wiry physique, fleetness of foot, and skill as marksmen. Their careful preparation in peace-time had made them hardy, active, intelligent, self-reliant, and resolute, and throughout the expedition, under the bold leading of their officers, they were conspicuous by their dash and daring, both in attack and defence.

The Scouts wore the uniform of their regiments, and their equipment differed in no respect from that of the regular soldier, except when engaged in night affairs, when they sallied out by themselves to try and stalk, and cut off "snipers," who were harassing the camp—a feat which more than once they successfully accomplished. On these occasions they went barefooted, wore plain clothes, and took with them just their rifles and bayonets, a few rounds of ammunition, and, of course, their knives—the well-

known *kukri*, without which the Gurkha never stirs from his bivouac.

That the special services of these Scouts were appreciated may be inferred from the fact, that at the close of the first phase of the campaign their numbers were increased to 500 men and six officers, at Sir William Lockhart's particular recommendation.¹

At the same time, as the special duties on which they were employed were precisely those which in the Peninsular days could have been undertaken by the "*Light Companies*," which were then kept up in every regiment, and to which it was an honourable distinction to be posted, the question arises whether it would not be a sound thing once more to introduce the "*light company*" into every battalion, and dispense with Scouts. Of course, in these days, one company is theoretically "as good as another, if not better," and all are supposed to be equally trained to the highest pitch of perfection. But the experience gained with these Scouts shows that specially selected men, under specially selected officers, can, under special conditions—the harder the conditions the stronger the argument—"go one better" than the average line company, in which the physique of the men—to deal with one point only—is not equal all

¹ "During the present expedition the Scouts drawn from the 3rd and 5th Gurkhas have proved especially valuable. Being trained mountaineers and accustomed to guerilla warfare, they were able to climb the most precipitous hills, lie in ambush at night, and surpass the tribesmen in their own tactics."—*Sir Wm. Lockhart's Despatches.*

through. And the spirit of emulation is now so much abroad, and is such a powerful incentive in the struggle for distinction, that it seems worth considering whether immense good might not be done, and the fighting power of every battalion substantially increased, by reviving in each the old Light Company, posting to it only picked men and officers, training them highly and specially, and in return granting them some small distinctions and privileges in time of peace, and posts of honour and danger in time of war.

I think many practical soldiers would like to see this idea taken up.

Amid the clash of arms, the hum of camps, the commotion of marches, and the turmoil of retreats, the great Military-Medical Services, British and Indian, are apt to receive scant notice from a chronicler of events, whose attention (naturally, perhaps) is directed rather to the narrative of stirring deeds in the field than to descriptions of the earnest, patient, self-denying work of those whose business it is to bind up wounds and tend the sick. But where so many pages have been devoted to telling the story of the fighting in Tirah, and of the pluck and endurance of the troops in many situations, it is only in accordance with the fitness of things that some reference should also be made to the Medical Department during this arduous campaign, whose work, if it has not been so much

in evidence, or so much noised abroad, as have the stories of frays and forays, and "deeds of derring-do" of the soldiery, has at least entailed on those engaged in it as much toil and exposure, and has been performed with as much zeal and devotion to duty.

Few people, probably, outside the Department, have any conception of the strain and responsibility devolved on the Medical Services, not merely during the continuance and stress of active operations, but also in the preparations necessary before an army is ready to take the field. Here figures may be of use to help the imagination. Twenty-three field hospitals altogether were mobilised for service in Tirah. Each of these could accommodate 100 sick men, and was fully equipped with supplies and comforts for three months. In addition, base hospitals were formed at Rawal Pindi, Nowshera, and Kohat, in which beds were provided for upwards of 3000 men. These figures will give some idea of the scale of the organisation. But the wild, roadless country in which the operations were conducted enormously increased the difficulties with which the Department had to contend in making arrangements for the care and treatment and transport of the wounded and sick. From Bāgh in Tirah to the advanced base at Shinauri is about thirty-five miles by a track traversable only by mules and ponies, or on foot. For these thirty-five miles those who were too ill or too weak to ride, and there were hundreds such, had to be carried in *doolies*

(palanquins) and stretchers, and strongly escorted all the way, for the road throughout was in hostile territory, except the last few miles.

From Shinauri wheeled ambulances were available for seventy-five miles, until the railway was reached at Khusalgarh, whence it was a run of eighty miles to Rawal Pindi.

It may easily be believed that the work of carrying the wounded, and transporting them to the base hospitals, was a very real difficulty. The *dooly* at any time is heavy, cumbrous, and awkward to carry, even on level ground, and when the bearers are trained carriers. But when the roads are steep, stony, and narrow, and crowded with transport and troops, and when the bearers are wretched untrained *coolies*, caught up from the nearest bazaars, and pressed into an unwilling service—then it may be imagined what delays and accidents ensue, and what terrible sufferings must often be endured by the wounded from the jolts, and jars, and drops, that they get *en route*. When an enemy is near, and bullets are whistling around, the *doolies*, with their pale-green flapping canvas covers, form a conspicuous target, and are often hit; the panic-stricken bearers are always ready to drop them, and fly, if they can; and it frequently happened that the wounded, abandoned by the regular carriers, had to be carried by their own comrades. One would much like to see the *dooly* extinguished, but it has been the feature of our ambulance system in India for the

last hundred years, and no one seems to be able to suggest an efficient substitute for it.

But if the *dooly* bearers were bad, the riding and baggage ponies supplied to the hospitals were worse. These are matters for which the Medical Department is not responsible. They take what is given them, and have no choice ; and as the strain on the Commissariat Transport was extraordinary at this time—so many expeditions being on hand simultaneously—the animals supplied to the Field Hospitals in Tirah were of the most wretched description, and were directly the cause of not a little of the delays and losses incurred in marching down the Bāra Valley, as rear-guards and escorts were constantly stopped either to help animals that had fallen and thrown their loads, or to give them time to get along.

Complete reorganisation of the present system of providing ambulance seems an imperative necessity.

923 wounded men were treated in the Field Hospitals in Tirah.¹ Of these the Gordons contributed 70, the Dorsets 80, the K.O.S.Bs. 34, the Northamptons 55, the Derbys 35, the Yorks 42, the 3rd Sikhs 28, the 15th Sikhs 48, the 36th Sikhs 72, the 2nd Gurkhas 66, and the 3rd Gurkhas 40. These were the principal figures. Other corps made up the balance. The proportion of wounded to killed was as 3 to 1. With the Germans in 1870-

¹ Up to the middle of January 1898.

71 it was as 5 to 1. The wounds were inflicted by all sorts of rifles, Lee-Metfords, Martinis, Sniders, and sporting rifles, those by the Snider being the most terrible of all.

One noticeable feature of the medical arrangements which should be recorded was the use for the first time in the field (in India, at all events) of Röntgen rays. They were found of the greatest value in locating bullets and splinters of lead. The apparatus was brought out (entirely at his own expense) and worked by Surgeon-Major Beevor, A.M.S., to whom all the credit of the innovation is due.

Numerous medical officers obtained a well-deserved mention in Despatches, in which also the subjoined passages occurred :—

The officers of the Army Medical Staff, and of the Indian Medical Service, have fully maintained their high reputation by their attention to the sick and wounded, both under fire and in hospital. The hospital arrangements were generally excellent, but I consider that the field equipment is too heavy and elaborate for mountain warfare, and that it might be materially reduced without hardship to the patients. The conspicuous colour of the canvas *doolies* is very objectionable, as it attracts the enemy's fire.

Surgeon-Major-General G. Thomson, C.B., I.M.S., has been my Principal Medical Officer in the field, and I desire to express my indebtedness to him, and to the other officers of the department of which he has been in charge, for the high state of efficiency in which it has been maintained, often under very unfavourable conditions.

The P.M.O. speaks in high terms of his Secretary, Surgeon-Major W. A. Morris, A.M.S.

The Commander-in-Chief in India, in submitting

these Despatches to the Government of India, wrote :—

The administration of the Military-Medical Service has been successfully and satisfactorily carried on during the same period by Surgeon-Major-General A. A. Gore, P.M.O., H.M.'s Forces in India, through whose efforts, and the ready co-operation of officers and subordinates, the Department has, at a time of pressing emergency, been able to comply with the heavy demands made upon it.

The extent of these demands may be best realised from the statement that it was considered necessary to provide hospital accommodation for 12 per cent of troops and followers. On this basis 6526 beds were made available, including 36 $\frac{1}{2}$ ¹ field hospitals. The accuracy of this forecast may be gauged from the fact that on the 20th December 1897 the number of sick in hospital, then at its highest, was 11.16 per cent of the force. The results obtained in the treatment of the sick, and especially in surgical cases of wounds, have been most satisfactory.

¹ Twenty-three of these for Tirah; the remainder for other expeditions.

APPENDIX

THE subjoined summary of casualties incurred during the Tirah Expedition will be of interest.

From the 12th October 1897 to the 6th April 1898

BRITISH OFFICERS

Killed : as per list A 23
 Wounded : as per list B 56

NATIVE OFFICERS

Killed, 4 ; wounded, 16

LIST A

TIRAH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

NOMINAL ROLL OF BRITISH OFFICERS **Killed DURING THE EXPEDITION**

Rank.	Names.	Corps.	Date.
Major .	R. D. Jennings-Bramly .	Gordon Highlanders	18th Oct. 1897
Captain .	W. E. C. Smith .	Derbyshire Regt.	20th "
Lieutenant .	A. Lamont .	Gordon Highlanders	" "
Captain .	C. B. Judge .	2nd Gurkhas .	" "
"	F. R. M'Butts .	No. 5 (Bom.) M. B.	29th "
Lieutenant .	C. L. Giffard .	Northampton Regt.	6th Nov. 1897
Captain .	E. Y. Watson .	D.A. Com.-Genl.	8th "
Lieutenant .	J. T. Waddell .	Northampton Regt.	9th "
2nd Lieut. .	A. H. Macintire .	2 ^o Suffolk Regt. Attached Dorsets }	16th "
Lieutenant .	G. D. Crooke .		" "
"	R. E. A. Hales .	East York Regt.	" "
"	G. M. Wylie .	1/2nd Gurkhas .	" "
"	N. A. Lewarne .	15th Sikhs .	" "
"	D. E. O. Jones .	Yorkshire Regt.	22nd "
"	R. M. Batty .	6th Bengal Cavalry .	1st Dec. 1897
"	G. W. M. West .	1/3rd Gurkhas .	13th "
"	C. R. Tonge .	Royal Engineers .	28th "
Major .	D. W. Hickman .	34th Pioneers .	3rd Jan. 1898
Lieutenant .	M. R. Walker .	York Lt. Infantry .	29th "
"	T. P. Dowdall .	" .	" "
2nd Lieut. .	E. S. G. Hughes .	" .	" "
Lieut.-Col. .	J. Haughton .	36th Sikhs .	" "
Lieutenant .	A. H. Turing .	" .	" "

LIST B

TIRAH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

NOMINAL ROLL OF BRITISH OFFICERS **Wounded** DURING THE EXPEDITION

Rank.	Names.	Corps.	Date.
Lieutenant .	M. L. Pears . . .	Scottish Rifles . . . (attached to Gordon Highlanders)	18th Oct. 1897
Captain .	D. R. Sladen . . .	K. O. Scot. Borderers	," , "
2nd Lieut. .	T. H. Keyes . . .	,"	," , "
Captain .	W. R. Arnold . . .	Dorsetshire Regt. . .	20th , "
," .	J. G. Robinson . . .	1/2nd Gurkhas . . .	," , "
Lieutenant .	G. E. White . . .	3rd Sikhs . . .	," , "
Major .	F. Macbean . . .	Gordon Highlanders	," , "
Lieutenant .	K. Dingwall . . .	,"	," , "
Lieut.-Col. .	H. H. Mathias, C.B.	,"	," , "
Captain .	H. P. Uniacke . . .	,"	," , "
Lieutenant .	M. F. Meiklejohn . . .	,"	," , "
," .	G. S. G. Crauford . . .	,"	," , "
Captain .	F. F. Badcock, D.S.O.	(Staff) 1/5th Gurkhas	25th , "
Lieutenant .	G. D. Crocker . . .	Munster Fusiliers . . .	," , "
Lieut.-Col. .	R. C. Hadow . . .	15th Sikhs . . .	26th , "
," .	C. A. P. Sage . . .	2/1st Gurkhas . . .	28th , "
Major .	R. Hansford-Flood . . .	West Surrey Regt. . .	29th , "
Captain .	C. T. A. Searle . . .	36th Sikhs . . .	31st , "
Lieutenant .	E. G. Caffin . . .	Yorkshire Regt. . .	1st Nov. 1897
Captain .	T. G. MacLaren . . .	K. O. Scot. Borderers	," , "
," .	E. L. Sullivan . . .	36th Sikhs . . .	6th , "
Lieutenant .	O. P. S. Ingham . . .	Dorsetshire Regt. . .	9th , "
," .	A. A. Mercer . . .	,"	," , "
," .	G. A. Trent . . .	Northampton Regt. . .	," , "
," .	G. E. G. Cameron . . .	Gordon Highlanders	10th , "
2nd Lieut. .	W. D. Wright . . .	West Surrey Regt. . .	11th , "
Captain .	J. H. Bowman . . .	Derbyshire Regt. . .	13th , "
Major .	G. A. Money . . .	18th Bengal Lancers	," , "
Captain .	H. L. Custance . . .	36th Sikhs . . .	16th , "
Lieutenant .	R. G. Munn . . .	,"	," , "
Lieut.-Col. .	H. A. Abbott . . .	15th Sikhs . . .	," , "

LIST B—*Continued*

Rank.	Name.	Corps.	Date.
2nd Lieut.	O. C. S. Watson	Yorkshire Regt.	22nd Nov. 1897
Captain	W. E. Venour	5th Punj. Infantry (attached to 36th Sikhs)	24th "
Lieutenant	B. C. W. Williams	Yorkshire Regt.	29th "
"	F. O. Wyatt	R.A.	" Dec. 1897
"	W. H. Pennington	6th Bengal Cavalry	1st Dec. 1897
"	W. D. Villiers-Stuart	1/5th Gurkhas	" "
Major	E. Vansittart	"	" "
Lieutenant	R. Fowke	Dorsetshire Regt.	10th "
Captain	C. E. Norie	1/2nd Gurkhas	11th "
Lieutenant	W. de L. Williams	Assistant Transport Officer	" "
Captain	A. Bateman-Champain	1/3rd Gurkhas	13th "
"	F. de Saussmarez-Shortt	Scots Fusiliers	" "
Lieutenant	S. de V. A. Julius	Sussex Regt.	27th "
Lieut.-Col.	F. Plowden	Oxford Lt. Infantry	30th "
Captain	C. Parr	"	" "
Lieutenant	R. Owen	R.H.A.	1st Jan. 1898 (since dead)
"	H. D. Hammond	"	" "
Captain	F. G. Bond	R.E.	" "
Major	H. Earle, D.S.O.	York Lt. Infantry	29th "
Captain	A. G. Marable	"	" "
2nd Lieut.	G. C. W. G. Hall	"	" "
"	D. S. Browne	36th Sikhs	31st "
Surg.-Lieut.	M. Dick	"	" "
2nd Lieut.	H. J. de la Condamine	D. of C. Lt. Infantry	11th Mar. 1898
Captain	E. W. Margesson	Norfolk Regt.	26th "


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